time become conscious of its reality。
The grounds on which Locke refutes innate ideas are empirical。 “There is nothing more commonly
taken for granted than that there are certain principles； both speculative and practical； universally
agreed upon by all mankind： which therefore； they argue； must needs be constant impressions
which the souls of men receive in their first Beings。” But this universal consent is not to be found。
We may instance the proposition； “Whatsoever is； is； and It is impossible for the same thing to be
and not to be； which of all others I think have the most allowed title to innate。” But this
proposition does not hold good for the Notion； there is nothing either in heaven or earth which
does not contain Being and non…Being。 Many men； “All children and idiots；” says Locke； “have
not the least apprehension of these propositions。” “No proposition can be said to be in the mind
which it never yet knew； which it was never yet conscious of。 。 。 。 'Tis usually answered； That all
men know and assent to them” （the propositions） “when they come to the use of reason。 。 。 。 If it
be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims； it would prove them
not to be innate。” Reason is said to be the deriving from principles already known unknown
truths。 How then should the application of reason be required to discover supposed innate
principles？ This is a weak objection； for it assumes that by innate ideas we understand those which
man possesses in consciousness as immediately present。 But development； in consciousness is
something altogether different from any inherent determination of reason； and therefore the
expression innate idea is undoubtedly quite wrong。 Innate principles must be found “clearest and
most perspicuous nearest the fountain； in children and illiterate people； who have received least
impression from foreign opinion。” Locke gives further reasons of a similar nature； more especially
employing those which are of a practical kind … the diversity in moral judgments； the case of those
who are utterly wicked and depraved； devoid of sense of right or conscience。（3）
b。 In the second book Locke goes on to the next stage； to the origin of ideas； and seeks to
demonstrate this process from experience … this is the main object of his efforts。 The reason that
the positive point of view which he opposes to any derivation from within； is so false； is that he
derives his conceptions only from outside and thus maintains Being for…another； while he quite
neglects the implicit。 He says： “Every man being conscious to himself； that he thinks； and that
which his mind is applied about； while thinking； being the ideas that are there； 'tis past doubt； that
men have in their minds several ideas； such as those expressed in the words； whiteness； hardness；
sweetness； thinking； motion； man； elephant； army； drunkenness； and others。” Idea here signifies
both the ordinary conception and thought； we understand something quite different by the word
idea。 “It is in the first place then to be inquired； how he comes by them” （these ideas）？ Innate
ideas have already been refuted。 “Let us then suppose the mind to be； as we say； white paper；
void of all characters； without any ideas； how comes it to be furnished？ 。 。 。 To this I answer in a
word； from Experience： in that all our knowledge is founded。”（4）
As to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true that man commences with
experience if he desires to arrive at thought。 Everything is experienced； not merely what is
sensuous； but also what excites and stimulates my mind。 Consciousness thus undoubtedly obtains
all conceptions and Notions from experience and in experience； the only question is what we
understand by experience。 In a usual way when this is spoken of the idea of nothing particular is
conveyed； we speak of it as of something quite well known。 But experience is nothing more than
the form of objectivity； to say that it is something which is in consciousness means that it has
objective form for consciousness or that consciousness experiences it； it sees it as an objective。
Experience thus signifies immediate knowledge； perception； i。e。； I myself must have and be
something； and the consciousness of what I have and am is experience。 Now there is no question
as to this； that whatever we know； of whatever kind it may be； must be experienced； that rests in
the conception of the thing。 It is absurd to say that one knows anything which is not in experience。
I undoubtedly know men； for instance； from experience； without requiring to have seen them all；
for I have； as man； activity and will； a consciousness respecting what I am and what others are。
The rational exists； i。e。； it is as an existent for consciousness； or this last experiences it； it must be
seen and heard； it must be there or have been there as a phenomenon in the world。 This
connection of universal with objective is however in the second place not the only form； that of the
implicit is likewise absolute and essential … that is； the apprehension of what is experienced or the
abrogation of this apparent other…being and the knowledge of the necessity of the thing through
itself。 It is now quite a matter of indifference whether anything is accepted as something
experienced； as a succession of empirical ideas； if one may so say； or conceptions； or whether the
succession is a succession of thoughts； i。e。； implicitly existent。
Locke treats of the various kinds of these ideas imperfectly and empirically merely。
According to Locke simple ideas arise； partly from outward； and partly from inward experience。
For experiences； he says； are in the first place sensations； the other side is reflection； the inward
determinations of consciousness。（5） From sensation； from the organs of sight for instance； the
conceptions of colour； light； etc。； arise； there further arises from outward experience the idea of
impenetrability； of figure； rest； motion and such like。 From reflections come the ideas of faith；
doubt； judgment； reasoning； thinking； willing； etc。； from both combined； pleasure； pain； etc。 This is
a very commonplace account of the matter。
After Locke has pre…supposed experience； he goes on to say that it is the understanding which
now discovers and desires the universal … the complex ideas。 The Bishop of Worcester made the
objection that “If the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason； then we must
allow an idea of substance which comes not in by sensation or reflection。” Locke replies：
“General ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection； but are the creatures or
inventions of the understanding。 The mind makes them from ideas which it has got by sensation
and reflection。” The work of the mind now consists in bringing forth from several simple so…called
ideas a number of new ones； by means of its working upon this material through comparing；
distinguishing and contrasting it； and finally through separation or abstraction； whereby the
universal conceptions； such as space； time； existence； unity and diversity； capacity； cause and
effect； freedom； necessity； take their rise。 “The mind in respect of its simple ideas is wholly
passive； and receives them all from the existence and operation of things； such as sensation or
reflection offers them； without being able to make any one idea。” But “the mind often exercises
an active power in making these several combinations。 For it being once furnished with simple
ideas it can put them together in several combinations。” According to Locke therefore thought
itself is not the essence of the soul； but one of its powers and manifestations。 He maintains thought
to be existent in consciousness as conscious thought； and thus brings it forward as a fact in his
experience； that we do not always think。 Experience demonstrates dreamless sleep when the sleep
is profound。 Locke quotes the example of a man who remembered no dream until he had reached
his twenty…fifth year。 It is as in the Xenien； … （6）
Oft schon war ich； und hab' wirklich an gar nichts gedacht。
That is to say； my object is not a thought。 But sensuous perception and recollection are thought；
and thought is truth。（7） Locke； however； places the reality of the understanding only in the formal
activity of constituting new determinations from the simple conceptions received by means of
perception； through their comparison and the combination of several into one； it is the
apprehension of the abstract sensations which are contained in the objects。 Locke likewise
distinguishes （Bk。 11。 chap。 xi。 § 15…17） between pure and mixed modes。 Pure modes are simple
determinations such as power； number； infinitude； in such expressions as causality we reach； on
the other hand； a mixed mode。
Locke now explains in detail the manner in which the mind； from the simple ideas of experience；
reaches more complex ideas； but this derivation of general determinations from concrete
perception is most unmeaning； trivial； tiresome and diffuse； it is entirely formal； an empty tautology。
For instance we form the general conception of space from the perception of the distance