be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world？ Is it not rather
possible that； although every effect in the phenomenal world must be
connected with an empirical cause； according to the universal law of
nature； this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a
non…empirical and intelligible causality… its connection with
natural causes remaining nevertheless intact？ Such a causality would
be considered； in reference to phenomena； as the primal action of a
cause； which is in so far； therefore； not phenomenal； but； by reason
of this faculty or power； intelligible； although it must； at the
same time； as a link in the chain of nature； be regarded as
belonging to the sensuous world。
A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary； if
we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of
natural events； that is to say； their causes。 This being admitted as
unexceptionably valid； the requirements of the understanding； which
recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena； are
satisfied； and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may
proceed in their regular course； without hindrance and without
opposition。 But it is no stumbling…block in the way； even assuming the
idea to be a pure fiction； to admit that there are some natural causes
in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical； but
intelligible； inasmuch as it is not determined to action by
empirical conditions； but purely and solely upon grounds brought
forward by the understanding… this action being still； when the
cause is phenomenized； in perfect accordance with the laws of
empirical causality。 Thus the acting subject； as a causal
phenomenon； would continue to preserve a plete connection with
nature and natural conditions； and the phenomenon only of the
subject （with all its phenomenal causality） would contain certain
conditions； which； if we ascend from the empirical to the
transcendental object； must necessarily be regarded as intelligible。
For； if we attend； in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world
of phenomena； to the directions of nature alone； we need not trouble
ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject；
which is pletely unknown to us； stands to these phenomena and their
connection in nature。 The intelligible ground of phenomena in this
subject does not concern empirical questions。 It has to do only with
pure thought； and； although the effects of this thought and action
of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena； these
phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and plete
explanation； upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with
natural laws。 And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and
omit all consideration of their intelligible character （which is the
transcendental cause of the former） as pletely unknown； except in
so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol。 Now
let us apply this to experience。 Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous
world and； at the same time； therefore； a natural cause； the causality
of which must be regulated by empirical laws。 As such； he must possess
an empirical character； like all other natural phenomena。 We remark
this empirical character in his actions； which reveal the presence
of certain powers and faculties。 If we consider inanimate or merely
animal nature； we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves
any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous
manner。 But man； to whom nature reveals herself only through sense；
cognizes himself not only by his senses； but also through pure
apperception； and this in actions and internal determinations； which
he cannot regard as sensuous impressions。 He is thus to himself； on
the one hand； a phenomenon； but on the other hand； in respect of
certain faculties； a purely intelligible object… intelligible； because
its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity。 These faculties
are understanding and reason。 The latter； especially； is in a peculiar
manner distinct from all empirically…conditioned faculties； for it
employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects； and by
means of these determines the understanding； which then proceeds to
make an empirical use of its own conceptions； which； like the ideas of
reason； are pure and non…empirical。
That reason possesses the faculty of causality； or that at least
we are pelled so to represent it； is evident from the
imperatives； which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of
our executive powers。 The words I ought express a species of
necessity； and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not
and cannot present to the mind of man。 Understanding knows nothing
in nature but that which is； or has been； or will be。 It would be
absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is
in the relations of time in which it stands； indeed； the ought； when
we consider merely the course of nature； bas neither application nor
meaning。 The question； 〃What ought to happen in the sphere of nature？〃
is just as absurd as the question； 〃What ought to be the properties of
a circle？〃 All that we are entitled to ask is； 〃What takes place in
nature？〃 or； in the latter case； 〃What are the properties of a
circle？〃
But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action； the
ground of which is a pure conception； while the ground of a merely
natural action is； on the contrary； always a phenomenon。 This action
must certainly be possible under physical conditions； if it is
prescribed by the moral imperative ought； but these physical or
natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will
itself； they relate to its effects alone； and the consequences of
the effect in the world of phenomena。 Whatever number of motives
nature may present to my will； whatever sensuous impulses… the moral
ought it is beyond their power to produce。 They may produce a
volition； which； so far from being necessary； is always conditioned… a
volition to which the ought enunciated by reason； sets an aim and a
standard； gives permission or prohibition。 Be the object what it
may； purely sensuous… as pleasure； or presented by pure reason… as
good； reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin。
Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience；
but； with perfect spontaneity； rearranges them according to ideas；
with which it pels empirical conditions to agree。 It declares； in
the name of these ideas； certain actions to be necessary which
nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take
place； and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of
causality in relation to these actions。 For； in the absence of this
supposition； it could not expect its ideas to produce certain
effects in the world of experience。
Now； let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that
reason does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena。 In this
case it must… pure reason as it is… exhibit an empirical character。
For every cause supposes a rule； according to which certain
phenomena follow as effects from the cause； and every rule requires
uniformity in these effects； and this is the proper ground of the
conception of a cause… as a faculty or power。 Now this conception
（of a cause） may be termed the empirical character of reason； and this
character is a permanent one； while the effects produced appear； in
conformity with the various conditions which acpany and partly
limit them； in various forms。
Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character； which
is nothing more than the causality of his reason； in so far as its
effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule；
according to which we are enabled to examine； in their several kinds
and degrees； the actions of this causality and the rational grounds
for these actions； and in this way to decide upon the subjective
principles of the volition。 Now we learn what this empirical character
is only from phenomenal effects； and from the rule of these which is
presented by experience； and for this reason all the actions of man in
the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character；
and the co…operative causes of nature。 If； then； we could
investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest
foundation in the mind； there would be no action which we could not
anticipate with certainty； and recognize to be absolutely necessary
from its preceding conditions。 So far as relates to this empirical
character； therefore； there can be no freedom； and it is only in the
light of this character that we can consider the human will； when we
confine ourselves to simple observation and； as is the case in
anthropology； institute a physiological investigation of the motive
causes of human actions。
But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason… not for
the purpose of explaining their origin； that is； in relation to
speculative reason； but to practical reason； as the producing cause of
these actions… we shall discover a rule and an order very different
from those of nature and experience。 For the declaration of this
mental faculty