determined by other phenomenal existences。 This cause and its
causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of
phenomena； while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the
series of empirical conditions。 Such an effect may therefore be
considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause； and
necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary
consequence… a distinction which； stated in this perfectly general and
abstract manner； must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure。
The sequel will explain。 It is sufficient； at present； to remark that；
as the plete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable
law of nature； freedom is impossible… on the supposition that
phenomena are absolutely real。 Hence those philosophers who adhere
to the mon opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling
the ideas of nature and freedom。
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law
of Natural Necessity。
That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous； I
may be allowed to term intelligible。 If； accordingly； an object
which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty
which is not an object of sensuous intuition； but by means of which it
is capable of being the cause of phenomena； the causality of an object
or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of
view。 It may be considered to be intelligible； as regards its
action… the action of a thing which is a thing in itself； and
sensuous； as regards its effects… the effects of a phenomenon
belonging to the sensuous world。 We should accordingly； have to form
both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of
such a faculty or power… both； however； having reference to the same
effect。 This twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a
sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which
we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible
experience。 Phenomena… not being things in themselves… must have a
transcendental object as a foundation； which determines them as mere
representations； and there seems to be no reason why we should not
ascribe to this transcendental object； in addition to the property
of self…phenomenization； a causality whose effects are to be met
with in the world of phenomena； although it is not itself a
phenomenon。 But every effective cause must possess a character； that
is to say； a law of its causality； without which it would cease to
be a cause。 In the above case； then； every sensuous object would
possess an empirical character； which guaranteed that its actions；
as phenomena； stand in plete and harmonious connection； conformably
to unvarying natural laws； with all other phenomena； and can be
deduced from these； as conditions； and that they do thus； in
connection with these； constitute a series in the order of nature。
This sensuous object must； in the second place； possess an
intelligible character； which guarantees it to be the cause of those
actions； as phenomena； although it is not itself a phenomenon nor
subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense。 The former may be
termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon； the latter the
character of the thing as a thing in itself。
Now this active subject would； in its character of intelligible
subject； be subordinate to no conditions of time； for time is only a
condition of phenomena； and not of things in themselves。 No action
would begin or cease to be in this subject； it would consequently be
free from the law of all determination of time… the law of change；
namely； that everything which happens must have a cause in the
phenomena of a preceding state。 In one word； the causality of the
subject； in so far as it is intelligible； would not form part of the
series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an
event in the world of sense。 Again； this intelligible character of a
thing cannot be immediately cognized； because we can perceive
nothing but phenomena； but it must be capable of being cogitated in
harmony with the empirical character； for we always find ourselves
pelled to place； in thought； a transcendental object at the basis
of phenomena although we can never know what this object is in itself。
In virtue of its empirical character； this subject would at the same
time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality； and； as
a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world； its effects would
have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena。
Eternal phenomena must be capable of influencing it； and its
actions； in accordance with natural laws； must explain to us how its
empirical character； that is； the law of its causality； is to be
cognized in and by means of experience。 In a word； all requisites
for a plete and necessary determination of these actions must be
presented to us by experience。
In virtue of its intelligible character； on the other hand （although
we possess only a general conception of this character）； the subject
must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences； and from all
phenomenal determination。 Moreover； as nothing happens in this
subject… for it is a noumenon； and there does not consequently exist
in it any change； demanding the dynamical determination of time； and
for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes… this
active existence must in its actions be free from and independent of
natural necessity； for or necessity exists only in the world of
phenomena。 It would be quite correct to say that it originates or
begins its effects in the world of sense from itself； although the
action productive of these effects does not begin in itself。 We should
not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to
exist of themselves； because they are always determined by prior
empirical conditions… by virtue of the empirical character； which is
the phenomenon of the intelligible character… and are possible only as
constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes。 And
thus nature and freedom； each in the plete and absolute
signification of these terms； can exist； without contradiction or
disagreement； in the same action to
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony
with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity。
I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely
a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem； in order to
enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the
course which reason must adopt in the solution。 I shall now proceed to
exhibit the several momenta of this solution； and to consider them
in their order。
The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause；
that the causality of this cause； that is； the action of the cause
（which cannot always have existed； but must be itself an event； for it
precedes in time some effect which it has originated）； must have
itself a phenomenal cause； by which it is determined and； and；
consequently； all events are empirically determined in an order of
nature… this law； I say； which lies at the foundation of the
possibility of experience； and of a connected system of phenomena or
nature is a law of the understanding； from which no departure； and
to which no exception； can be admitted。 For to except even a single
phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of
possible experience and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of
thought or phantom of the brain。
Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of
causes； in which； however； absolute totality cannot be found。 But we
need not detain ourselves with this question； for it has already
been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into
which reason falls； when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the
series of phenomena。 If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the
illusion of transcendental idealism； we shall find that neither nature
nor freedom exists。 Now the question is： 〃Whether； admitting the
existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena； it is
possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature
and an effect of freedom… or； whether these two modes of causality are
contradictory and inpatible？〃
No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series。
Every action； in so far as it is productive of an event； is itself
an event or occurrence； and presupposes another preceding state； in
which its cause existed。 Thus everything that happens is but a
continuation of a series； and an absolute beginning is impossible in
the sensuous world。 The actions of natural causes are； accordingly；
themselves effects； and presuppose causes preceding them in time。 A
primal action which forms an absolute beginning； is beyond the
causal power of phenomena。
Now； is it absolutely necessary that； granting that all effects
are phenomena； the causality of the cause of these effects must also
be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world？ Is it not rather
possible that； although every effect in the phenomenal world must be
connected with an em