I call the world a moral world； in so far as it may be in accordance
with all the ethical laws… which； by virtue of the freedom of
reasonable beings； it can be； and according to the necessary laws of
morality it ought to be。 But this world must be conceived only as an
intelligible world； inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all
conditions （ends）； and even of all impediments to morality （the
weakness or pravity of human nature）。 So far； then； it is a mere idea…
though still a practical idea… which may have； and ought to have； an
influence on the world of sense； so as to bring it as far as
possible into conformity with itself。 The idea of a moral world has；
therefore； objective reality； not as referring to an object of
intelligible intuition… for of such an object we can form no
conception whatever… but to the world of sense… conceived； however； as
an object of pure reason in its practical use… and to a corpus
mysticum of rational beings in it； in so far as the liberum
arbitrium of the individual is placed； under and by virtue of moral
laws； in plete systematic unity both with itself and with the
freedom of all others。
That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure
reason which relate to its practical interest： Do that which will
render thee worthy of happiness。 The second question is this： If I
conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness； may I hope
thereby to obtain happiness？ In order to arrive at the solution of
this question； we must inquire whether the principles of pure
reason； which prescribe a priori the law； necessarily also connect
this hope with it。
I say； then； that just as the moral principles are necessary
according to reason in its practical use； so it is equally necessary
according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one
has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made
himself worthy of it in his conduct； and that therefore the system
of morality is inseparably （though only in the idea of pure reason）
connected with that of happiness。
Now in an intelligible； that is； in the moral world； in the
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to
morality （sensuous desires）； such a system of happiness； connected
with and proportioned to morality； may be conceived as necessary；
because freedom of volition… partly incited； and partly restrained
by moral laws… would be itself the cause of general happiness； and
thus rational beings； under the guidance of such principles； would
be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and
that of others。 But such a system of self…rewarding morality is only
an idea； the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that
every one acts as he ought； in other words； that all actions of
reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a
Supreme Will； prehending in； or under； itself all particular wills。
But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of
his freedom of volition； even if others should not act in conformity
with this law； neither the nature of things； nor the causality of
actions and their relation to morality； determine how the consequences
of these actions will be related to happiness； and the necessary
connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to
bee worthy of happiness； cannot be cognized by reason； if we take
nature alone for our guide。 This connection can be hoped for only on
the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason； which
governs according to moral laws。
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect
will； united with supreme blessedness； is the cause of all happiness
in the world； so far as happiness stands in strict ｝ relation to
morality （as the worthiness of being happy）； the ideal of the
supreme Good。 supreme original good； that pure reason can find the
ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the
highest derivative good； and accordingly of an intelligible； that
is； moral world。 Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive
ourselves as belonging to such a world； while the senses present to us
nothing but a world of phenomena； we must assume the former as a
consequence of our conduct in the world of sense （since the world of
sense gives us no hint of it）； and therefore as future in relation
to us。 Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which；
according to the principles of pure reason； are inseparable from the
obligation which this reason imposes upon us。
Morality per se constitutes a system。 But we can form no system of
happiness； except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to
morality。 But this is only possible in the intelligible world； under a
wise author and ruler。 Such a ruler； together with life in such a
world； which we must look upon as future； reason finds itself
pelled to assume； or it must regard the moral laws as idle
dreams； since the necessary consequence which this same reason
connects with them must； without this hypothesis； fall to the
ground。 Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as
mands； which they could not be did they not connect a priori
adequate consequences with their dictates； and thus carry with them
promises and threats。 But this； again； they could not do； did they not
reside in a necessary being； as the Supreme Good； which alone can
render such a teleological unity possible。
Leibnitz termed the world； when viewed in relation to the rational
beings which it contains； and the moral relations in which they
stand to each other； under the government of the Supreme Good； the
kingdom of Grace； and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature；
in which these rational beings live； under moral laws； indeed； but
expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow
according to the course of nature in the world of sense。 To view
ourselves； therefore； as in the kingdom of grace； in which all
happiness awaits us； except in so far as we ourselves limit our
participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of
happiness； is a practically necessary idea of reason。
Practical laws； in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions；
that is； subjective principles； are termed maxims。 The judgements of
moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
according ideas； the observance of its laws； according to according to
maxims。
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims； but
this is impossible； unless with the moral law； which is a mere idea；
reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct
which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or
in another life； which is in exact conformity with our highest aims。
Thus； without a God and without a world； invisible to us now； but
hoped for； the glorious ideas of morality are； indeed； objects of
approbation and of admiration； but cannot be the springs of purpose
and action。 For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural
to every rational being； and which are determined a priori by pure
reason itself； and necessary。
Happiness alone is； in the view of reason； far from being the
plete good。 Reason does not approve of it （however much inclination
may desire it）； except as united with desert。 On the other hand；
morality alone； and with it； mere desert； is likewise far from being
the plete good。 To make it plete； he who conducts himself in a
manner not unworthy of happiness； must be able to hope for the
possession of happiness。 Even reason； unbiased by private ends； or
interested considerations； cannot judge otherwise； if it puts itself
in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness
to others。 For in the practical idea both points are essentially
bined； though in such a way that participation in happiness is
rendered possible by the moral disposition； as its condition； and
not conversely； the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness。
For a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as
its necessary condition would not be moral； and hence also would not
be worthy of plete happiness… a happiness which； in the view of
reason； recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own
immoral conduct。
Happiness； therefore； in exact proportion with the morality of
rational beings （whereby they are made worthy of happiness）；
constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely
must transport ourselves according to the mands of pure but
practical reason。 This world is； it is true； only an intelligible
world； for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires； the
world of sense gives us no hint。 Its reality can be based on nothing
else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good。 In it
independent reason； equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme
cause； founds； maintains； and fulfils the universal order of things；
with the most perfect teleological harmony； however much this order
may be hidden from us in the world of sense。
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage； in contrast with
speculative theology； of leading inevitably to the conception o