substance to the phenomenon； and we should have been obliged to
prove that in all phenomena there is something permanent； of the
existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination。
But because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical； that is；
cannot be drawn from conceptions； inasmuch as it concerns a
synthetical proposition a priori； and as philosophers never
reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to
possible experience； and therefore cannot be proved except by means of
a deduction of the possibility of experience； it is no wonder that
while it has served as the foundation of all experience （for we feel
the need of it in empirical cognition）； it has never been supported by
proof。
A philosopher was asked： 〃What is the weight of smoke？〃 He answered：
〃Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the
remaining ashes； and you will have the weight of the smoke。〃 Thus he
presumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter
（substance） does not perish； but that only the form of it undergoes
a change。 In like manner was the saying： 〃From nothing es nothing；〃
only another inference from the principle or permanence； or rather
of the ever…abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena。 For if
that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper
substratum of all determination of time； it follows that all existence
in past as well as in future time； must be determinable by means of it
alone。 Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a
phenomenon； only because we suppose its existence in all time； a
notion which the word permanence does not fully express； as it seems
rather to be referable to future time。 However； the internal necessity
perpetually to be； is inseparably connected with the necessity
always to have been； and so the expression may stand as it is。
〃Gigni de nihilo nihil； in nihilum nil posse reverti；〃* are two
propositions which the ancients never parted； and which people
nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin； because they imagine that the
propositions apply to objects as things in themselves； and that the
former might be inimical to the dependence （even in respect of its
substance also） of the world upon a supreme cause。 But this
apprehension is entirely needless； for the question in this case is
only of phenomena in the sphere of experience； the unity of which
never could be possible； if we admitted the possibility that new
things （in respect of their substance） should arise。 For in that case；
we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity
of time； to wit； the identity of the substratum； as that through which
alone all change possesses plete and thorough unity。 This
permanence is； however； nothing but the manner in which we represent
to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world。
*＇Persius； Satirae； iii。83…84。 〃Nothing can be produced from
nothing； nothing can be returned into nothing。〃＇
The determinations of a substance； which are only particular modes
of its existence； are called accidents。 They are always real；
because they concern the existence of substance （negations are only
determinations； which express the non…existence of something in the
substance）。 Now； if to this real in the substance we ascribe a
particular existence （for example； to motion as an accident of
matter）； this existence is called inherence； in contradistinction to
the existence of substance； which we call subsistence。 But hence arise
many misconceptions； and it would be a more accurate and just mode
of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which
the existence of a substance is positively determined。 Meanwhile； by
reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding；
it is impossible to avoid separating； as it were； that which in the
existence of a substance is subject to change； whilst the substance
remains； and regarding it in relation to that which is properly
permanent and radical。 On this account； this category of substance
stands under the title of relation； rather because it is the condition
thereof than because it contains in itself any relation。
Now； upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the
conception change。 Origin and extinction are not changes of that which
originates or bees extinct。 Change is but a mode of existence；
which follows on another mode of existence of the same object； hence
all that changes is permanent； and only the condition thereof changes。
Now since this mutation affects only determinations； which can have
a beginning or an end； we may say； employing an expression which seems
somewhat paradoxical： 〃Only the permanent （substance） is subject to
change； the mutable suffers no change； but rather alternation； that
is； when certain determinations cease； others begin。〃
Change； when； cannot be perceived by us except in substances； and
origin or extinction in an absolute sense； that does not concern
merely a determination of the permanent； cannot be a possible
perception； for it is this very notion of the permanent which
renders possible the representation of a transition from one state
into another； and from non…being to being； which； consequently； can be
empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that
which is permanent。 Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be； we
must then have a point of time in which it was not。 But how and by
what can we fix and determine this point of time； unless by that which
already exists？ For a void time… preceding… is not an object of
perception； but if we connect this beginning with objects which
existed previously； and which continue to exist till the object in
question in question begins to be； then the latter can only be a
determination of the former as the permanent。 The same holds good of
the notion of extinction； for this presupposes the empirical
representation of a time； in which a phenomenon no longer exists。
Substances （in the world of phenomena） are the substratum of all
determinations of time。 The beginning of some； and the ceasing to be
of other substances； would utterly do away with the only condition
of the empirical unity of time； and in that case phenomena would
relate to two different times； in which； side by side； existence would
pass； which is absurd。 For there is only one time in which all
different times must be placed； not as coexistent； but as successive。
Accordingly； permanence is a necessary condition under which alone
phenomena； as things or objects； are determinable in a possible
experience。 But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary
permanence； and with it of the substantiality of phenomena； we shall
find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel。
B。 SECOND ANALOGY。
Principle of the Succession of Time According
to the Law of Causality。
All changes take place according to the law of the
connection of Cause and Effect。
PROOF。
（That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes； that
is； a successive being and non…being of the determinations of
substance； which is permanent； consequently that a being of
substance itself which follows on the non…being thereof； or a
non…being of substance which follows on the being thereof； in other
words； that the origin or extinction of substance itself； is
impossible… all this has been fully established in treating of the
foregoing principle。 This principle might have been expressed as
follows： 〃All alteration （succession） of phenomena is merely
change〃； for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction；
because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as
existing with two opposite determinations； and consequently as
permanent。 After this premonition； we shall proceed to the proof。）
I perceive that phenomena succeed one another； that is to say； a
state of things exists at one time； the opposite of which existed in a
former state。 In this case； then； I really connect together two
perceptions in time。 Now connection is not an operation of mere
sense and intuition； but is the product of a synthetical faculty of
imagination； which determines the internal sense in respect of a
relation of time。 But imagination can connect these two states in
two ways； so that either the one or the other may antecede in time；
for time in itself cannot be an object of perception； and what in an
object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in
relation to it。 I am only conscious； then； that my imagination
places one state before and the other after； not that the one state
antecedes the other in the object。 In other words； the objective
relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by
means of mere perception。 Now in order that this relation may be
cognized as determined； the relation between the two states must be so
cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary； which of them
must be placed before and which after； and not conversely。 But the
conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity； can
be none other than a