would certainly be the case with contingent things； but it cannot be
with mere representations of things； the contingency of which is
itself merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than
that which determines phenomena； that is； the empirical。 But to
cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena； as free； moreover；
from the contingency of the latter； conflicts neither with the
unlimited nature of the empirical regress； nor with the plete
contingency of phenomena。 And the demonstration of this was the only
thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy。 For if the
condition of every conditioned… as regards its existence… is sensuous；
and for this reason a part of the same series； it must be itself
conditioned； as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy。
The embarrassments into which a reason； which postulates the
unconditioned； necessarily falls； must； therefore； continue to
exist； or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the
intelligible。 In this way； its necessity does not require； nor does it
even permit； the presence of an empirical condition： and it is；
consequently； unconditionally necessary。
The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption
of a purely intelligible being； it continues its operations on the
principle of the contingency of all phenomena； proceeding from
empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions； themselves
empirical。 just as little does this regulative principle exclude the
assumption of an intelligible cause； when the question regards
merely the pure employment of reason… in relation to ends or aims。
For； in this case； an intelligible cause signifies merely the
transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous
phenomena； and its existence； necessary and independent of all
sensuous conditions； is not inconsistent with the contingency of
phenomena； or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists
in the series of empirical conditions。
Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason。
So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of
conditions in the world of phenomena； and the satisfaction； from
this source； of the requirements of reason； so long are our ideas
transcendental and cosmological。 But when we set the unconditioned…
which is the aim of all our inquiries… in a sphere which lies out of
the world of sense and possible experience； our ideas bee
transcendent。 They are then not merely serviceable towards the
pletion of the exercise of reason （which remains an idea； never
executed； but always to be pursued）； they detach themselves pletely
from experience and construct for themselves objects； the material
of which has not been presented by experience； and the objective
reality of which is not based upon the pletion of the empirical
series； but upon pure a priori conceptions。 The intelligible object of
these transcendent ideas may be conceded； as a transcendental
object。 But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain
distinct predicates relating to its internal nature； for it has no
connection with empirical conceptions； nor are we justified in
affirming the existence of any such object。 It is； consequently； a
mere product of the mind alone。 Of all the cosmological ideas；
however； it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which pels us
to venture upon this step。 For the existence of phenomena； always
conditioned and never self…subsistent； requires us to look for an
object different from phenomena… an intelligible object； with which
all contingency must cease。 But； as we have allowed ourselves to
assume the existence of a self…subsistent reality out of the field
of experience； and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely
a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by
beings which are themselves intelligences… no other course remains for
us than to follow an alogy and employ the same mode in forming some
conception of intelligible things； of which we have not the least
knowledge； which nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical
conceptions。 Experience made us acquainted with the contingent。 But we
are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not
objects of experience； and must； therefore； deduce our knowledge of
them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself； that is；
from pure conceptions。 Hence the first step which we take out of the
world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with
the investigation of a necessary being； and to deduce from our
conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things。 This
we propose to attempt in the following chapter。
CHAPTER III。 The Ideal of Pure Reason。
SECTION I。 Of the Ideal in General。
We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the
mind； except under sensuous conditions； because the conditions of
objective reality do not exist in these conceptions； which contain； in
fact； nothing but the mere form of thought。 They may； however； when
applied to phenomena； be presented in concreto； for it is phenomena
that present to them the materials for the formation of empirical
conceptions； which are nothing more than concrete forms of the
conceptions of the understanding。 But ideas are still further
removed from objective reality than categories； for no phenomenon
can ever present them to the human mind in concreto。 They contain a
certain perfection； attainable by no possible empirical cognition； and
they give to reason a systematic unity； to which the unity of
experience attempts to approximate； but can never pletely attain。
But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is
the Ideal； by which term I understand the idea； not in concreto； but
in individuo… as an individual thing； determinable or determined by
the idea alone。 The idea of humanity in its plete perfection
supposes not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties；
which constitute our conception of human nature； to a plete
attainment of their final aims； but also everything which is requisite
for the plete determination of the idea； for of all contradictory
predicates； only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man。
What I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the
divine mind… an individual object present to its pure intuition； the
most perfect of every kind of possible beings； and the archetype of
all phenomenal existences。
Without rising to these speculative heights； we are bound to confess
that human reason contains not only ideas； but ideals； which
possess； not； like those of Plato； creative； but certainly practical
power… as regulative principles； and form the basis of the
perfectibility of certain actions。 Moral conceptions are not perfectly
pure conceptions of reason； because an empirical element… of
pleasure or pain… lies at the foundation of them。 In relation；
however； to the principle； whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom
which is in itself without law； and consequently when we attend merely
to their form； they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason。
Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity are ideas。 But the wise
man of the Stoics is an ideal； that is to say； a human being
existing only in thought and in plete conformity with the idea of
wisdom。 As the idea provides a rule； so the ideal serves as an
archetype for the perfect and plete determination of the copy。 Thus
the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of
action； with which we may pare and judge ourselves； which may
help us to reform ourselves； although the perfection it demands can
never be attained by us。 Although we cannot concede objective
reality to these ideals； they are not to be considered as chimeras； on
the contrary； they provide reason with a standard； which enables it to
estimate； by parison； the degree of inpleteness in the objects
presented to it。 But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in
the world of experience… to describe； for instance； the character of
the perfectly wise man in a romance… is impracticable。 Nay more； there
is something absurd in the attempt； and the result must be little
edifying； as the natural limitations； which are continually breaking
in upon the perfection and pleteness of the idea； destroy the
illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is
good in the idea； which hence appears fictitious and unreal。
Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason； which is always
based upon determinate conceptions； and serves as a rule and a model
for limitation or of criticism。 Very different is the nature of the
ideals of the imagination。 Of these it is impossible to present an
intelligible conception； they are a kind of monogram； drawn
according to no determinate rule； and forming rather a vague
picture… the production of many diverse experiences… than a
determinate image。 Such are the ideals which painters and
physiognomists profess to have in their minds； and which can serve
neither as a model for production nor as a standard for
appreciation。 They may be termed； though imprope