inclination）； it is really a higher desire to which that which is
pathologically determined is subordinate； and is really； and even
specifically； distinct from the latter； so that even the slightest
admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and
superiority； just as in a mathematical demonstration the least
empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value。
Reason； with its practical law； determines the will immediately； not
by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain； not even of
pleasure in the law itself； and it is only because it can； as pure
reason； be practical； that it is possible for it to be legislative。
REMARK II。
To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational
being； and this； therefore； is inevitably a determining principle of
its faculty of desire。 For we are not in possession originally of
satisfaction with our whole existence… a bliss which would imply a
consciousness of our own independent self…sufficiency this is a
problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature； because we have
wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires； that is；
something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or
pain； which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with
our condition。 But just because this material principle of
determination can only be empirically known by the subject； it is
impossible to regard this problem as a law； for a law being
objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the
will in all cases and for all rational beings。 For； although the
notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical
relation of the objects to the desires； yet it is only a general
name for the subjective determining principles； and determines nothing
specifically； whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this
practical problem； which cannot be solved at all without such specific
determination。 For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure
and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness； and even
in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants
according as this feeling changes； and thus a law which is
subjectively necessary （as a law of nature） is objectively a very
contingent practical principle； which can and must be very different
in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law； since； in
the desire for happiness it is not the form （of conformity to law）
that is decisive； but simply the matter； namely； whether I am to
expect pleasure in following the law； and how much。 Principles of
self…love may； indeed； contain universal precepts of skill （how to
find means to acplish one's purpose）； but in that case they are
merely theoretical principles；* as； for example； how he who would like
to eat bread should contrive a mill； but practical precepts founded on
them can never be universal； for the determining principle of the
desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain； which can never be
supposed to be universally directed to the same objects。
*Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical
ought properly to be called technical。 For they For they have
nothing to do with the determination of the theoretical they only
point out how the certain must is to be produced and are； therefore；
just as theoretical as any propositions which express the connection
of a cause with an effect。 Now whoever chooses the effect must also
choose the cause。
Even supposing； however； that all finite rational beings were
thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of
pleasure and pain； and also as to the means which they must employ
to attain the one and avoid the other； still； they could by no means
set up the principle of self…love as a practical law； for this
unanimity itself would be only contingent。 The principle of
determination would still be only subjectively valid and merely
empirical； and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in
every law； namely； an objective necessity arising from a priori
grounds； unless； indeed； we hold this necessity to be not at all
practical； but merely physical； viz。； that our action is as inevitably
determined by our inclination； as yawning when we see others yawn。
It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at
all； but only counsels for the service of our desires； than to raise
merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws； which have
objective necessity； and not merely subjective； and which must be
known by reason a priori； not by experience （however empirically
universal this may be）。 Even the rules of corresponding phenomena
are only called laws of nature （e。g。； the mechanical laws）； when we
either know them really a priori； or （as in the case of chemical laws）
suppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if
our insight reached further。 But in the case of merely subjective
practical principles； it is expressly made a condition that they rest；
not on objective； but on subjective conditions of choice； and hence
that they must always be represented as mere maxims； never as
practical laws。 This second remark seems at first sight to be mere
verbal refinement； but it defines the terms of the most important
distinction which can e into consideration in practical
investigations。
IV。 THEOREM II。
A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal
laws； unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will；
not by their matter； but by their form only。
By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the
will。 This object is either the determining ground of the will or it
is not。 In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an
empirical condition （viz。； the relation of the determining idea to the
feeling of pleasure and pain）； consequently it can not be a
practical law。 Now； when we abstract from a law all matter； i。e。；
every object of the will （as a determining principle）； nothing is left
but the mere form of a universal legislation。 Therefore； either a
rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles；
that is； his maxims； as being at the same time universal laws； or he
must suppose that their mere form； by which they are fitted for
universal legislation； is alone what makes them practical laws。
REMARK。
The monest understanding can distinguish without instruction what
form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation； and what is not。
Suppose； for example； that I have made it my maxim to increase my
fortune by every safe means。 Now； I have a deposit in my hands； the
owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it。 This is
just the case for my maxim。 I desire then to know whether that maxim
can also bold good as a universal practical law。 I apply it；
therefore； to the present case； and ask whether it could take the form
of a law； and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same
time give such a law as this； that everyone may deny a deposit of
which no one can produce a proof。 I at once bee aware that such a
principle； viewed as a law； would annihilate itself； because the
result would be that there would be no deposits。 A practical law which
I recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation；
this is an identical proposition and； therefore； self…evident。 Now； if
I say that my will is subject to a practical law； I cannot adduce my
inclination （e。g。； in the present case my avarice） as a principle of
determination fitted to be a universal practical law； for this is so
far from being fitted for a universal legislation that； if put in
the form of a universal law； it would destroy itself。
It is； therefore； surprising that intelligent men could have thought
of calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the
ground that the desire is universal； and； therefore； also the maxim by
which everyone makes this desire determine his will。 For whereas in
other cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious；
here； on the contrary； if we attribute to the maxim the universality
of a law； the extreme opposite of harmony will follow； the greatest
opposition and the plete destruction of the maxim itself and its
purpose。 For； in that case； the will of all has not one and the same
object； but everyone has his own （his private welfare）； which may
accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally
selfish； but it is far from sufficing for a law； because the
occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless；
and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule。 In this
manner； then； results a harmony like that which a certain satirical
poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to
ruin； 〃O； marvellous harmony； what he wishes； she wishes also〃； or
like what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V；
〃What my brother Charles wishes that I wish also〃 （viz。； Milan）。
Empirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal
external legislation； but just as little