speculative theology； of leading inevitably to the conception of a
sole； perfect； and rational First Cause； whereof speculative
theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds； far
less any convincing evidence。 For we find neither in transcendental
nor in natural theology； however far reason may lead us in these；
any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only
Being； which stands at the head of all natural causes； and on which
these are entirely dependent。 On the other band； if we take our
stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe； and from this
point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate
efficiency and； for us； obligatory force； we must e to the
conclusion that there is one only supreme will； which prehends
all these laws in itself。 For how； under different wills； should we
find plete unity of ends？ This will must be omnipotent； that all
nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it；
omniscient； that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and
their moral worth； omnipresent； that it may be at hand to supply every
necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise；
eternal； that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail； and
so on。
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences…
which； as mere nature； is only a world of sense； but； as a system of
freedom of volition； may be termed an intelligible； that is； moral
world （regnum gratiae）… leads inevitably also to the teleological
unity of all things which constitute this great whole； according to
universal natural laws… just as the unity of the former is according
to universal and necessary moral laws… and unites the practical with
the speculative reason。 The world must be represented as having
originated from an idea； if it is to harmonize with that use of reason
without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason…
namely； the moral use； which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme
good。 Hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological
direction； and bees； in its widest extension； physico…theology。 But
this； taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence
of freedom； and not accidentally instituted by external mands；
establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be
inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things。 This
gives rise to a transcendental theology； which takes the ideal of
the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity；
and this principle connects all things according to universal and
necessary natural laws； because all things have their origin in the
absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being。
What use can we make of our understanding； even in respect of
experience； if we do not propose ends to ourselves？ But the highest
ends are those of morality； and it is only pure reason that can give
us the knowledge of these。 Though supplied with these； and putting
ourselves under their guidance； we can make no teleological use of the
knowledge of nature； as regards cognition； unless nature itself has
established teleological unity。 For without this unity we should not
even possess reason； because we should have no school for reason；
and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for
its conceptions。 But teleological unity is a necessary unity； and
founded on the essence of the individual will itself。 Hence this will；
which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto；
must be so likewise。 In this way the transcendental enlargement of our
rational cognition would be； not the cause； but merely the effect of
the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us。
Hence； also； we find in the history of human reason that； before the
moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined； and
before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of
ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles； the
knowledge of nature； and even a considerable amount of intellectual
culture in many other sciences； could produce only rude and vague
conceptions of the Deity； sometimes even admitting of an astonishing
indifference with regard to this question altogether。 But the more
enlarged treatment of moral ideas； which was rendered necessary by the
extreme pure moral law of our religion； awakened the interest； and
thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this
object。 In this way； and without the help either of an extended
acquaintance with nature； or of a reliable transcendental insight （for
these have been wanting in all ages）； a conception of the Divine Being
was arrived at； which we now bold to be the correct one； not because
speculative reason convinces us of its correctness； but because it
accords with the moral principles of reason。 Thus it is to pure
reason； but only in its practical use； that we must ascribe the
merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition； of
which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture； but the
validity of which it was unable to establish… and of having thereby
rendered it； not indeed a demonstrated dogma； but a hypothesis
absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason。
But if practical reason has reached this elevation； and has attained
to the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good； it
must not； therefore； imagine that it has transcended the empirical
conditions of its application； and risen to the immediate cognition of
new objects； it must not presume to start from the conception which it
has gained； and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves。 For it
was these very laws； the internal practical necessity of which led
us to the hypothesis of an independent cause； or of a wise ruler of
the universe； who should give them effect。 Hence we are not entitled
to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the
ruler； especially as we have no conception of such a will； except as
formed in accordance with these laws。 So far； then； as practical
reason has the right to conduct us； we shall not look upon actions
as binding on us； because they are the mands of God； but we shall
regard them as divine mands； because we are internally bound by
them。 We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which
accords with principles of reason； we shall look upon ourselves as
acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold
sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of
actions themselves； and we shall believe that we can obey that will
only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others。
Moral theology is； therefore； only of immanent use。 It teaches us to
fulfil our destiny here in the world； by placing ourselves in
harmony with the general system of ends； and warns us against the
fanaticism； nay； the crime of depriving reason of its legislative
authority in the moral conduct of life； for the purpose of directly
connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being。 For this
would be； not an immanent； but a transcendent use of moral theology；
and； like the transcendent use of mere speculation； would inevitably
pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason。
SECTION III。 Of Opinion； Knowledge； and Belief。
The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our
understanding which may rest on objective grounds； but requires； also；
subjective causes in the mind of the person judging。 If a judgement is
valid for every rational being； then its ground is objectively
sufficient； and it is termed a conviction。 If； on the other hand； it
has its ground in the particular character of the subject； it is
termed a persuasion。
Persuasion is a mere illusion； the ground of the judgement； which
lies solely in the subject； being regarded as objective。 Hence a
judgement of this kind has only private validity… is only valid for
the individual who judges； and the holding of a thing to be true in
this way cannot be municated。 But truth depends upon agreement with
the object； and consequently the judgements of all understandings；
if true； must be in agreement with each other （consentientia uni
tertio consentiunt inter se）。 Conviction may； therefore； be
distinguished； from an external point of view； from persuasion； by the
possibility of municating it and by showing its validity for the
reason of every man； for in this case the presumption； at least；
arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other； in
spite of the different characters of individuals； rests upon the
mon ground of the agreement of each with the object； and thus the
correctness of the judgement is established。
Persuasion； accordingly； cannot be subjectively distinguished from
conviction； that is； so long as the subject views its judgement simply
as a phenomenon of its own mind。 But if we inquire whether the grounds
of our judgement； which are valid for us； produce the same effect on
the reason of others as on our own； we have then the means； though
only subjective means； not； indeed； of producing conviction； but of
detecting the