the critique of practical reason- 第11部分

uld　even　be　adapted　to　a　system　so　constituted；　on　the　contrary；　its　maxims　are　private　inclinations　which　constitute；　indeed；　a　natural　whole　in　conformity　with　pathological　（physical）　laws；　but　could　not　form　part　of　a　system　of　nature；　which　would　only　be　possible　through　our　will　acting　in　accordance　with　pure　practical　laws。　Yet　we　are；　through　reason；　conscious　of　a　law　to　which　all　our　maxims　are　subject；　as　though　a　natural　order　must　be　originated　from　our　will。　This　law；　therefore；　must　be　the　idea　of　a　natural　system　not　given　in　experience；　and　yet　possible　through　freedom；　a　system；　therefore；　which　is　supersensible；　and　to　which　we　give　objective　reality；　at　least　in　a　practical　point　of　view；　since　we　look　on　it　as　an　object　of　our　will　as　pure　rational　beings。　　　Hence　the　distinction　between　the　laws　of　a　natural　system　to　which　the　will　is　subject；　and　of　a　natural　system　which　is　subject　to　a　will　（as　far　as　its　relation　to　its　free　actions　is　concerned）；　rests　on　this；　that　in　the　former　the　objects　must　be　causes　of　the　ideas　which　determine　the　will；　whereas　in　the　latter　the　will　is　the　cause　of　the　objects；　so　that　its　causality　has　its　determining　principle　solely　in　the　pure　faculty　of　reason；　which　may　therefore　be　called　a　pure　practical　reason。　　　There　are　therefore　two　very　distinct　problems：　how；　on　the　one　side；　pure　reason　can　cognise　objects　a　priori；　and　how　on　the　other　side　it　can　be　an　immediate　determining　principle　of　the　will；　that　is；　of　the　causality　of　the　rational　being　with　respect　to　the　reality　of　objects　（through　the　mere　thought　of　the　universal　validity　of　its　own　maxims　as　laws）。　　　The　former；　which　belongs　to　the　critique　of　the　pure　speculative　reason；　requires　a　previous　explanation；　how　intuitions　without　which　no　object　can　be　given；　and；　therefore；　none　known　synthetically；　are　possible　a　priori；　and　its　solution　turns　out　to　be　that　these　are　all　only　sensible　and；　therefore；　do　not　render　possible　any　speculative　knowledge　which　goes　further　than　possible　experience　reaches；　and　that　therefore　all　the　principles　of　that　pure　speculative　reason　avail　only　to　make　experience　possible；　either　experience　of　given　objects　or　of　those　that　may　be　given　ad　infinitum；　but　never　are　completely　given。　　　The　latter；　which　belongs　to　the　critique　of　practical　reason；　requires　no　explanation　how　the　objects　of　the　faculty　of　desire　are　possible；　for　that　being　a　problem　of　the　theoretical　knowledge　of　nature　is　left　to　the　critique　of　the　speculative　reason；　but　only　how　reason　can　determine　the　maxims　of　the　will；　whether　this　takes　place　only　by　means　of　empirical　ideas　as　principles　of　determination；　or　whether　pure　reason　can　be　practical　and　be　the　law　of　a　possible　order　of　nature；　which　is　not　empirically　knowable。　The　possibility　of　such　a　supersensible　system　of　nature；　the　conception　of　which　can　also　be　the　ground　of　its　reality　through　our　own　free　will；　does　not　require　any　a　priori　intuition　（of　an　intelligible　world）　which；　being　in　this　case　supersensible；　would　be　impossible　for　us。　For　the　question　is　only　as　to　the　determining　principle　of　volition　in　its　maxims；　namely；　whether　it　is　empirical；　or　is　a　conception　of　the　pure　reason　（having　the　legal　character　belonging　to　it　in　general）；　and　how　it　can　be　the　latter。　It　is　left　to　the　theoretic　principles　of　reason　to　decide　whether　the　causality　of　the　will　suffices　for　the　realization　of　the　objects　or　not；　this　being　an　inquiry　into　the　possibility　of　the　objects　of　the　volition。　Intuition　of　these　objects　is　therefore　of　no　importance　to　the　practical　problem。　We　are　here　concerned　only　with　the　determination　of　the　will　and　the　determining　principles　of　its　maxims　as　a　free　will；　not　at　all　with　the　result。　For；　provided　only　that　the　will　conforms　to　the　law　of　pure　reason；　then　let　its　power　in　execution　be　what　it　may；　whether　according　to　these　maxims　of　legislation　of　a　possible　system　of　nature　any　such　system　really　results　or　not；　this　is　no　concern　of　the　critique；　which　only　inquires　whether；　and　in　what　way；　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　that　is　directly　determine　the　will。　　　In　this　inquiry　criticism　may　and　must　begin　with　pure　practical　laws　and　their　reality。　But　instead　of　intuition　it　takes　as　their　foundation　the　conception　of　their　existence　in　the　intelligible　world；　namely；　the　concept　of　freedom。　For　this　concept　has　no　other　meaning；　and　these　laws　are　only　possible　in　relation　to　freedom　of　the　will；　but　freedom　being　supposed；　they　are　necessary；　or　conversely　freedom　is　necessary　because　those　laws　are　necessary；　being　practical　postulates。　It　cannot　be　further　explained　how　this　consciousness　of　the　moral　law；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　of　freedom；　is　possible；　but　that　it　is　admissible　is　well　established　in　the　theoretical　critique。　　　The　exposition　of　the　supreme　principle　of　practical　reason　is　now　finished；　that　is　to　say；　it　has　been…　shown　first；　what　it　contains；　that　it　subsists　for　itself　quite　a　priori　and　independent　of　empirical　principles；　and　next　in　what　it　is　distinguished　from　all　other　practical　principles。　With　the　deduction；　that　is；　the　justification　of　its　objective　and　universal　validity；　and　the　discernment　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　synthetical　proposition　a　priori；　we　cannot　expect　to　succeed　so　well　as　in　the　case　of　the　principles　of　pure　theoretical　reason。　For　these　referred　to　objects　of　possible　experience；　namely；　to　phenomena；　and　we　could　prove　that　these　phenomena　could　be　known　as　objects　of　experience　only　by　being　brought　under　the　categories　in　accordance　with　these　laws；　and　consequently　that　all　possible　experience　must　conform　to　these　laws。　But　I　could　not　proceed　in　this　way　with　the　deduction　of　the　moral　law。　For　this　does　not　concern　the　knowledge　of　the　properties　of　objects；　which　may　be　given　to　the　reason　from　some　other　source；　but　a　knowledge　which　can　itself　be　the　ground　of　the　existence　of　the　objects；　and　by　which　reason　in　a　rational　being　has　causality；　i。e。；　pure　reason；　which　can　be　regarded　as　a　faculty　immediately　determining　the　will。　　　Now　all　our　human　insight　is　at　an　end　as　soon　as　we　have　arrived　at　fundamental　powers　or　faculties；　for　the　possibility　of　these　cannot　be　understood　by　any　means；　and　just　as　little　should　it　be　arbitrarily　invented　and　assumed。　Therefore；　in　the　theoretic　use　of　reason；　it　is　experience　alone　that　can　justify　us　in　assuming　them。　But　this　expedient　of　adducing　empirical　proofs；　instead　of　a　deduction　from　a　priori　sources　of　knowledge；　is　denied　us　here　in　respect　to　the　pure　practical　faculty　of　reason。　For　whatever　requires　to　draw　the　proof　of　its　reality　from　experience　must　depend　for　the　grounds　of　its　possibility　on　principles　of　experience；　and　pure；　yet　practical；　reason　by　its　very　notion　cannot　be　regarded　as　such。　Further；　the　moral　law　is　given　as　a　fact　of　pure　reason　of　which　we　are　a　priori　conscious；　and　which　is　apodeictically　certain；　though　it　be　granted　that　in　experience　no　example　of　its　exact　fulfilment　can　be　found。　Hence；　the　objective　reality　of　the　moral　law　cannot　be　proved　by　any　deduction　by　any　efforts　of　theoretical　reason；　whether　speculative　or　empirically　supported；　and　therefore；　even　if　we　renounced　its　apodeictic　certainty；　it　could　not　be　proved　a　posteriori　by　experience；　and　yet　it　is　firmly　established　of　itself。　　　But　instead　of　this　vainly　sought　deduction　of　the　moral　principle；　something　else　is　found　which　was　quite　unexpected；　namely；　that　this　moral　principle　serves　conversely　as　the　principle　of　the　deduction　of　an　inscrutable　faculty　which　no　experience　could　prove；　but　of　which　speculative　reason　was　compelled　at　least　to　assume　the　possibility　（in　order　to　find　amongst　its　cosmological　ideas　the　unconditioned　in　the　chain　of　causality；　so　as　not　to　contradict　itself）…　I　mean　the　faculty　of　freedom。　The　moral　law；　which　itself　does　not　require　a　justification；　proves　not　merely　the　possibility　of　freedom；　but　that　it　really　belongs　to　beings　who　recognize　this　law　as　binding　on　themselves。　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　a　law　of　the　causality　of　free　agents　and；　therefore；　of　the　possibility　of　a　supersensible　system　of　nature；　just　as　the　metaphysical　law　of　events　in　the　world　of　sense　was　a　law　of　causality　of　the　sensible　system　of　nature；　and　it　therefore　determines　what　speculative　philosophy　was　compelled　to　leave　undetermined；　namely；　the　law　for　a　causality；　the　concept　of　which　in　the　latter　was　only　negative；　and　therefore　for　the　first　time　gives　this　concept　objective　reality。　　　This　sort　of　credential　of　the　moral　law；　viz。；　that　it　is　set　forth　as　a　principle　of　the　deduction　of　freedom；　which　is　a　causality　of　pure　reason；　is　a　sufficient　substitute　for　all　a　priori　justification；　since　theoretic　reason　was　compelled　to　assume　at　least　the　possibility　of　freedom；　in　order　to　satisfy　a　want　of　its　own。　For　the　moral　law　proves　its　reality；　so　as　even　to　satisfy　the　critique　of　the　speculative　reason；　by　the　fact　that　it　adds　a　positive　definition　to　a　causality　previously　conceived　only　negatively；　the　possibility　of　which　was　incomprehensible　to　speculative　reason；　which　yet　was　compelled　to　suppose　it。　For　it　adds　the　notion