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The¡¡American¡¡legislators¡¡therefore¡¡agreed¡¡to¡¡create¡¡a¡¡federal¡¡judiciary¡¡power¡¡to¡¡apply¡¡the¡¡laws¡¡of¡¡the¡¡Union£»¡¡and¡¡to¡¡determine¡¡certain¡¡questions¡¡affecting¡¡general¡¡interests£»¡¡which¡¡were¡¡carefully¡¡determined¡¡beforehand¡£¡¡¡¡The¡¡entire¡¡judicial¡¡power¡¡of¡¡the¡¡Union¡¡was¡¡centred¡¡in¡¡one¡¡tribunal£»¡¡which¡¡was¡¡denominated¡¡the¡¡Supreme¡¡Court¡¡of¡¡the¡¡United¡¡States¡£¡¡¡¡But£»¡¡to¡¡facilitate¡¡the¡¡expedition¡¡of¡¡business£»¡¡inferior¡¡courts¡¡were¡¡appended¡¡to¡¡it£»¡¡which¡¡were¡¡empowered¡¡to¡¡decide¡¡causes¡¡of¡¡small¡¡importance¡¡without¡¡appeal£»¡¡and¡¡with¡¡appeal¡¡causes¡¡of¡¡more¡¡magnitude¡£¡¡¡¡The¡¡members¡¡of¡¡the¡¡Supreme¡¡Court¡¡are¡¡named¡¡neither¡¡by¡¡the¡¡people¡¡nor¡¡the¡¡legislature£»¡¡but¡¡by¡¡the¡¡President¡¡of¡¡the¡¡United¡¡States£»¡¡acting¡¡with¡¡the¡¡advice¡¡of¡¡the¡¡Senate¡£¡¡¡¡In¡¡order¡¡to¡¡render¡¡them¡¡independent¡¡of¡¡the¡¡other¡¡authorities£»¡¡their¡¡office¡¡was¡¡made¡¡inalienable£»¡¡and¡¡it¡¡was¡¡determined¡¡that¡¡their¡¡salary£»¡¡when¡¡once¡¡fixed£»¡¡should¡¡not¡¡be¡¡altered¡¡by¡¡the¡¡legislature¡£¡¡*d¡¡It¡¡was¡¡easy¡¡to¡¡proclaim¡¡the¡¡principle¡¡of¡¡a¡¡Federal¡¡judiciary£»¡¡but¡¡difficulties¡¡multiplied¡¡when¡¡the¡¡extent¡¡of¡¡its¡¡jurisdiction¡¡was¡¡to¡¡be¡¡determined¡£

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It¡¡will¡¡be¡¡observed¡¡that¡¡no¡¡analogy¡¡exists¡¡between¡¡the¡¡Supreme¡¡Court¡¡of¡¡the¡¡United¡¡States¡¡and¡¡the¡¡French¡¡Cour¡¡de¡¡Cassation£»¡¡since¡¡the¡¡latter¡¡only¡¡hears¡¡appeals¡¡on¡¡questions¡¡of¡¡law¡£¡¡¡¡The¡¡Supreme¡¡Court¡¡decides¡¡upon¡¡the¡¡evidence¡¡of¡¡the¡¡fact¡¡as¡¡well¡¡as¡¡upon¡¡the¡¡law¡¡of¡¡the¡¡case£»¡¡whereas¡¡the¡¡Cour¡¡de¡¡Cassation¡¡does¡¡not¡¡pronounce¡¡a¡¡decision¡¡of¡¡its¡¡own£»¡¡but¡¡refers¡¡the¡¡cause¡¡to¡¡the¡¡arbitration¡¡of¡¡another¡¡tribunal¡£¡¡¡¡See¡¡the¡¡law¡¡of¡¡September¡¡24£»¡¡1789£»¡¡¡¨Laws¡¡of¡¡the¡¡United¡¡States£»¡¨¡¡by¡¡Story£»¡¡vol¡£¡¡i¡£¡¡p¡£¡¡53¡££§

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