not authorize succession in the object。 Only； therefore； in
reference to a rule； according to which phenomena are determined in
their sequence； that is； as they happen； by the preceding state； can I
make my subjective synthesis （of apprehension） objective； and it is
only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is
possible。
No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
procedure of the human understanding。 According to these opinions；
it is by means of the perception and parison of similar
consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the
understanding is led to the discovery of a rule； according to which
certain events always follow certain phenomena； and it is only by this
process that we attain to the conception of cause。 Upon such a
basis； it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical；
and the rule which it furnishes us with… 〃Everything that happens must
have a cause〃… would be just as contingent as experience itself。 The
universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly
spurious attributes of it。 Indeed； it could not possess universal
validity； inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori； but
founded on deduction。 But the same is the case with this law as with
other pure a priori representations （e。g。； space and time）； which we
can draw in perfect clearness and pleteness from experience； only
because we had already placed them therein； and by that means； and
by that alone； had rendered experience possible。 Indeed； the logical
clearness of this representation of a rule； determining the series
of events； is possible only when we have made use thereof in
experience。 Nevertheless； the recognition of this rule； as a condition
of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time； was the ground of
experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori。
It is now our duty to show by an example that we never； even in
experience； attribute to an object the notion of succession or
effect （of an event… that is； the happening of something that did
not exist before）； and distinguish it from the subjective succession
of apprehension； unless when a rule lies at the foundation； which
pels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any
other； and that； indeed； it is this necessity which first renders
possible the representation of a succession in the object。
We have representations within us； of which also we can be
conscious。 But； however widely extended； however accurate and
thoroughgoing this consciousness may be； these representations are
still nothing more than representations； that is； internal
determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time。 Now how
happens it that to these representations we should set an object； or
that； in addition to their subjective reality； as modifications； we
should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective
reality？ It is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in a
relation to another representation （of that which we desire to term
object）； for in that case the question again arises： 〃How does this
other representation go out of itself； and obtain objective
significancy over and above the subjective； which is proper to it；
as a determination of a state of mind？〃 If we try to discover what
sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective
representations； and what new importance they thereby receive； we
shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of
rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain
manner； and of subjecting them to a rule； and that conversely； it is
only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time
of our representations； that objective significancy is ascribed to
them。
In the synthesis of phenomena； the manifold of our representations
is always successive。 Now hereby is not represented an object； for
by means of this succession； which is mon to all apprehension； no
one thing is distinguished from another。 But so soon as I perceive
or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state
antecedent； from which the representation follows in accordance with a
rule； so soon do I represent something as an event； or as a thing that
happens； in other words； I cognize an object to which I must assign
a certain determinate position in time； which cannot be altered；
because of the preceding state in the object。 When； therefore； I
perceive that something happens； there is contained in this
representation； in the first place； the fact； that something
antecedes； because； it。 is only in relation to this that the
phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time； in other words； exists
after an antecedent time； in which it did not exist。 But it can
receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that
something existed in the foregoing state； upon which it follows
inevitably and always； that is； in conformity with a rule。 From all
this it is evident that； in the first place； I cannot reverse the
order of succession； and make that which happens precede that upon
which it follows； and that； in the second place； if the antecedent
state be posited； a certain determinate event inevitably and
necessarily follows。 Hence it follows that there exists a certain
order in our representations； whereby the present gives a sure
indication of some previously existing state； as a correlate； though
still undetermined； of the existing event which is given… a
correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence；
conditions it； and connects it necessarily with itself in the series
of time。
If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility； and
consequently a formal condition of all perception； that the
preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time （inasmuch as I
cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding）； it must
likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the
series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all
phenomena in the succeeding time； and that the latter； as events；
cannot take place； except in so far as the former determine their
existence in time； that is to say； establish it according to a rule。
For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically
cognize this continuity in the connection of times。
For all experience and for the possibility of experience；
understanding is indispensable； and the first step which it takes in
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear；
but to render the representation of an object in general； possible。 It
does this by applying the order of time to phenomena； and their
existence。 In other words； it assigns to each phenomenon； as a
consequence； a place in relation to preceding phenomena； determined
a priori in time； without which it could not harmonize with time
itself； which determines a place a priori to all its parts。 This
determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of
phenomena to absolute time （for it is not an object of perception）；
but； on the contrary； phenomena must reciprocally determine the places
in time of one another； and render these necessary in the order of
time。 In other words； whatever follows or happens； must follow in
conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in
the foregoing state。 Hence arises a series of phenomena； which； by
means of the understanding； produces and renders necessary exactly the
same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible
perceptions； as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition
（time）； in which all our perceptions must have place。
That something happens； then； is a perception which belongs to a
possible experience； which bees real only because I look upon the
phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time；
consequently as an object； which can always be found by means of a
rule in the connected series of my perceptions。 But this rule of the
determination of a thing according to succession in time is as
follows： 〃In what precedes may be found the condition； under which
an event always （that is； necessarily） follows。〃 From all this it is
obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of
possible experience； that is； of objective cognition of phenomena；
in regard to their relations in the succession of time。
The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the
following momenta of argument。 To all empirical cognition belongs
the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination； a synthesis which is
always successive； that is； in which the representations therein
always follow one another。 But the order of succession in
imagination is not determined； and the series of successive
representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively。
But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension （of the
manifold of a given phenomenon）；then the order is determined in the
object； or to speak more accurately； there is therein an order of
successive synthesis which determines an object； and according to
wh