the objects themselves； in mind and thought。
B 3。 THOMAS HOBBES。
a。 Hobbes； who was celebrated and distinguished on account of the originality of his views； was
tutor to the Earl of Devonshire； he was born in 1588 at Malmesbury； and died in 1679。（3） As a
contemporary of Cromwell； he found in the events of that time； in the Revolution which then took
place in England； an occasion for reflecting on the principles of state and law； and in fact he
succeeded in making his way to quite original conceptions。 He wrote much； including a treatise on
Philosophy； entitled “The Elements of Philosophy。” The first section （Sectio） of this work； De
corpore； appeared in London in 1655； in it he first of all treats of Logic （Pars I。）； and secondly of
philosophia prima （Pars III。）； this last is an ontology and metaphysic。 The next subdivision （Pars
III。）； “On the relation between motion and magnitude；” is a system of mechanism； a quite popular
system of physics； and a study of the human organs。 The second section was to treat of the nature
of man （De homine）； and the third of the state （De cive）； but the intellectual sections of the work
Hobbes did not entirely finish。 He says in his preface that Copernicus first opened up astronomy；
and Galileo physics； before them there was nothing certain in either science。 Harvey worked out
the science of the human body； and physics generally as well as astronomy were perfected by
Keppler。 All this was termed Philosophy； in accordance with the point of view which has been
already given （p。 313）； since in it the reflective understanding desires to know the universal。
Hobbes further says concerning the philosophy of the state （philosophia civilis）； that it only dates
from the publication of his book De cive。（4） This work； which appeared at Paris in 1642；（5） is；
like his Leviathan； a much decried book； the second mentioned writing was forbidden to be
circulated； and is hence very rare。 Both works contain sounder reflections on the nature of society
and government than many now in circulation。 Society； the state； is to Hobbes absolutely
preeminent； it is the determining power without appeal as regards law and positive religion and
their external relations； and because he placed these in subjection to the state； his doctrines were
of course regarded with the utmost horror。 But there is nothing speculative or really philosophic in
them； and there is still less in Hugo Grotius。
Before this ideals were set before us； or Holy Scripture or positive law was quoted as
authoritative。 Hobbes； on the contrary； sought to derive the bond which holds the state together；
that which gives the state its power； from principles which lie within us； which we recognize as our
own。 In this way two opposite principles arise。 The first is the passive obedience of subjects； the
divine authority of rulers； whose will is absolute law； and is itself elevated above all other law。 All
this is represented in close connection with religion； and proved by examples from the Old
Testament； by such stories as those of Saul and David。 Criminal and marriage laws； too； for long
derived their character from the Mosaic laws； or； speaking generally； from those the provisions of
which possessed their value by the fact of being established by express divine command。 On the
other hand we have in the second place the reasoning wherein we ourselves are the determining
agents； and which was called sound reason。 In the movement which Cromwell made use of there
was allied with this a fanaticism； which from the written letter drew opposite conclusions to the
above； and this we see exemplified in the equality of property； for instance。 Hobbes； it is true；
likewise maintained passive obedience； the absolute freedom of the royal will and power； but at
the same time he sought to derive the principles of monarchical power； etc。； from universal
determinations。 The views that he adopts are shallow and empirical； but the reasons he gives for
them； and the propositions he makes respecting them； are original in character； inasmuch as they
are derived from natural necessities and wants。
Hobbes maintained that “The origin of all society is to be found in the mutual fear of all its
members；” it is hence a phenomenon in consciousness。 “Each association is thus formed in its
own interest or for its own renown； that is； from selfish motives。” All such matters as security of
life； property； and enjoyment； are not to be found outside it。 “But men have in all dissimilarity of
strength a natural similarity as well。” This Hobbes proves by a characteristic reason； viz。 that
“each individual can make away with the other；” each is the ultimate power over the others。
“Each can be supreme。”（6） Thus their similarity is not derived from the greatest strength； it is not；
as in modern times； founded on the freedom of the spirit； or on an equality of merit and
independence； but on the equal weakness of mankind； each man is weak as regards others。
b。 Hobbes further takes up the position that this natural condition is of such a nature that all
possess the desire to rule over one another。 “All in their natural condition are possessed of the will
to injure others；” to tyrannize over other men； each has thus to fear the other。 Hobbes looks at
this condition in its true light； and we find in him no idle talk about a state of natural goodness； the
natural condition is really far more like that of the animals — a condition in which there is an
unsubdued individual will。 All thus wish to “secure themselves against the pretensions of others； to
acquire for themselves advantages and superior rights。 Opinions； religions； desires； arouse strife；
the stronger bears away the victory。 The natural condition is consequently a condition of mistrust
on the part of all toward all； it is a war of all against all （bellum omnium in omnes）；” and the
endeavour of one to overreach another。 The expression nature has a double significance： In the
first place the nature of man signifies his spiritual and rational Being； but his natural condition
indicates quite another condition； wherein man conducts himself according to his natural impulses。
In this way he conducts himself in conformity with his desires and inclinations； while the rational； on
the contrary； is the obtaining supremacy over the immediately natural。 “In the condition of nature a
certain irresistible power grants the right to rule over those who cannot resist； it is absurd to leave
those whom we have in our power to become free and strong again。”
From this Hobbes draws the conclusion that “man must go forth from the natural condition。”（7）
This is true； the natural condition is not what it should be； and must hence be cast off。
c。 Hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason which preserve tranquillity。 This condition of law is
the subjection of the natural； particular will of the individual to the universal will； which； however； is
not that of all individuals； but is the will of the ruler； this is consequently not responsible to
individuals； but is directed against this private will； and to it all must be obedient。（8） Thus the
whole matter is now placed on quite another footing。 But because the universal will is made to
reside in the will of one monarch； there nevertheless proceeds from this point of view； which is
really correct； a condition of absolute rule； of perfect despotism。 The condition of law does not；
however； mean that the arbitrary will of one man constitutes absolute law； for the universal will is
no despotism； being rational； inasmuch as it is consistently expressed and determined in laws。
Rixner （Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 p。 30） says： “Law to him is nothing
but the sum of the conditions of peace extorted by iron necessity from the original wickedness of
mankind。” We might add that in Hobbes we at least find this； that the nature and organism of the
State is established on the principle of human nature； human desire； &c。 The English concerned
themselves greatly with that principle of passive obedience； in accordance with which it is said that
kings receive their power from God。 This； in one aspect； is quite true； but in another it is falsely
taken to mean that they have no responsibility； that their blind desires； their merely subjective will；
is what must be obeyed。
B 4。 CUDWORTH。 CLARKE。 WOLLASTON。
Cudworth wished to revive Plato in England； but to do this after the manner of the demonstrations
which we met with in Descartes； and through a trivial metaphysic of the understanding。 He wrote a
celebrated work： “The true intellectual System of the Universe；” but the Platonic ideas expressed
are often in a clumsy form and mingled with the Christian conceptions of God and angels — all
regarded as particular existent things。 What in Plato is mythical； is here taken as reality in the form
of existence； this is reasoned about just as we reason respecting a matter of ordinary fact； such as
whether it is probable that the French seek to effect a landing in England； and if so； whether they
will successfully accomplish it。 The Christian intellectual world is dragged do