from those of nature and experience。 For the declaration of this
mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in
the course of nature； ought not to have taken place。 Sometimes； too；
we discover； or believe that we discover； that the ideas of reason did
actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man； and
that these actions have taken place because they were determined；
not by empirical causes； but by the act of the will upon grounds of
reason。
Now； granting that reason stands in a causal relation to
phenomena； can an action of reason be called free； when we know
that； sensuously； in its empirical character； it is pletely
determined and absolutely necessary？ But this empirical character is
itself determined by the intelligible character。 The latter we
cannot cognize； we can only indicate it by means of phenomena； which
enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical
character。* An action； then； in so far as it is to be ascribed to an
intelligible cause； does not result from it in accordance with
empirical laws。 That is to say； not the conditions of pure reason； but
only their effects in the internal sense； precede the act。 Pure
reason； as a purely intelligible faculty； is not subject to the
conditions of time。 The causality of reason in its intelligible
character does not begin to be； it does not make its appearance at a
certain time； for the purpose of producing an effect。 If this were not
the case； the causality of reason would be subservient to the
natural law of phenomena； which determines them according to time； and
as a series of causes and effects in time； it would consequently cease
to be freedom and bee a part of nature。 We are therefore
justified in saying： 〃If reason stands in a causal relation to
phenomena； it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition
of an empirical series of effects。〃 For the condition； which resides
in the reason； is non…sensuous； and therefore cannot be originated； or
begin to be。 And thus we find… what we could not discover in any
empirical series… a condition of a successive series of events
itself empirically unconditioned。 For； in the present case； the
condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena… it is
intelligible； and it consequently cannot be subjected to any
sensuous condition； or to any time…determination by a preceding cause。
*The real morality of actions… their merit or demerit； and even that
of our own conduct； is pletely unknown to us。 Our estimates can
relate only to their empirical character。 How much is the result of
the action of free will； how much is to be ascribed to nature and to
blameless error； or to a happy constitution of temperament （merito
fortunae）； no one can discover； nor； for this reason； determine with
perfect justice。
But； in another respect； the same cause belongs also to the series
of phenomena。 Man is himself a phenomenon。 His will has an empirical
character； which is the empirical cause of all his actions。 There is
no condition… determining man and his volition in conformity with this
character… which does not itself form part of the series of effects in
nature； and is subject to their law… the law according to which an
empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist。 For
this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
origination； all actions being phenomena； and belonging to the world
of experience。 But it cannot be said of reason； that the state in
which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state
determining it。 For reason is not a phenomenon； and therefore not
subject to sensuous conditions； and； consequently； even in relation to
its causality； the sequence or conditions of time do not influence
reason； nor can the dynamical law of nature； which determines the
sequence of time according to certain rules； be applied to it。
Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the
human will。 Each of these is determined in the empirical character
of the man； even before it has taken place。 The intelligible
character； of which the former is but the sensuous schema； knows no
before or after； and every action； irrespective of the time…relation
in which it stands with other phenomena； is the immediate effect of
the intelligible character of pure reason； which； consequently； enjoys
freedom of action； and is not dynamically determined either by
internal or external preceding conditions。 This freedom must not be
described； in a merely negative manner； as independence of empirical
conditions； for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a
cause of phenomena； but it must be regarded； positively； as a
faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events。 At the
same time； it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place
in reason； on the contrary； reason； as the unconditioned condition
of all action of the will； admits of no time…conditions； although
its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena… a beginning
which is not； however； absolutely primal。
I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an
example； from its employment in the world of experience； proved it
cannot be by any amount of experience； or by any number of facts；
for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental
propositions。 Let us take a voluntary action… for example； a
falsehood… by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree
of confusion into the social life of humanity； which is judged
according to the motives from which it originated； and the blame of
which and of the evil consequences arising from it； is imputed to
the offender。 We at first proceed to examine the empirical character
of the offence； and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to
the sources of that character； such as a defective education； bad
pany； a shameless and wicked disposition； frivolity； and want of
reflection… not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed
at the moment of the transgression。 In this the procedure is exactly
the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of
causes which determine a given physical effect。 Now； although we
believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances；
we do not the less blame the offender。 We do not blame him for his
unhappy disposition； nor for the circumstances which influenced him；
nay； not even for his former course of life； for we presuppose that
all these considerations may be set aside； that the series of
preceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed； and that
the action may be considered as pletely unconditioned in relation
to any state preceding； just as if the agent menced with it an
entirely new series of effects。 Our blame of the offender is
grounded upon a law of reason； which requires us to regard this
faculty as a cause； which could have and ought to have otherwise
determined the behaviour of the culprit； independently of all
empirical conditions。 This causality of reason we do not regard as a
co…operating agency； but as plete in itself。 It matters not whether
the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this
causality； the offence is estimated according to its intelligible
character… the offender is decidedly worthy of blame； the moment he
utters a falsehood。 It follows that we regard reason； in spite of
the empirical conditions of the act； as pletely free； and
therefore； therefore； as in the present case； culpable。
The above judgement is plete evidence that we are accustomed to
think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions； that in it
no change takes place… although its phenomena； in other words； the
mode in which it appears in its effects； are subject to change… that
in it no preceding state determines the following； and；
consequently； that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous
conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws。
Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all
times； but it does not itself exist in time； and therefore does not
enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist。 It is；
relatively to new states or conditions； determining； but not
determinable。 Hence we cannot ask： 〃Why did not reason determine
itself in a different manner？〃 The question ought to be thus stated：
〃Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain
phenomena in a different manner？〃 〃But this is a question which admits
of no answer。 For a different intelligible character would have
exhibited a different empirical character； and； when we say that； in
spite of the course which his whole former life has taken； the
offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood； this
means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority…
permissive or prohibitive… of reason。 Now； reason is not subject in
its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time； and a
difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of
phenomena to each other… for these are not things and therefore not
causes in themselves… but it cannot produce any difference in the
relation in which