the one absolute substance； wherein they are simply swallowed up； and all life in itself is utterly
destroyed。 This is what we find philosophically inadequate with Spinoza； distinctions are externally
present； it is true； but they remain external； since even the negative is not known in itself。 Thought
is the absolutely abstract； and for that very reason the absolutely negative； it is so in truth； but with
Spinoza it is not asserted to be the absolutely negative。 But if in opposition to Spinozism we hold
fast to the assertion that Spirit； as distinguishing itself from the corporeal； is substantial； actual； true；
and in the same way that freedom is not something merely privative； then this actuality in formal
thought is doubtless correct； yet it rests only upon feeling； but the further step is that the Idea
essentially includes within itself motion and vitality； and that it consequently has in itself the principle
of spiritual freedom。 On the one hand； therefore； the defect of Spinozism is conceived as
consisting in its want of correspondence with actuality； but on the other side it is to be
apprehended in a higher sense； I mean in the sense that substance with Spinoza is only the Idea
taken altogether abstractly； not in its vitality。
If； in conclusion； we sum up this criticism that we have offered； we would say that on the one hand
with Spinoza negation or privation is distinct from substance； for he merely assumes individual
determinations； and does not deduce them from substance。 On the other hand the negation is
present only as Nothing； for in the absolute there is no mode； the negative is not there； but only its
dissolution； its return： we do not find its movement； its Becoming and Being。 The negative is
conceived altogether as a vanishing moment — not in itself； but only as individual
self…consciousness； it is not like the Separator we met with in Boehme's system （supra； p。 206）。
Self…consciousness is born from this ocean； dripping with the water thereof； i。e。； never coming to
absolute self…hood； the heart； the independence is transfixed — the vital fire is wanting。 This lack
has to be supplied； the moment of self…consciousness has to be added。 It has the following two
special aspects； which we now perceive emerging and gaining acceptance； in the first place the
objective aspect； that absolute essence obtains in self…consciousness the mode of an object of
consciousness for which the “other” exists； or the existent as such； and that what Spinoza；
understood by the “modes” is elevated to objective reality its an absolute moment of the absolute；
in the second place we have the aspect of self…consciousness； individuality； independence。 As was
formerly the case with respect to Bacon and Boehme； the former aspect is here taken up by the
Englishman； John Locke； the latter by the German Leibnitz； in the first case it did not appear as a
moment； nor did it in the second appear as absolute Notion。 Now while Spinoza only takes notice
of these ordinary conceptions； and。 the highest point of view he reaches in regard to them is that
they sink and disappear in the one Substance； Locke on the contrary examines the genesis of
these conceptions； while Leibnitz opposes to Spinoza the infinite multiplicity of individuals；
although all these monads have one monad as the basis of their Being。 Both Locke and Leibnitz
therefore came forward as opponents of the abovementioned one…sidedness of Spinoza。
1。 Collectanea de vita B。 de Spinoza （addita Operibus ed。 Paulus Jenn？ 1802…1803； T。 II。）； pp。
593…604； 612…628 （Spinoza Epist。 LIII…LIV。 in Oper。 ed。 Paul T。 I。 pp。 638…640） 642…665；
Spinoz？ Oper。 ed。 Paul T。 II。 Pr？f。 p。 XVI。
2。 Collectanea de vita B。 de Spinoza； pp。 629…641； Spinoz？ Ethic。 （Oper。 T。 II。） Pp。 1； 3 et not。；
33。
3。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 I。 Prop。 V。 VIII。 X。 et Schol。； XIII。 pp。 37…39； 41； 42； 45。
4。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 I。 Prop。 XVII。； Coroll。 I。； II。； et Schol。； Prop。 XVIII。； Prop。 XX。； et Coroll。
I。 Prop。 XXI。； XXVI。； XXVII。； XXIX。； XXXII。； XXXIII。 Schol。 II。 pp。 51…57； 59； 61； 63； 67；
68。
5。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 I。； II。； VII。 et Schol。 pp。 78； 79； 82； 83。
6。 Spinoz。 Ethic。 P。 I。 Prop。 XXX…XXXII。 pp。 62； 63； P。 III。 Defin。 III。 p。 132； Prop。 XI。 Schol。；
p。 141。
7。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XI。 Demonst。 et Coroll。 pp。 86； 87； Defin。 IV。 pp。 77； 78。
8。 Dictionnaire historique et critique （édition de 1740； T。 IV。）； Article Spinosa； p。 261； Note N。
No。 IV。
9。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XII。； XIII。 et Schol。 Prop。 XIV。； XXIII。； V。 pp。 87…89； 95； 102；
80； 81。
10。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XI。 （Axiom I。 p。 78） et Demonstr。 Prop。 X。 pp。 85…87； Prop。
VI。 p。 81； P。 III。 Prop。 II。 pp。 133； 134。
11。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 III。 Prop。 VI…VIII。 Prop。 IX。 Schol。 pp。 139；1 140； P。 II。 Prop。 XLIX。
Coroll。 p。 123； P。 III。 Prop。 II。 Schol。 p。 136； P。 V。 Prop。 III。 Demonst。 et Coroll。 pp。 272； 273。
12。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 III。 Prop。 I。 p。 132； Prop。 III。 p。 138； P。 IV。 Pr？f。 p。 199； P。 III。 Prop。
XI。 Schol。 pp。 141； 142； P。 IV。 Prop。 II。 p。 205； P。 III。 Prop。 III。 et Schol。 p。 138。
13。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 V。 Prop。 XXXVI。 Schol。 Prop。 XXXVIL Demonstr。； Prop。 XXXVIII。 et
Schol。 pp。 293…295。
14。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XL。 Schol。 II。 pp。 113； 114。
15。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XLIV。 et Coroll。 II。 pp。 117； 118； Prop。 XLV。 p。 119； P。 V。
Prop。 XXX。 p。 289： P。 II。 Prop。 XXXII。 p。 107。
16。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 V。 Prop。 XIV。 p。 280； Prop。 VI。 p。 275； Prop。 XXVII。 pp。 287； 288；
Prop。 XXXII。 Coroll。； Prop。 XXXV。 pp。 291； 292。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I。 — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
A 3。 MALEBRANCHE
The philosophy of Malebranche is in point of matter entirely identical with that of Spinoza； but it
has another； a more religious and more theological form； on account of this form it never
encountered the opposition met with by Spinoza； and for the same reason Malebranche has never
been reproached with Atheism。
Nicholas Malebranche was born at Paris in 1638。 He was sickly and deformed in body； and was
hence brought up with great care。 He was diffident and loved solitude； in his twenty…second year
he entered the congrégation de l’ oratoire； a sort of spiritual order； and devoted himself to the
sciences。 In passing a bookseller’ s shop he happened accidentally to see Descartes’ work De
homine； he read it；and it interested him greatly — so much so that the reading of it brought on
severe palpitation and he was forced to cease。 This decided his future life； there awoke in him an
irrepressible inclination for Philosophy。 He was a man of most noble and gentle character； and of
the most genuine； and unswerving； piety。 He died at Paris in 1715； and in； the seventy…seventh
year of his age。（1）
His principal work bears the title： De la recherche de la vérité。 One part of it is entirely
metaphysical； but the greater part is altogether empirical。 For instance； Malebranche in the first
three books treats logically and psychologically of the errors in sight and hearing； in the imagination
and understanding。
a。 What is most important in this book is his idea of the origin of our knowledge。 He says： “The
essence of the soul is in thought； just as that of matter is in extension。 All else； such as sensation；
imagination and will； are modifications of thought。” He thus begins with two sides； between which
he sets an absolute chasm； and then he follows out in detail the Cartesian idea of the assistance of
God in knowledge。 His main point is that “the soul cannot attain to its conceptions and notions
from external things。” For when I and the thing are clearly independent of one another and have
nothing in common； the two can certainly not enter into relation with one another nor be for one
another。 “Bodies are impenetrable； their images would destroy one another on the way to the
organs。” But further： “The soul cannot beget ideas from itself； nor can they be inborn；” for as
“Augustine has said； ‘ Say not that ye yourselves are your own light。’ ” But how then comes
extension； the manifold； into the simple； into the spirit； since it is the reverse of the simple； namely
the diverse？ This question regarding the association of thought and extension is always an
important one in Philosophy。 According to Malebranche the answer is； “That we see all things in
God。” God Himself is the connection between us and them； and thus the unity between the thing
and thought。 “God has in Him the ideas of all things because He has created all； God is through
His omnipresence united in the most intimate way with spirits。 God thus is the place of spirits；” the
Universal of spirit； “just as space” is the universal； “the place of bodies。 Consequently the soul
knows in God what is in Him；” bodies； “inasmuch as He sets forth” （inwardly conceives）
“created existence； because all this is spiritual； intellectual； and present to the soul。〃（2） Because
things and God are intellectual and we too are intellectual； we perceive them in God as they are；
so to speak； intellectual in Him。 If this be further analyzed it in no way differs from Spinozism。
Malebranche