not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness； viz。 that objects outside of us are the
real and the true。 The finite is thus not grasped by Locke as absolute negativity； i。e。； in its
infinitude； this we shall not find until we come to deal in the third place with Leibnitz。 It is in a
higher sense that Leibnitz asserts individuality； the differentiated； to be self…existent and indeed
objectless； to be true Being。 That is to say； it is not according to him finite； but is yet distinguished；
thus； each monad is itself the totality。 Leibnitz and Locke hence likewise stand in a position of
mutual independence and antagonism。
John Locke was born in 1632； at Wrington； in England。 He studied for himself the Cartesian
philosophy at Oxford； setting aside the scholastic philosophy which was still in vogue。 He devoted
himself to the study of medicine； which； however； on account of his delicate health； he never really
practised。 In 1664 he went with an English ambassador for a year to Berlin。 After his return to
England； he became acquainted with the intellectual Earl of Shaftesbury of that time； who availed
himself of his medical advice； and in whose house he lived without requiring to give himself up to
practice。 When Lord Shaftesbury became Lord Chancellor of England； Locke received an office
from him； which； however； he soon lost by a change of ministry。 Owing to his dread of falling a
prey to consumption； he betook himself in 1675 to Montpellier for the benefit of his health。 When
his patron came into power again he once more recovered the place he had lost； only to be again
deposed on a fresh overthrow of this minister； and he was now compelled to flee from England。
“The act by means of which Locke was driven from Oxford” （what post he held there we are not
told） “was not an enactment of the University； but of James II。； by whose express command； and
by the peremptory authority of a written warrant； the expulsion was carried out。 From the
correspondence that took place； it is evident that the college submitted itself against its will to a
measure which it could not resist without compromising the peace and quiet of its members。”
Locke went to Holland； which was at that time the land wherein all who were obliged to effect
their escape from any oppression； whether political or religious； found protection； and in which the
most famous and liberal…minded men were to be met with。 The Court party persecuted him even
here； and by royal warrant he was ordered to be taken prisoner and sent to England； consequently
he had to remain hidden with his friends。 When William of Orange ascended the English throne；
after the Revolution of 1688； Locke returned with him to England。 He was there made
Commissioner of Trade and Plantation； gave to the world his famous treatise on the Human
Understanding； and finally； having withdrawn from public office or account of the delicacy of his
health； he spent his remaining years in the country houses of English nobles； he died on the 28th
day of October； 1704； in the seventy…third year of his life。（1）
The philosophy of Locke is much esteemed； it is still； for the most part； the philosophy of the
English and the French； and likewise in a certain sense of the Germans。 To put it in a few words； it
asserts on the one hand that truth and knowledge rest upon experience and observation； and on
the other the analysis of and abstraction from general determinations is prescribed as the method
of knowledge； it is； so to speak； a metaphysical empiricism； and this is the ordinary method
adopted in the sciences。 In respect of method； Locke thus employs an exactly opposite system to
that of Spinoza。 In the methods of Spinoza and Descartes an account of the origin of ideas may be
dispensed with； they are accepted at once as definitions； such as those of substance； the infinite；
mode； extension； etc。； all of which constitute a quite incoherent list。 But we require to show where
these thoughts come in； on what they are founded； and how they are verified。 Thus Locke has
striven to satisfy a true necessity。 For he has the merit of having deserted the system of mere
definitions； which were before this made the starting point； and of having attempted to make
deduction of general conceptions； inasmuch as he was； for example； at the pains to show how
substantiality arises subjectively from objects。 That is a further step than any reached by Spinoza；
who begins at once with definitions and axioms which are unverified。 Now they are derived； and
no longer oracularly laid down； even if the method and manner whereby this authentication is
established is not the right one。 That is to say； here the matter in question is merely subjective； and
somewhat psychological； since Locke merely describes the methods of mind as it appears to us to
be。 For in his philosophy we have more especially to deal with the derivation of the general
conceptions； or ideas； as he called them； that are present in our knowledge； and with their origin
as they proceed from what is outwardly and inwardly perceptible。 Malebranche no doubt likewise
asks how we arrive at conceptions； and thus he apparently has before him the same subject of
investigation as has Locke。 But firstly； this psychological element in Malebranche is merely the
later development； and then to him the universal or God is plainly first； while Locke commences at
once with individual perceptions； andonly from them does he proceed to Notions； to God。 The
universal to Locke is； therefore； merely a later result； the work of our minds； it is simply something
pertaining to thought； as subjective。 Every man undoubtedly knows that when his consciousness
develops empirically； he commences from feelings； from quite concrete conditions； and that it is
only later on that general conceptions come in； which are connected with the concrete of sensation
by being contained therein。 Space； for example； comes to consciousness later than the spacial； the
species later than the individual； and it is only through the activity of my consciousness that the
universal is separated from the particular of conception； feeling； etc。 Feeling undoubtedly comes
lowest； it is the animal mode of spirit； but in its capacity as thinking； spirit endeavours to transform
feeling into its own form。 Thus the course adopted by Locke is quite a correct one； but all dialectic
considerations are utterly and entirely set aside； since the universal is merely analyzed from the
empirical concrete。 And in this matter Kant reproaches Locke with reason； the individual is not the
source of universal conceptions； but the understanding。
As to Locke's further reflections； they are very simple。 Locke considers how the understanding is
only consciousness； and in being so is something in consciousness； and he only recognizes the
implicit in as far as it is in the same。
a。 Locke's philosophy is more especially directed against Descartes； who； like Plato； had spoken
of innate ideas。 Locke likewise makes special examination of the “inborn impressions （notiones
communes in foro interiori descript？）” which Lord Herbert assumes in his work De veritate。
In the first book of his work Locke combats the so…called innate ideas； theoretic as well as
practical； i。e。； the universal； absolutely existent ideas which at the same time are represented as
pertaining to mind in a natural way。 Locke said that we arrive first at that which we call idea。 By
this he understands not the essential determinations of man； but conceptions which we have and
which are present and exist in consciousness as such： in the same way we all have arms and legs
as parts of our bodies； and the desire to eat exists in everyone。 In Locke we thus have the
conception of the soul as of a contentless tabula rasa which is by…and…by filled with what we call
experience。（2） The expression “innate principles” was at that time common； and these innate
principles have sometimes been foolishly spoken of。 But their true signification is that they are
implicit； that they are essential moments in the nature of thought； qualities of a germ； which do not
yet exist： only in relation to this last there is an element of truth in Locke's conclusions。 As diverse
conceptions essentially determined they are only legitimatized by its being shown that they are
implied in the essential nature of thought； but as propositions which hold good as axioms； and
conceptions which are immediately accepted as laid down in definitions； they undoubtedly possess
the form of that which is present and inborn。 As they are regarded they are bound to have value in
and for themselves； but this is a mere assertion。 From the other point of view the question of
whence they come is a futile one。 Mind is undoubtedly determined in itself； for it is the explicitly
existent Notion； its development signifies the coming to consciousness。 But the determinations
which it brings forth from itself cannot be called innate； for this development must be occasioned
by an external； and only on that does the activity of mind react； in order that it may for the first
time become conscious of its reality。
The grounds on which Locke refutes innate ideas are emp