secondary relation。 Mathematical science； in its true propositions respecting a whole； escapes
from the difficulty by proving also the converse of the propositions； in this way obtaining for them a
special definiteness by proving each proposition in both ways。 True propositions may； therefore；
be looked on as definitions； and the conversion is the proof of the proposition in the form in which
it is expressed。 But this means of escaping the difficulty Philosophy cannot well employ； since the
subject of which something is proved is itself only the Notion or the universal； and the proposition
form is therefore quite superfluous and out of place。 What has the form of the subject is in the form
of an existent thing； as contrasted with the universal； the content of the proposition。 The existent
thing is taken as signifying existent in the ordinary sense； it is the word which we use in every…day
life； and of which we have a conception that has nothing of the Notion in it。 The converse of a
proposition would simply read like this： The Notion is that which is thus popularly conceived。 This
proof from the usage of language — that we also understand this to be the meaning in every…day
life； or in other words that the name is correct — has no philosophic significance。 But if the
proposition is not one like this； but an ordinary proposition； and if the predicate is not the Notion；
but some general term or other； a predicate of the subject； such propositions are really not
philosophic： we might instance the statement that substance is one and not several； but only that in
which substance and unity are the same。 Or； in other words； this unity of the two moments is the
very thing which the proof has to demonstrate； it is the Notion or the essence。 In this case it looks
as if the proposition were the matter of chief importance； the truth。 But if in these really only
so…called propositions； subject and predicate are in truth not alike； because one is individual and
the other universal； their relation is essential； i。e。； the reason for which they are one。 The proof has
here a false position indeed； as if that subject were implicit or in itself； whereas subject and
predicate are； fundamentally even； moments in separation； in the judgment “God is One；” the
subject itself is universal； since it resolves itself into unity。 On the other side it is implied in this false
position that the proof is brought in from outside merely； as in mathematics from a preceding
proposition； and that the proposition is not therefore conceived through itself； thus we see the
ordinary method of proof take its middle term； the principle； from anywhere it can； in the same
way as in classification it takes its principle of classification。 The proposition is then； as it were； a
secondary affair； but we must ask if this proposition is true。 The result as proposition ought to be
truth； but is only knowledge。 The movement of knowledge； as proof； falls therefore； in the third
place； outside of the proposition； which ought to be the truth。 The essential moments of the system
are really already completely contained in the pre…suppositions of the definitions； from which all
further proofs have merely to be deduced。 But whence have we these categories which here
appear as definitions？ We find them doubtless in ourselves； in scientific culture。 The existence of
the understanding； the will； extension； is therefore not developed from infinite substance； but it is
directly expressed in these determinations； and that quite naturally； for of a truth there exists the
One into which everything enters； in order to be absorbed therein； but out of which nothing comes。
For as Spinoza has set up the great proposition； all determination implies negation （supra； p。 267）；
and as of everything； even of thought in contrast to extension； it may be shown that it is determined
and finite； what is essential in it rests upon negation。 Therefore God alone is the positive； the
affirmative； and consequently the one substance； all other things； on the contrary； are only
modifications of this substance； and are nothing in and for themselves。 Simple determination or
negation belongs only to form； but is quite another thing from absolute determinateness or
negativity； which is absolute form； in this way of looking at it negation is the negation of negation；
and therefore true affirmation。 This negative self…conscious moment； the movement of knowledge；
which pursues its way in the thought which is present before us； is however certainly lacking to the
content of Spinoza's philosophy； or at least it is only externally associated with it； since it falls
within self…consciousness。 That is to say； thoughts form the content； but they are not self…conscious
thoughts or Notions： the content signifies thought； as pure abstract self…consciousness； but an
unreasoning knowledge； into which the individual does not enter： the content has not the
signification of 'I。' Therefore the case is as in mathematics； a proof is certainly given； conviction
must follow； but yet the matter fails to be understood。 There is a rigid necessity in the proof； to
which the moment of self…consciousness is lacking； the 'I' disappears； gives itself altogether up；
merely withers away。 Spinoza's procedure is therefore quite correct； yet the individual proposition
is false； seeing that it expresses only one side of the negation。 The understanding has
determinations which do not contradict one another； contradiction the understanding cannot suffer。
The negation of negation is； however； contradiction； for in that it negates negation as simple
determination； it is on the one hand affirmation； but on the other hand also really negation； and this
contradiction； which is a matter pertaining to reason； is lacking in the case of Spinoza。 There is
lacking the infinite form； spirituality and liberty。 I have already mentioned before this （pp。 93； 94；
129…137） that Lullus and Bruno attempted to draw up a system of form； which should embrace
and comprehend the one substance which organizes itself into the universe； this attempt Spinoza
did not make。
Because negation was thus conceived by Spinoza in one…sided fashion merely； there is； in the third
place； in his system； an utter blotting out of the principle of subjectivity； individuality； personality；
the moment of self…consciousness in Being。 Thought has only the signification of the universal； not
of self…consciousness。 It is this lack which has； on the one side； brought the conception of the
liberty of the subject into such vehement antagonism to the system of Spinoza； because it set aside
the independence of the human consciousness； the so…called liberty which is merely the empty
abstraction of independence； and in so doing set aside God； as distinguished from nature and the
human consciousness — that is as implicit consciousness of freedom； of the spiritual； which is the
negative of the corporeal； and man has also the consciousness that his true Being lies in what is
opposed to the corporeal。 This has been firmly maintained by religion； theology； and the sound
common sense of the common consciousness； and this form of opposition to Spinoza appears first
of all in the assertion that freedom is real； and that evil exists。 But because for Spinoza； on the
other hand； there exists only absolute universal substance as the non…particularized； the truly real
— all that is particular and individual； my subjectivity and spirituality； has； on the other hand； as a
limited modification whose Notion depends on another； no absolute existence。 Thus the soul； the
Spirit； in so far as it is an individual Being； is for Spinoza a mere negation； like everything in general
that is determined。 As all differences and determinations of things and of consciousness simply go
back into the One substance； one may say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast
down into this abyss of annihilation。 But from this abyss nothing comes out； and the particular of
which Spinoza speaks is only assumed and presupposed from the ordinary conception； without
being justified。 Were it to be justified； Spinoza would have to deduce it from his Substance； but
that does not open itself out； and therefore comes to no vitality； spirituality or activity。 His
philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding substance； and not yet spirit； in it we are not at home
with ourselves。 But the reason that God is not spirit is that He is not the Three in One。 Substance
remains rigid and petrified； without Boehme's sources or springs； for the individual determinations
in the form of determinations of the understanding are not Boehme's originating spirits； which
energize and expand in one another （supra； pp。 202； 203）。 What we find regarding this particular
then is that it is only a modification of absolute substance； which； however； is not declared to be
such； for the moment of negativity is what is lacking to this rigid motionlessness； whose single form
of activity is this； to divest all things of their determination and particularity and cast them back into
the one absolute substance； wherein they are simply swallowed up； and all life in itself is utterly
destroyed。 This