moral law gives merely a mand； and to doubt the possibility of that
element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself。
But as regards the second element of that object； namely； happiness
perfectly proportioned to that worthiness； it is true that there is no
need of a mand to admit its possibility in general； for theoretical
reason has nothing to say against it； but the manner in which we
have to conceive this harmony of the laws of nature with those of
freedom has in it something in respect of which we have a choice；
because theoretical reason decides nothing with apodeictic certainty
about it； and in respect of this there may be a moral interest which
turns the scale。
I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an
accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be
expected and must be regarded as impossible； and that therefore the
possibility of the summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side
except on the supposition of a moral Author of the world。 I
purposely reserved the restriction of this judgement to the subjective
conditions of our reason； in order not to make use of it until the
manner of this belief should be defined more precisely。 The fact is
that the impossibility referred to is merely subjective； that is；
our reason finds it impossible for it to render conceivable in the way
of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly proportioned and so
thoroughly adapted to an end； between two sets of events happening
according to such distinct laws； although； as with everything else
in nature that is adapted to an end； it cannot prove； that is； show by
sufficient objective reason； that it is not possible by universal laws
of nature。
Now； however； a deciding principle of a different kind es into
play to turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason。
The mand to promote the summum bonum is established on an objective
basis （in practical reason）； the possibility of the same in general is
likewise established on an objective basis （in theoretical reason；
which has nothing to say against it）。 But reason cannot decide
objectively in what way we are to conceive this possibility； whether
by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over
nature； or only on supposition of such an Author。 Now here there es
in a subjective condition of reason； the only way theoretically
possible for it； of conceiving the exact harmony of the kingdom of
nature with the kingdom of morals； which is the condition of the
possibility of the summum bonum； and at the same time the only one
conducive to morality （which depends on an objective law of reason）。
Now since the promotion of this summum bonum； and therefore the
supposition of its possibility； are objectively necessary （though only
as a result of practical reason）； while at the same time the manner in
which we would conceive it rests with our own choice； and in this
choice a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the
assumption of a wise Author of the world； it is clear that the
principle that herein determines our judgement； though as a want it is
subjective； yet at the same time being the means of promoting what
is objectively （practically） necessary； is the foundation of a maxim
of belief in a moral point of view； that is； a faith of pure practical
reason。 This； then； is not manded； but being a voluntary
determination of our judgement； conducive to the moral （manded）
purpose； and moreover harmonizing with the theoretical requirement
of reason； to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of
our further employment of reason； it has itself sprung from the
moral disposition of mind； it may therefore at times waver even in the
well…disposed； but can never be reduced to unbelief。
IX。 Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties
to his Practical Destination。
If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum；
we must suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties；
and particularly their relation to one another； is suitable to this
end。 Now the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is
incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are
proposed to it； although it does not ignore the natural and
important hints received from the same reason； nor the great steps
that it can make to approach to this great goal that is set before it；
which； however； it can never reach of itself； even with the help of
the greatest knowledge of nature。 Nature then seems here to have
provided us only in a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty required
for our end。
Suppose； now； that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish
and had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment
which we would gladly possess； or which some imagine they actually
possess； what would in all probability be the consequence？ Unless
our whole nature were at the same time changed； our inclinations；
which always have the first word； would first of all demand their
own satisfaction； and； joined with rational reflection； the greatest
possible and most lasting satisfaction； under the name of happiness；
the moral law would afterwards speak； in order to keep them within
their proper bounds； and even to subject them all to a higher end；
which has no regard to inclination。 But instead of the conflict that
the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations； in
which； though after some defeats； moral strength of mind may be
gradually acquired； God and eternity with their awful majesty would
stand unceasingly before our eyes （for what we can prove perfectly
is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of
our eyes）。 Transgression of the law； would； no doubt； be avoided； what
is manded would be done； but the mental disposition； from which
actions ought to proceed； cannot be infused by any mand； and in
this case the spur of action is ever active and external； so that
reason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to
resist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of
the law： hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would
be done from fear； a few only from hope； and none at all from duty；
and the moral worth of actions； on which alone in the eyes of
supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world
depends； would cease to exist。 As long as the nature of man remains
what it is； his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism；
in which； as in a puppet…show； everything would gesticulate well；
but there would be no life in the figures。 Now； when it is quite
otherwise with us； when with all the effort of our reason we have only
a very obscure and doubtful view into the future； when the Governor of
the world allows us only to conjecture his existence and his
majesty； not to behold them or prove them clearly； and on the other
hand； the moral law within us； without promising or threatening
anything with certainty； demands of us disinterested respect； and only
when this respect has bee active and dominant； does it allow us
by means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible； and
then only with weak glances： all this being so； there is room for true
moral disposition； immediately devoted to the law； and a rational
creature can bee worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that
corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his
actions。 Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us
sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also； that the
unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration
in what it has denied than in what it has granted。
SECOND PART。
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason。
By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand
the mode of proceeding with pure practical principles （whether in
study or in exposition）； with a view to a scientific knowledge of
them； which alone is what is properly called method elsewhere in
theoretical philosophy （for popular knowledge requires a manner；
science a method； i。e。； a process according to principles of reason by
which alone the manifold of any branch of knowledge can bee a
system）。 On the contrary； by this methodology is understood the mode
in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the
human mind and influence on its maxims； that is； by which we can
make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also。
Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will
which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth；
namely； the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity
of obeying it as our duty； must be regarded as the proper springs of
actions； since otherwise legality of actions might be produced； but
not morality of character。 But it is not so clear； on the contrary； it
must at first sight seem to every one very improbable that even
subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over
the human mind； and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting
that legality of actions； and can produce