possessed of the power of representation； and is as such a representation of the universe；
therefore implicitly the totality of the whole world。 But at the same time this representation is not in
consciousness； the naked monad is implicitly the universe； and difference is the development of this
totality in it。（31） What develops itself therein is at the same time in harmony with all other
developments； all is one harmony。 “In the universe all things are closely knit together； they are in
one piece； like an ocean： the slightest movement transmits its influence far and wide all
around。”（32） From a single grain of sand； Leibnitz holds； the whole universe might be
comprehended in its entire development if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly。 There is not
really much in all this； though it sounds very fine； for the rest of the universe is considerably more
than a grain of sand； well though we knew it； and considerably different therefrom。 To say that its
essence is the universe is mere empty talk： for the fact is that the universe as essence is not the
universe。 To the sand grain much must be added which is not present； and since thought adds
more than all the grains of sand that exist； the universe and its development may in this way
certainly be comprehended。 Thus according to Leibnitz every monad has or is the representation
of the entire universe； which is the same as saying that it is really representation in general； but at
the same time it is a determinate representation； by means of which it comes to be this particular
monad； therefore it is representation according to its particular situation and circumstances。（33）
The representations of the monad in itself； which constitute its universe； develop themselves from
themselves； as the spiritual element in it； according to the laws of their own activity and desire； just
as the movements of their outer world do according to laws of bodies； hence liberty is nothing
other than this spontaneity of immanent development； but as in consciousness。 The magnetic
needle； on the contrary； has only spontaneity without consciousness； and consequently without
freedom。 For； says Leibnitz； the nature of the magnetic needle is to turn to the north； if it had
consciousness it would imagine that this was its self…determination； it would thus have the will to
move round in accordance with its nature。（34） But it is clear that in the course of conscious
representations there is involved no necessary connection； but contingency and want of sequence
are to be found； the reason of this according to Leibnitz （Oper。 T。 II。 P。 I。 p。 75） being “because
the nature of a created substance implies that it changes incessantly according to a certain order；
which order guides it spontaneously （spontanément） in all the circumstances which befall it； so that
one who sees all things recognizes in the present condition of substance the past also and the
future。 The law of order； which determines the individuality of the particular substance； has an
exact reference to what takes place in every other substance and in the whole universe。” The
meaning of this is that the monad is not a thing apart； or that there are two views of it； the one
making it out as spontaneously generating its representations； so far as form is concerned； and the
other making it out to be a moment of the whole of necessity； Spinoza would call this regarding it
from both sides。 An organic whole； a human being； is thus for instance the assertion of his aim
from out of himself： at the same time the being directed on something else is involved in his Notion。
He represents this and that to himself； he wills this and that； his activity employs itself and brings
about changes。 His inward determination thus becomes corporeal determination； and then change
going beyond himself； he appears as cause； influencing other monads。 But this Being…for…another is
only an appearance。 For the other； i。e。； the actual； in so far as the monad determines it or makes it
negative； is the passive element which the monad has in itself： all moments are indeed contained
therein； and for that very reason it has no need of other monads； but only of the laws of the
monads in itself。 But if the Being…for…another is mere appearance； the same may be said of
Being…for…self； for this has significance only in reference to Being…for…another。
The important point in Leibnitz's philosophy is this intellectuality of representation which Leibnitz；
however； did not succeed in carrying out； and for the same reason this intellectuality is at the same
time infinite multiplicity； which has remained absolutely independent； because this intellectuality has
not been able to obtain mastery over the One。 The separation in the Notion； which proceeds as
far as release from itself； or appearance in distinct independence； Leibnitz did not succeed in
bringing together into unity。 The harmony of these two moments； the course of mental
representations and the course of things external； appearing mutually as cause and effect； is not
brought by Leibnitz into relation in and for themselves； he therefore lets them fall asunder； although
each is passive as regards the other。 He moreover considers both of them in one unity； to be sure；
but their activity is at the same time not for themselves。 Every forward advance becomes therefore
incomprehensible when taken by itself； because the course of the representation as through aims in
itself； requires this moment of Other…Being or of passivity； and again the connection of cause and
effect requires the universal： each however lacks this its other moment。 The unity which according
to Leibnitz is to be brought about by the pre…established harmony； namely that the determination
of the will of man and the outward change harmonize； is therefore brought about by means of
another； if not indeed from without； for this other is God。 Before God the monads are not to be
independent； but ideal and absorbed in Him。
At this point the demand would come in that in God Himself there should be comprehended the
required unity of that which before fell asunder； and God has the special privilege of having laid on
Him the burden of what cannot be comprehended。 The word of God is thus the makeshift which
leads to a unity which itself is only hypothetical； for the process of the many out of this unity is not
demonstrated。 God plays therefore in the later philosophy a far greater part than in the early；
because now the comprehension of the absolute opposition of thought and Being is the chief
demand。 With Leibnitz the extent to which thoughts advance is the extent of the universe； where
comprehension ceases； the universe ceases； and God begins： so that later it was even maintained
that to be comprehended was derogatory to God； because he was thus degraded into finitude。 In
that procedure a beginning is made from the determinate； this and that are stated to be necessary；
but since in the next place the unity of these moments is not comprehended； it is transferred to
God。 God is therefore； as it were； the waste channel into which all contradictions flow： Leibnitz's
Théodicée is just a popular summing up such as this。 There are； nevertheless； all manner of
evasions to be searched out — in the opposition of God's justice and mercy； that the one tempers
the other； how the fore…knowledge of God and human freedom are compatible — all manner of
syntheses which never come to the root of the matter nor show both sides to be moments。
These are the main moments of Leibnitz's philosophy。 It is a metaphysic which starts from a
narrow determination of the understanding； namely； from absolute multiplicity； so that connection
can only be grasped as continuity。 Thereby absolute unity is certainly set aside； but all the same it
is presupposed； and the association of individuals with one another is to be explained only in this
way； that it is God who determines the harmony in the changes of individuals。 This is an artificial
system； which is founded on a category of the understanding； that of the absoluteness of abstract
individuality。 What is of importance in Leibnitz lies in the maxims； in the principle of individuality
and the maxim of indistinguishability。
1。 La vie de Mr。 Leibnitz par Mr。 le Chevalier de Jaucourt （Essais de Théodicée； par Leibnitz；
Amsterdam； 1747； T。 I。）； pp。 1…28； 45； 59…62； 66…74； 77…80； 87…92； 110…116； 148…151；
Brucker。 Hist。 crit。 phil。； T。 IV。 P。 II。 pp。 335…368； Leibnitzii Opera omnia （ed。 Dutens）； T。 II。； P
I。 pp。 45； 46。
2。 Vie de Mr。 Leibnitz； pp。 134…143； Brucker。 Hist。 crit。 philos。 T。 IV。 P。 II。 pp。 385； 389；
Tennemann； vol。 xi。 pp。 181； 182。
3。 Leibnitzii Opera； T。 II。 P。 I。 pp。 32…39。
4。 Ibidem； Principia philosophi？； pp。 20…31。
5。 cf。 Leibnitz： Essais de Théodicée； T。 I。 P。 I。 § 10； p。 86。
6。 Leibnitz： Principes de la nature et la grace； § 1； p。 32 （Recueil de diverses pièces par
Des…Maiseaux； T。 II。 p。 485）； Principia philosophi？； § 1； 2； p。 20。
7。 Leibnitzii De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum （Oper。 T。 II。 P。 II。）； § 11；
p。 55； Principia philosophi？； § 3…6； 18； pp。 20…22； Principes de la nature et de la grace； §