causes in themselves… but it cannot produce any difference in the
relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason。
Thus； then； in our investigation into free actions and the causal
power which produced them； we arrive at an intelligible cause；
beyond which； however； we cannot go； although we can recognize that it
is free； that is； independent of all sensuous conditions； and that； in
this way； it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of
phenomena。 But for what reason the intelligible character generates
such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical
character under certain circumstances； it is beyond the power of our
reason to decide。 The question is as much above the power and the
sphere of reason as the following would be： 〃Why does the
transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no
other form than that of intuition in space？〃 But the problem； which we
were called upon to solve； does not require us to entertain any such
questions。 The problem was merely this… whether freedom and natural
necessity can exist without opposition in the same action。 To this
question we have given a sufficient answer； for we have shown that； as
the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition
from those of the latter； the law of the one does not affect the law
of the other and that； consequently； both can exist together in
independence of and without interference with each other。
The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the
above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom；
as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena。
For； not to mention that such an argument would not have a
transcendental character； nor have been limited to the discussion of
pure conceptions… all attempts at inferring from experience what
cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws； must ever be
unsuccessful。 Nay； more； I have not even aimed at demonstrating the
possibility of freedom； for this too would have been a vain endeavour；
inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the
possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a
priori conceptions。 Freedom has been considered in the foregoing
remarks only as a transcendental idea； by means of which reason aims
at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with
the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned； involving
itself； however； in an antinomy with the laws which itself
prescribes for the conduct of the understanding。 That this antinomy is
based upon a mere illusion； and that nature and freedom are at least
not opposed… this was the only thing in our power to prove； and the
question which it was our task to solve。
IV。 Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences。
In the preceding remarks； we considered the changes in the world
of sense as constituting a dynamical series； in which each member is
subordinated to another… as its cause。 Our present purpose is to avail
ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an
existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable
phenomena； that is； to a necessary being。 Our endeavour to reach；
not the unconditioned causality； but the unconditioned existence； of
substance。 The series before us is therefore a series of
conceptions； and not of intuitions （in which the one intuition is
the condition of the other）。
But it is evident that； as all phenomena are subject to change and
conditioned in their existence； the series of dependent existences
cannot embrace an unconditioned member； the existence of which would
be absolutely necessary。 It follows that； if phenomena were things
in themselves； and… as an immediate consequence from this supposition…
condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena；
the existence of a necessary being； as the condition of the
existence of sensuous phenomena； would be perfectly impossible。
An important distinction； however； exists between the dynamical
and the mathematical regress。 The latter is engaged solely with the
bination of parts into a whole； or with the division of a whole
into its parts； and therefore are the conditions of its series parts
of the series； and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous； and for
this reason； as consisting； without exception； of phenomena。 If the
former regress； on the contrary； the aim of which is not to
establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of
given parts； or of an unconditioned part of a given whole； but to
demonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from
its cause； or of the contingent existence of substance from that which
exists necessarily； it is not requisite that the condition should form
part of an empirical series along with the conditioned。
In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present
dealing； there exists a way of escape from the difficulty； for it is
not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true
in different relations。 All sensuous phenomena may be contingent；
and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence；
and yet there may also exist a non…empirical condition of the whole
series； or； in other words； a necessary being。 For this necessary
being； as an intelligible condition； would not form a member… not even
the highest member… of the series； the whole world of sense would be
left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered with and
uninfluenced。 This would also form a ground of distinction between the
modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies。 For；
while in the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy； the
thing itself… the cause （substantia phaenomenon）… was regarded as
belonging to the series of conditions； and only its causality to the
intelligible world… we are obliged in the present case to cogitate
this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely
apart from the world of sense （as an ens extramundanum）； for otherwise
it would be subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and
dependence。
In relation to the present problem； therefore； the regulative
principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses
an empirically conditioned existence… that no property of the sensuous
world possesses unconditioned necessity… that we are bound to
expect； and； so far as is possible； to seek for the empirical
condition of every member in the series of conditions… and that
there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any
existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the
empirical series； or in regarding any existence as independent and
self…subsistent； although this should not prevent us from
recognizing the possibility of the whole series being based upon a
being which is intelligible； and for this reason free from all
empirical conditions。
But it has been far from my intention； in these remarks； to prove
the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being； or even to
evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the
existence or all sensuous phenomena。 As bounds were set to reason；
to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical
conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are
incapable of concrete presentation； so it was my purpose； on the other
band； to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical
understanding； and to protest against any attempts on its part at
deciding on the possibility of things； or declaring the existence of
the intelligible to be impossible； merely on the ground that it is not
available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena。 It has been
shown； at the same time； that the contingency of all the phenomena
of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with
the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary； although purely
intelligible condition； that no real contradiction exists between them
and that； consequently； both may be true。 The existence of such an
absolutely necessary being may be impossible； but this can never be
demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous
phenomena； nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue
the series at some member of it； or to seek for its cause in some
sphere of existence beyond the world of nature。 Reason goes its way in
the empirical world； and follows； too； its peculiar path in the sphere
of the transcendental。
The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena； which are mere
representations； and always sensuously conditioned； things in
themselves are not； and cannot be； objects to us。 It is not to be
wondered at； therefore； that we are not justified in leaping from some
member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense； as if
empirical representations were things in themselves； existing apart
from their transcendental ground in the human mind； and the cause of
whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series。 This
would certainly be the case with contingent things； but it cannot be
with mere representati