by the moral law； so frequent practice in accordance with this
principle of determination can； at least； produce subjectively a
feeling of satisfaction； on the contrary； it is a duty to establish
and to cultivate this； which alone deserves to be called properly
the moral feeling； but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it；
else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such； and thus
make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the
reason； and this； if it is not to be a flat contradiction； would
destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play
of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser。
If now we pare our formal supreme principle of pure practical
reason （that of autonomy of the will） with all previous material
principles of morality； we can exhibit them all in a table in which
all possible cases are exhausted； except the one formal principle； and
thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other
principle than that now proposed。 In fact all possible principles of
determination of the will are either merely subjective； and
therefore empirical； or are also objective and rational； and both
are either external or internal。
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the
Foundation of Morality； are：
SUBJECTIVE。
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Education Physical feeling
（Montaigne） （Epicurus）
The civil Moral feeling
Constitution （Hutcheson）
（Mandeville）
OBJECTIVE。
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
Perfection Will of God
（Wolf and the （Crusius and other
Stoics） theological Moralists）
Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable
of furnishing the universal principle of morality； but those in the
lower table are based on reason （for perfection as a quality of
things； and the highest perfection conceived as substance； that is；
God； can only be thought by means of rational concepts）。 But the
former notion； namely； that of perfection； may either be taken in a
theoretic signification； and then it means nothing but the
pleteness of each thing in its own kind （transcendental）； or that
of a thing merely as a thing （metaphysical）； and with that we are
not concerned here。 But the notion of perfection in a practical
sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of
purposes。 This perfection； as a quality of man and consequently
internal； is nothing but talent and； what strengthens or pletes
this； skill。 Supreme perfection conceived as substance； that is God；
and consequently external （considered practically）； is the sufficiency
of this being for all ends。 Ends then must first be given；
relatively to which only can the notion of perfection （whether
internal in ourselves or external in God） be the determining principle
of the will。 But an end… being an object which must precede the
determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground
of the possibility of this determination； and therefore contain also
the matter of the will； taken as its determining principle… such an
end is always empirical and； therefore； may serve for the Epicurean
principle of the happiness theory； but not for the pure rational
principle of morality and duty。 Thus； talents and the improvement of
them； because they contribute to the advantages of life； or the will
of God； if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will；
without any antecedent independent practical principle； can be motives
only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom。 Hence it
follows； first； that all the principles here stated are material；
secondly； that they include all possible material principles； and；
finally； the conclusion； that since material principles are quite
incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law （as has been shown）； the
formal practical principle the pure reason （according to which the
mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and
immediate determining principle of the will） is the only one
possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives； that
is； practical laws （which make actions a duty）； and in general to
serve as the principle of morality； both in criticizing conduct and
also in its application to the human will to determine it。
I。 Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure
Practical Reason。
This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical； that is；
can of itself determine the will independently of anything
empirical； and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us
proves itself actually practical； namely； the autonomy shown in the
fundamental principle of morality； by which reason determines the will
to action。
It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected
with the consciousness of freedom of the will； nay； is identical
with it； and by this the will of a rational being； although as
belonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself as necessarily
subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes； yet；
at the same time； on another side； namely； as a being in itself； is
conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order
of things； conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself；
but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its
causality in the sensible world； for it has been elsewhere proved that
if freedom is predicated of us； it transports us into an
intelligible order of things。
Now； if we pare with this the analytical part of the critique
of pure speculative reason； we shall see a remarkable contrast。
There it was not fundamental principles； but pure； sensible
intuition （space and time）； that was the first datum that made a
priori knowledge possible； though only of objects of the senses。
Synthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without
intuition； on the contrary； they could only exist with reference to
this intuition； and therefore to objects of possible experience； since
it is the concepts of the understanding； united with this intuition；
which alone make that knowledge possible which we call experience。
Beyond objects of experience； and therefore with regard to things as
noumena； all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative
reason。 This reason； however； went so far as to establish with
certainty the concept of noumena； that is； the possibility； nay； the
necessity； of thinking them； for example； it showed against all
objections that the supposition of freedom； negatively considered； was
quite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure
theoretic reason。 But it could not give us any definite enlargement of
our knowledge with respect to such objects； but； on the contrary；
cut off all view of them altogether。
On the other hand； the moral law； although it gives no view； yet
gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the
sensible world； and the whole pass of our theoretical use of
reason； a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding； nay；
even defines it positively and enables us to know something of it；
namely； a law。
This law （as far as rational beings are concerned） gives to the
world of sense； which is a sensible system of nature； the form of a
world of the understanding； that is； of a supersensible system of
nature； without interfering with its mechanism。 Now； a system of
nature； in the most general sense； is the existence of things under
laws。 The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their
existence under laws empirically conditioned； which； from the point of
view of reason； is heteronomy。 The supersensible nature of the same
beings； on the other hand； is their existence according to laws
which are independent of every empirical condition and； therefore；
belong to the autonomy of pure reason。 And； since the laws by which
the existence of things depends on cognition are practical；
supersensible nature； so far as we can form any notion of it； is
nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure
practical reason。 Now； the law of this autonomy is the moral law；
which； therefore； is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature；
and of a pure world of understanding； whose counterpart must exist
in the world of sense； but without interfering with its laws。 We might
call the former the archetypal world （natura archetypa）； which we only
know in the reason； and the latter the ectypal world （natura
ectypa）； because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the
former which is the determining principle of the will。 For the moral
law； in fact； transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason；
if it were acpanied with adequate physical power； would produce the
summum bonum； and it determines our will to give the sensible world
the form of a system of rational beings。
The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves
as the model for the determination