monads； separates itself also into two sides； namely universal Being and Being as the unity of
opposites。
That universal is God； as the cause of the world； to the consciousness of whom the above
principle of sufficient reason certainly forms the transition。 The existence of God is only an
inference from eternal truths； for these must as the laws of nature have a universal sufficient reason
which determines itself as none other than God。 Eternal truth is therefore the consciousness of the
universal and absolute in and for itself； and this universal and absolute is God； who； as one with
Himself； the monad of monads； is the absolute Monad。 Here we again have the wearisome proof
of His existence： He is the fountain of eternal truths and Notions； and without Him no potentiality
would have actuality； He has the prerogative of existing immediately in His potentiality。（21） God is
here also the unity of potentiality and actuality； but in an uncomprehending manner； what is
necessary； but not comprehended； is transferred to Him。 Thus God is at first comprehended
chiefly as universal； but already in the aspect of the relation of opposites。
As regards this second aspect； the absolute relation of opposites； it occurs in the first place in the
form of absolute opposites of thought； the good and the evil。 “God is the Author of the world；”
says Leibnitz； that refers directly to evil。 It is round this relation that philosophy specially revolves；
but to the unity of which it did not then attain； the evil in the world was not comprehended；
because no advance was made beyond the fixed opposition。 The result of Leibnitz's Théodicée is
an optimism supported on the lame and wearisome thought that God； since a world had to be
brought into existence； chose out of infinitely many possible worlds the best possible — the most
perfect； so far as it could be perfect； considering the finite element which it was to contain。（22）
This may very well be said in a general way； but this perfection is no determined thought； but a
loose popular expression； a sort of babble respecting an imaginary or fanciful potentiality； Voltaire
made merry over it。 Nor is the nature of the finite therein defined。 Because the world； it is said； has
to be the epitome of finite Beings； evil could not be separated from it； since evil is negation；
finitude。（23） Reality and negation remain standing in opposition to one another exactly in the same
way as before。 That is the principal conception in the Théodicée。 But something very like this can
be said in every day life。 If I have some goods brought to me in the market at some town； and say
that they are certainly not perfect； but the best that are to be got； this is quite a good reason why I
should content myself with them。 But comprehension is a very different thing from this。 Leibnitz
says nothing further than that the world is good； but there is also evil in it； the matter remains just
the same as it was before。 “Because it had to be finite” is then a mere arbitrary choice on the part
of God。 The next question would be： Why and how is there finitude in the Absolute and His
decrees？ And only then should there be deduced from the determination of finitude the evil which
no doubt exists therein。
It is true that Leibnitz has a reply to the above question： 〃God does not will what is evil； evil comes
only indirectly into the results” （blind）； “because oftentimes the greater good could not be
achieved if evils were not present。 Therefore they are means to a good end。〃 But why does not
God employ other means？ They are always external； not in and for themselves。 “A moral evil may
not be regarded as a means； nor must we； as the apostle says； do evil that good may come； yet it
has often the relation of a conditio sine qua non of the good。 Evil is in God only the object of a
permissive will （voluntatis permissiv？）；” but everything that is wrong would be such。 “God has
therefore among the objects of His will the best possible as the ultimate object； but the good as a
matter of choice （qualemcunque）； also as subordinate； and things indifferent and evils often as
means。 Evil is； however； an object of His will only as the condition of something otherwise
necessary （rei alioqui debit？）； which without it could not exist； in which sense Christ said it must
needs be that offences come。”（24）
In a general sense we are satisfied with the answer： “In accordance with the wisdom of God we
must accept it as a fact that the laws of nature are the best possible；” but this answer does not
suffice for a definite question。 What one wishes to know is the goodness of this or that particular
law； and to that no answer is given。 If； for example； it is said that “The law of falling bodies； in
which the relation of time and space is the square； is the best possible；” one might employ； as far
as mathematics are concerned； any other power whatever。 When Leibnitz answers： “God made it
so；” this is no answer at all。 We wish to know the definite reason of this law； such general
determinations sound pious； but are not satisfying。
He goes on to say that the sufficient reason has reference to the representation of the monads。 The
principles of things are monads； of which each is for itself； without having influence on the others。 If
now the Monad of monads； God； is the absolute substance； and individual monads are created
through His will； their substantiality comes to an end。 There is therefore a contradiction present；
which remains unsolved in itself — that is between the one substantial monad and the many
monads for which independence is claimed； because their essence consists in their standing in no
relation to one another。 Yet at the same time； in order to show the harmony that exists in the
world； Leibnitz understands the relation of monads to monads more generally as the unity of
contrasted existences； namely of soul and body。 This unity he represents as a relation without
difference； and notionless； i。e。 as a pre…established harmony。（25） Leibnitz uses here the illustration
of two clocks； which are set to the same hour； and keep the same time；（26） in the same way the
movement of the kingdom of thought goes on； determined in accordance with ends； and the
movement onward of the corporeal kingdom which corresponds with it； proceeds according to a
general casual connection。（27） The case is the same as with Spinoza； that these two sides of the
universe have no connection with each other； the one does not influence the other； but both are
entirely indifferent to one another； it is really the differentiating relation of the Notion that is lacking。
In abstract thought that is without Notion； that determination now receives the form of simplicity；
of implicitude； of indifference with regard to what is other； of a self…reflection that has no
movement： in this way red in the abstract is in a position of indifference as regards blue； &c。 Here；
as before； Leibnitz forsakes his principle of individuation； it has only the sense of being exclusively
one； and of not reaching to and including what is other； or it is only a unity of the popular
conception； not the Notion of unity。 The soul has thus a series of conceptions and ideas which are
developed from within it； and this series is from the very first placed within the soul at its creation；
i。e。； the soul is in all immediacy this implicit determination； determination is； however； not implicit；
but the reflected unfolding of this determination in the ordinary conception is its outward existence。
Parallel with this series of differentiated conceptions； there now runs a series of motions of the
body； or of what is external to the soul。（28） Both are essential moments of reality； they are
mutually indifferent； but they have also an essential relation of difference。
Since now every monad； as shut up within itself； has no influence upon the body and its
movements； and yet the infinite multitude of their atoms correspond with one another； Leibnitz
places this harmony in God； a better definition of the relation and the activity of the Monad of
monads is therefore that it is what pre…establishes harmony in the changes of the monads。（29） God
is the sufficient reason； the cause of this correspondence； He has so arranged the multitude of
atoms that the original changes which are developed within one monad correspond with the
changes of the others。 The pre…established harmony is to be thought of somewhat in this style；
when a dog gets a beating； the pain develops itself in him； in like fashion the beating develops itself
in itself； and so does the person who administers the beating； their determinations all correspond
with one another； and that not by means of their objective connection； since each is
independent。（30） The principle of the harmony among the monads does not consequently belong
to them； but it is in God； who for that very reason is the Monad of monads； their absolute unity。
We saw from the beginning how Leibnitz arrived at this conception。 Each monad is really
possessed of the power of representation； and is as such a representation of the universe；
therefore implicitly the totality of the whole world。 But at the same ti