conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity； can
be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does
not lie in mere perception； and in this case it is the conception of
〃the relation of cause and effect；〃 the former of which determines the
latter in time； as its necessary consequence； and not as something
which might possibly antecede （or which might in some cases not be
perceived to follow）。 It follows that it is only because we subject
the sequence of phenomena； and consequently all change； to the law
of causality； that experience itself； that is； empirical cognition
of phenomena； bees possible； and consequently； that phenomena
themselves； as objects of experience； are possible only by virtue of
this law。
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always
successive。 The representations of parts succeed one another。
Whether they succeed one another in the object also； is a second point
for reflection； which was not contained in the former。 Now we may
certainly give the name of object to everything； even to every
representation； so far as we are conscious thereof； but what this word
may mean in the case of phenomena； not merely in so far as they （as
representations） are objects； but only in so far as they indicate an
object； is a question requiring deeper consideration。 In so far as
they； regarded merely as representations； are at the same time objects
of consciousness； they are not to be distinguished from
apprehension； that is； reception into the synthesis of imagination；
and we must therefore say： 〃The manifold of phenomena is always
produced successively in the mind。〃 If phenomena were things in
themselves； no man would be able to conjecture from the succession
of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object；
for we have to do only with our representations。 How things may be
in themselves； without regard to the representations through which
they affect us； is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition。 Now
although phenomena are not things in themselves； and are
nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized； it is my
duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold
in phenomena themselves； while the representation of this manifold
in apprehension is always successive。 For example； the apprehension of
the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me； is
successive。 Now es the question whether the manifold of this
house is in itself successive… which no one will be at all willing
to grant。 But； so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the
transcendental signification thereof； I find that the house is not a
thing in itself； but only a phenomenon； that is； a representation； the
transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown。 What then am I
to understand by the question： 〃How can the manifold be connected in
the phenomenon itself… not considered as a thing in itself； but merely
as a phenomenon？〃 Here that which lies in my successive apprehension
is regarded as representation； whilst the phenomenon which is given
me； notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a plex of these
representations； is regarded as the object thereof； with which my
conception； drawn from the representations of apprehension； must
harmonize。 It is very soon seen that； as accordance of the cognition
with its object constitutes truth； the question now before us can only
relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth； and that the
phenomenon； in opposition to the representations of apprehension；
can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them； if it is
subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other
apprehension； and which renders necessary a mode of connection of
the manifold。 That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of
this necessary rule of apprehension； is the object。
Let us now proceed to our task。 That something happens； that is to
say； that something or some state exists which before was not；
cannot be empirically perceived； unless a phenomenon precedes； which
does not contain in itself this state。 For a reality which should
follow upon a void time； in other words； a beginning； which no state
of things precedes； can just as little be apprehended as the void time
itself。 Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which
follows upon another perception。 But as this is the case with all
synthesis of apprehension； as I have shown above in the example of a
house； my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently
distinguished from other apprehensions。 But I remark also that if in a
phenomenon which contains an occurrence； I call the antecedent state
of my perception； A； and the following state； B； the perception B
can only follow A in apprehension； and the perception A cannot
follow B； but only precede it。 For example； I see a ship float down
the stream of a river。 My perception of its place lower down follows
upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river； and
it is impossible that； in the apprehension of this phenomenon； the
vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the
stream。 Here； therefore； the order in the sequence of perceptions in
apprehension is determined； and by this order apprehension is
regulated。 In the former example； my perceptions in the apprehension
of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation； or
vice versa； or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical
intuition； by going from left to right； and from right to left。
Accordingly； in the series of these perceptions； there was no
determined order； which necessitated my beginning at a certain
point； in order empirically to connect the manifold。 But this rule
is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens；
and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the
apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary。
I must； therefore； in the present case； deduce the subjective
sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena； for
otherwise the former is quite undetermined； and one phenomenon is
not distinguishable from another。 The former alone proves nothing as
to the connection of the manifold in an object； for it is quite
arbitrary。 The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a
phenomenon； according to which order the apprehension of one thing
（that which happens） follows that of another thing （which precedes）；
in conformity with a rule。 In this way alone can I be authorized to
say of the phenomenon itself； and not merely of my own apprehension；
that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein。 That is； in
other words； I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this
order。
In conformity with this rule； then； it is necessary that in that
which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule；
according to which in this event follows always and necessarily； but I
cannot reverse this and go back from the event； and determine （by
apprehension） that which antecedes it。 For no phenomenon goes back
from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point； although
it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time； from a given
time； on the other hand； there is always a necessary progression to
the determined succeeding time。 Therefore； because there certainly
is something that follows； I must of necessity connect it with
something else； which antecedes； and upon which it follows； in
conformity with a rule； that is necessarily； so that the event； as
conditioned； affords certain indication of a condition； and this
condition determines the event。
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event； upon which this event
must follow in conformity with a rule。 All sequence of perception
would then exist only in apprehension； that is to say； would be merely
subjective； and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
thing ought to precede； and what ought to follow in perception。 In
such a case； we should have nothing but a play of representations；
which would possess no application to any object。 That is to say； it
would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another； as regards relations of time； because the succession
in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort； and
therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the
succession； and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary。
And； in this case； I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow
one upon the other； but only that one apprehension follows upon
another。 But this is merely subjective； and does not determine an
object； and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an
object… not even in the phenomenal world。
Accordingly； when we know in experience that something happens； we
always presuppose that something precedes； whereupon it follows in
conformity with a rule。 For otherwise I could not say of the object
that it follows； because the mere succession in my apprehension； if it
be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding； does
not authorize succession in the object。 Only； therefore； in
reference to a rul