origin）… in this expectation； I say； we form to ourselves； by
anticipation； the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational
cognition； by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a
priori。 A science of this kind； which should determine the origin； the
extent； and the objective validity of such cognitions； must be
called transcendental logic； because it has not； like general logic；
to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to
empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction； but
concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects。
III。 Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic。
The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
corner； so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms
or confess their ignorance； and consequently the vanity of their whole
art； is this： 〃What is truth？〃 The definition of the word truth； to
wit； 〃the accordance of the cognition with its object；〃 is presupposed
in the question； but we desire to be told； in the answer to it； what
is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition。
To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a
strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence。 For if a question be
in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer； it is
attended with the danger… not to mention the shame that falls upon the
person who proposes it… of seducing the unguarded listener into making
absurd answers； and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle
of one （as the ancients said） 〃milking the he…goat； and the other
holding a sieve。〃
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object； this object must be； ipso facto； distinguished from all
others； for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates； although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects。 Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions； without distinction of
their objects。 But it is evident that since； in the case of such a
criterion； we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition （that
is； of all relation to its object）； and truth relates precisely to
this content； it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition； and that； accordingly； a sufficient； and
at the same time universal； test of truth cannot possibly be found。 As
we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter； we shall
say： 〃Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter； no
universal test can be demanded； because such a demand is
self…contradictory。〃
On the other hand； with regard to our cognition in respect of its
mere form （excluding all content）； it is equally manifest that
logic； in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of
the understanding； must in these very laws present us with criteria of
truth。 Whatever contradicts these rules is false； because thereby
the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of
thought； that is； to contradict itself。 These criteria； however； apply
solely to the form of truth； that is； of thought in general； and in so
far they are perfectly accurate； yet not sufficient。 For although a
cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form； that is； not
self…contradictory； it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may
not stand in agreement with its object。 Consequently； the merely
logical criterion of truth； namely； the accordance of a cognition with
the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason； is
nothing more than the conditio sine qua non； or negative condition
of all truth。 Farther than this logic cannot go； and the error which
depends not on the form； but on the content of the cognition； it has
no test to discover。
General logic； then； resolves the whole formal business of
understanding and reason into its elements； and exhibits them as
principles of all logical judging of our cognitions。 This part of
logic may； therefore； be called analytic； and is at least the negative
test of truth； because all cognitions must first of an be estimated
and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate
them in respect of their content； in order to discover whether they
contain positive truth in regard to their object。 Because； however；
the mere form of a cognition； accurately as it may accord with logical
laws； is insufficient to supply us with material （objective） truth； no
one； by means of logic alone； can venture to predicate anything of
or decide concerning objects； unless he has obtained； independently of
logic； well…grounded information about them； in order afterwards to
examine； according to logical laws； into the use and connection； in
a cohering whole； of that information； or； what is still better；
merely to test it by them。 Notwithstanding； there lies so seductive
a charm in the possession of a specious art like this… an art which
gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding； although
with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient… that
general logic； which is merely a canon of judgement； has been employed
as an organon for the actual production； or rather for the semblance
of production； of objective assertions； and has thus been grossly
misapplied。 Now general logic； in its assumed character of organon； is
called dialectic。
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used
this term for a science or an art； we may safely infer； from their
actual employment of it； that with them it was nothing else than a
logic of illusion… a sophistical art for giving ignorance； nay； even
intentional sophistries； the colouring of truth； in which the
thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated； and their
topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions。 Now it may be taken
as a safe and useful warning； that general logic； considered as an
organon； must always be a logic of illusion； that is； be
dialectical； for； as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the
content of our cognitions； but merely the formal conditions of their
accordance with the understanding； which do not relate to and are
quite indifferent in respect of objects； any attempt to employ it as
an instrument （organon） in order to extend and enlarge the range of
our knowledge must end in mere prating； any one being able to maintain
or oppose； with some appearance of truth； any single assertion
whatever。
Such instruction is quite unbeing the dignity of philosophy。
For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic
dialectic； in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion； and
we wish the term to be so understood in this place。
IV。 Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
Analytic and Dialectic。
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding （as in
transcendental aesthetic the sensibility） and select from our
cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the
understanding alone。 The exercise of this pure cognition； however；
depends upon this as its condition； that objects to which it may be
applied be given to us in intuition； for without intuition the whole
of our cognition is without objects； and is therefore quite void。 That
part of transcendental logic； then； which treats of the elements of
pure cognition of the understanding； and of the principles without
which no object at all can be thought； is transcendental analytic； and
at the same time a logic of truth。 For no cognition can contradict it；
without losing at the same time all content； that is； losing all
reference to an object； and therefore all truth。 But because we are
very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and
principles of the understanding by themselves； and that even beyond
the boundaries of experience； which yet is the only source whence we
can obtain matter （objects） on which those pure conceptions may be
employed… understanding runs the risk of making； by means of empty
sophisms； a material and objective use of the mere formal principles
of the pure understanding； and of passing judgements on objects
without distinction… objects which are not given to us； nay； perhaps
cannot be given to us in any way。 Now； as it ought properly to be only
a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding； this
kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of
the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding； and attempt
with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically； affirm；
and determine respecting objects in general。 In this case the exercise
of the pure understanding bees dialectical。 The second part of
our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical
illusion； and this critique we shall term transcendental dialectic…
not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion （an
art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of
metaphysical juggling）； but as a critique of understanding and
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use。 This critique will expose
the groundless nature