the critique of practical reason- 第25部分

tify　some　judgements　which　we　passed　with　all　conscientiousness；　and　which　yet　at　first　sight　seem　quite　opposed　to　all　equity。　There　are　cases　in　which　men；　even　with　the　same　education　which　has　been　profitable　to　others；　yet　show　such　early　depravity；　and　so　continue　to　progress　in　it　to　years　of　manhood；　that　they　are　thought　to　be　born　villains；　and　their　character　altogether　incapable　of　improvement；　and　nevertheless　they　are　judged　for　what　they　do　or　leave　undone；　they　are　reproached　for　their　faults　as　guilty；　nay；　they　themselves　（the　children）　regard　these　reproaches　as　well　founded；　exactly　as　if　in　spite　of　the　hopeless　natural　quality　of　mind　ascribed　to　them；　they　remained　just　as　responsible　as　any　other　man。　This　could　not　happen　if　we　did　not　suppose　that　whatever　springs　from　a　man's　choice　（as　every　action　intentionally　performed　undoubtedly　does）　has　as　its　foundation　a　free　causality；　which　from　early　youth　expresses　its　character　in　its　manifestations　（i。e。；　actions）。　These；　on　account　of　the　uniformity　of　conduct；　exhibit　a　natural　connection；　which　however　does　not　make　the　vicious　quality　of　the　will　necessary；　but　on　the　contrary；　is　the　consequence　of　the　evil　principles　voluntarily　adopted　and　unchangeable；　which　only　make　it　so　much　the　more　culpable　and　deserving　of　punishment。　There　still　remains　a　difficulty　in　the　combination　of　freedom　with　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　a　being　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　a　difficulty　which；　even　after　all　the　foregoing　is　admitted；　threatens　freedom　with　complete　destruction。　But　with　this　danger　there　is　also　a　circumstance　that　offers　hope　of　an　issue　still　favourable　to　freedom；　namely；　that　the　same　difficulty　presses　much　more　strongly　（in　fact　as　we　shall　presently　see；　presses　only）　on　the　system　that　holds　the　existence　determinable　in　time　and　space　to　be　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves；　it　does　not　therefore　oblige　us　to　give　up　our　capital　supposition　of　the　ideality　of　time　as　a　mere　form　of　sensible　intuition；　and　consequently　as　a　mere　manner　of　representation　which　is　proper　to　the　subject　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　and　therefore　it　only　requires　that　this　view　be　reconciled　with　this　idea。　　　The　difficulty　is　as　follows：　Even　if　it　is　admitted　that　the　supersensible　subject　can　be　free　with　respect　to　a　given　action；　although；　as　a　subject　also　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　he　is　under　mechanical　conditions　with　respect　to　the　same　action；　still；　as　soon　as　we　allow　that　God　as　universal　first　cause　is　also　the　cause　of　the　existence　of　substance　（a　proposition　which　can　never　be　given　up　without　at　the　same　time　giving　up　the　notion　of　God　as　the　Being　of　all　beings；　and　therewith　giving　up　his　all　sufficiency；　on　which　everything　in　theology　depends）；　it　seems　as　if　we　must　admit　that　a　man's　actions　have　their　determining　principle　in　something　which　is　wholly　out　of　his　power…　namely；　in　the　causality　of　a　Supreme　Being　distinct　from　himself　and　on　whom　his　own　existence　and　the　whole　determination　of　his　causality　are　absolutely　dependent。　In　point　of　fact；　if　a　man's　actions　as　belonging　to　his　modifications　in　time　were　not　merely　modifications　of　him　as　appearance；　but　as　a　thing　in　itself；　freedom　could　not　be　saved。　Man　would　be　a　marionette　or　an　automaton；　like　Vaucanson's；　prepared　and　wound　up　by　the　Supreme　Artist。　Self…consciousness　would　indeed　make　him　a　thinking　automaton；　but　the　consciousness　of　his　own　spontaneity　would　be　mere　delusion　if　this　were　mistaken　for　freedom；　and　it　would　deserve　this　name　only　in　a　comparative　sense；　since；　although　the　proximate　determining　causes　of　its　motion　and　a　long　series　of　their　determining　causes　are　internal；　yet　the　last　and　highest　is　found　in　a　foreign　hand。　Therefore　I　do　not　see　how　those　who　still　insist　on　regarding　time　and　space　as　attributes　belonging　to　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves；　can　avoid　admitting　the　fatality　of　actions；　or　if　（like　the　otherwise　acute　Mendelssohn）　they　allow　them　to　be　conditions　necessarily　belonging　to　the　existence　of　finite　and　derived　beings；　but　not　to　that　of　the　infinite　Supreme　Being；　I　do　not　see　on　what　ground　they　can　justify　such　a　distinction；　or；　indeed；　how　they　can　avoid　the　contradiction　that　meets　them；　when　they　hold　that　existence　in　time　is　an　attribute　necessarily　belonging　to　finite　things　in　themselves；　whereas　God　is　the　cause　of　this　existence；　but　cannot　be　the　cause　of　time　（or　space）　itself　（since　this　must　be　presupposed　as　a　necessary　a　priori　condition　of　the　existence　of　things）；　and　consequently　as　regards　the　existence　of　these　things。　His　causality　must　be　subject　to　conditions　and　even　to　the　condition　of　time；　and　this　would　inevitably　bring　in　everything　contradictory　to　the　notions　of　His　infinity　and　independence。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　quite　easy　for　us　to　draw　the　distinction　between　the　attribute　of　the　divine　existence　of　being　independent　on　all　time…conditions；　and　that　of　a　being　of　the　world　of　sense；　the　distinction　being　that　between　the　existence　of　a　being　in　itself　and　that　of　a　thing　in　appearance。　Hence；　if　this　ideality　of　time　and　space　is　not　adopted；　nothing　remains　but　Spinozism；　in　which　space　and　time　are　essential　attributes　of　the　Supreme　Being　Himself；　and　the　things　dependent　on　Him　（ourselves；　therefore；　included）　are　not　substances；　but　merely　accidents　inhering　in　Him；　since；　if　these　things　as　His　effects　exist　in　time　only；　this　being　the　condition　of　their　existence　in　themselves；　then　the　actions　of　these　beings　must　be　simply　His　actions　which　He　performs　in　some　place　and　time。　Thus；　Spinozism；　in　spite　of　the　absurdity　of　its　fundamental　idea；　argues　more　consistently　than　the　creation　theory　can；　when　beings　assumed　to　be　substances；　and　beings　in　themselves　existing　in　time；　are　regarded　as　effects　of　a　Supreme　Cause；　and　yet　as　not　＇belonging＇　to　Him　and　His　action；　but　as　separate　substances。　　　The　above…mentioned　difficulty　is　resolved　briefly　and　clearly　as　follows：　If　existence　in　time　is　a　mere　sensible　mode　of　representation　belonging　to　thinking　beings　in　the　world　and　consequently　does　not　apply　to　them　as　things　in　themselves；　then　the　creation　of　these　beings　is　a　creation　of　things　in　themselves；　since　the　notion　of　creation　does　not　belong　to　the　sensible　form　of　representation　of　existence　or　to　causality；　but　can　only　be　referred　to　noumena。　Consequently；　when　I　say　of　beings　in　the　world　of　sense　that　they　are　created；　I　so　far　regard　them　as　noumena。　As　it　would　be　a　contradiction；　therefore；　to　say　that　God　is　a　creator　of　appearances；　so　also　it　is　a　contradiction　to　say　that　as　creator　He　is　the　cause　of　actions　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　therefore　as　appearances；　although　He　is　the　cause　of　the　existence　of　the　acting　beings　（which　are　noumena）。　If　now　it　is　possible　to　affirm　freedom　in　spite　of　the　natural　mechanism　of　actions　as　appearances　（by　regarding　existence　in　time　as　something　that　belongs　only　to　appearances；　not　to　things　in　themselves）；　then　the　circumstance　that　the　acting　beings　are　creatures　cannot　make　the　slightest　difference；　since　creation　concerns　their　supersensible　and　not　their　sensible　existence；　and；　therefore；　cannot　be　regarded　as　the　determining　principle　of　the　appearances。　It　would　be　quite　different　if　the　beings　in　the　world　as　things　in　themselves　existed　in　time；　since　in　that　case　the　creator　of　substance　would　be　at　the　same　time　the　author　of　the　whole　mechanism　of　this　substance。　　　Of　so　great　importance　is　the　separation　of　time　（as　well　as　space）　from　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves　which　was　effected　in　the　Critique　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason。　　　It　may　be　said　that　the　solution　here　proposed　involves　great　difficulty　in　itself　and　is　scarcely　susceptible　of　a　lucid　exposition。　But　is　any　other　solution　that　has　been　attempted；　or　that　may　be　attempted；　easier　and　more　intelligible？　Rather　might　we　say　that　the　dogmatic　teachers　of　metaphysics　have　shown　more　shrewdness　than　candour　in　keeping　this　difficult　point　out　of　sight　as　much　as　possible；　in　the　hope　that　if　they　said　nothing　about　it；　probably　no　one　would　think　of　it。　If　science　is　to　be　advanced；　all　difficulties　must　be　laid　open；　and　we　must　even　search　for　those　that　are　hidden；　for　every　difficulty　calls　forth　a　remedy；　which　cannot　be　discovered　without　science　gaining　either　in　extent　or　in　exactness；　and　thus　even　obstacles　become　means　of　increasing　the　thoroughness　of　science。　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　difficulties　are　intentionally　concealed；　or　merely　removed　by　palliatives；　then　sooner　or　later　they　burst　out　into　incurable　mischiefs；　which　bring　science　to　ruin　in　an　absolute　scepticism。　　　Since　it　is；　properly　speaking；　the　notion　of　freedom　alone　amongst　all　the　ideas　of　pure　speculative　reason　that　so　greatly　enlarges　our　knowledge　in　the　sphere　of　the　supersensible；　though　only　of　our　practical　knowledge；　I　ask　myself　why　it　exclusively　possesses　so　great　fertility；　whereas　the　others　only　designate　the　vacant　space　for　possible　beings　of　the　pure　understanding；　but　are　unable　by　any　means　to　define　the　concept　of　them。　I　presently　find　that　as　I　cannot　think　anything　without　a　category；　I　must　fir