； not an object of the senses； and consequently does not belong to the class of phenomena； it follows that the idea of it； which determines the will； is distinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to the law of causality； because in their case the determining principles must themselves be phenomena。 Now； if no other determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that universal legislative form； such a will must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation； namely； the law of causality； such independence is called freedom in the strictest； that is； in the transcendental； sense； consequently； a will which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will。
VI。 PROBLEM II。
Supposing that a will is free； to find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily。 Since the matter of the practical law； i。e。； an object of the maxim； can never be given otherwise than empirically； and the free will is independent on empirical conditions （that is； conditions belonging to the world of sense） and yet is determinable； consequently a free will must find its principle of determination in the law； and yet independently of the matter of the law。 But； besides the matter of the law； nothing is contained in it except the legislative form。 It is the legislative form； then； contained in the maxim； which can alone constitute a principle of determination of the ＇free＇ will。
REMARK。
Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other。 Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct； or whether an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness of a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the positive concept of freedom； I only ask； whence begins our knowledge of the unconditionally practical； whether it is from freedom or from the practical law？ Now it cannot begin from freedom； for of this we cannot be immediately conscious； since the first concept of it is negative； nor can we infer it from experience； for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law of phenomena； and hence of the mechanism of nature； the direct opposite of freedom。 It is therefore the moral law； of which we become directly conscious （as soon as we trace for ourselves maxims of the will）； that first presents itself to us； and leads directly to the concept of freedom； inasmuch as reason presents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions； nay； wholly independent of them。 But how is the consciousness； of that moral law possible？ We can become conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical principles； by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions； which it directs。 The concept of a pure will arises out of the former； as that of a pure understanding arises out of the latter。 That this is the true subordination of our concepts； and that it is morality that first discovers to us the notion of freedom； hence that it is practical reason which； with this concept； first proposes to speculative reason the most insoluble problem； thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity； is evident from the following consideration： Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the concept of freedom； but the mechanism of nature must constitute the only clue； moreover； when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of causes to the unconditioned； it falls into an antinomy which is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the other； whilst the latter （namely； mechanism） is at least useful in the explanation of phenomena； therefore no one would ever have been so rash as to introduce freedom into science； had not the moral law； and with it practical reason； come in and forced this notion upon us。 Experience； however； confirms this order of notions。 Suppose some one asserts of his lustful appetite that； when the desired object and the opportunity are present； it is quite irresistible。 ＇Ask him＇… if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this opportunity； in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately after the gratification of his lust； whether he could not then control his passion； we need not be long in doubt what he would reply。 Ask him； however… if his sovereign ordered him； on pain of the same immediate execution； to bear false witness against an honourable man； whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible pretext； would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life； however great it may be。 He would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he would do so or not； but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible to do so。 He judges； therefore； that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought； and he recognizes that he is free… a fact which but for the moral law he would never have known。
VII。 FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON。
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation。
REMARK。
Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions； but contain nothing further than the assumption that we can do something if it is required that we should do it； and these are the only geometrical propositions that concern actual existence。 They are； then； practical rules under a problematical condition of the will； but here the rule says： We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner。 The practical rule is； therefore； unconditional； and hence it is conceived a priori as a categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately （by the practical rule itself； which thus is in this case a law）； for pure reason practical of itself is here directly legislative。 The will is thought as independent on empirical conditions； and； therefore； as pure will determined by the mere form of the law； and this principle of determination is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims。 The thing is strange enough； and has no parallel in all the rest of our practical knowledge。 For the a priori thought of a possible universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical； is unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will。 This； however； is not a precept to do something by which some desired effect can be attained （for then the will would depend on physical conditions）； but a rule that determines the will a priori only so far as regards the forms of its maxims； and thus it is at least not impossible to conceive that a law； which only applies to the subjective form of principles； yet serves as a principle of determination by means of the objective form of law in general。 We may call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason； because we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason； e。g。； the consciousness of freedom （for this is not antecedently given）； but it forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition； which is not based on any intuition； either pure or empirical。 It would； indeed； be analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed； but to presuppose freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition； which cannot here be assumed； however； when we regard this law as given； it must be observed； in order not to fall into any misconception； that it is not an empirical fact； but the sole fact of the pure reason； which thereby announces itself as originally legislative （sic volo； sic jubeo）。
COROLLARY。
Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives （to man） a universal law which we call the moral law。
REMARK。
The fact just mentioned is undeniable。 It is only necessary to analyse the judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their actions； in order to find that； whatever inclination may say to the contrary； reason； incorruptible and selfconstrained； always confronts the maxim of the will in any action with the pure will； that is； with itself； considering itself as a priori practical。 Now this principle of morality； just on account of the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of the will； without regard to any subjective differentes； is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational beings； in so far as they have a will； that is； a power to determine their causality by the conception of rules； and； therefore； so far as they are capable of acting according to principles； and consequently also according to practical a priori principles （for these alone have the necessity that reason requires in a principle）。 It is； therefore； not limited to men only； but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will； nay； it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence。 In the former case； however； the law has the form of an imperative； because in them； as rational beings； we can suppose a pure will； but being creatures affected