Beattie： Essays on the nature and immutability of Truth； &c。 （Edinburh； 1772）； Pt。 I。； chap。 i。； pp。
18…31 （translated into German； Copenhagen and Leipzig； 1772； pp。 24…42）； chap。 ii。 Sect。 2； pp。
37…42 （pp。 49…55）； &c。
4。 Cf。 James Oswald： An Appeal of common…sense in behalf of religion （Edinburgh； 1772）； Vol。 I。
Book I。 Introduction； p。 12 （translated by Wilmsen； Leipzig； 1774； p。 11）。
5。 Rixner； ibidem； § 121； p。 262； cf。 James Oswald； ibidem； Vol。 II。 Book II。 chap。 i。 pp。 50； 51
（pp。 54； 55）。
6。 The name assumed by Abraham Tucker。…＇Translator's note。＇
7。 Lectures of 1825…1826。
8。 Lectures of 1829…1830。
9。 The name assumed by Abraham Tucker。…＇Translator's note。＇
10。 Lectures of 1825…1826。
11。 Lectures of 1829…1830。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period
C。 French Philosophy
We pass onto the French philosophy； the relation it bears to metaphysics is this； that while man as
a metaphysician stands to himself in the attitude of a layman or outsider； French philosophy does
away with the lay or outside position in regard alike to politics； religion； and philosophy。 Two
forms have to be mentioned which are of the greatest importance in respect to culture — French
philosophy and the Aufkl？rung。 With the English we saw a certain idealism only： this was either
formal； as the mere general translation of Being into Being…for…another； i。e。； into perceptibility； or
else what is implicit in this perceptibility； instincts； impulses； habits； &c。 — blind determinate forces；
a return into self…consciousness； which itself appears as a physical thing。 In that first idealism the
whole finitude and extension of appearances； of sensations； and likewise of thoughts and
determinate fixed conceptions； remain just what they are in the unphilosophic consciousness。 The
scepticism of Hume makes all that is universal sink into habits and instincts； i。e。； it consists in a
more simple synthesis of the phenomenal world； but these simpler elements； these instincts；
impulses； and forces； are just as much a fixed present existence in self…consciousness； unspiritual；
and without movement。 The French philosophy has more life； more movement； more spirit； it
would perhaps be more correct to describe it as full of life and spirit。 It is the absolute Notion；
which revolts against the whole reigning system of prevalent conceptions and established ideas；
which overthrows all that has settled into fixity； and acquires the consciousness of perfect liberty。
At the root of this idealistic activity lies the certainty that whatever is； whatever counts for anything
in itself； is all a matter of self…consciousness； and as to Notions （individual and isolated existences
ruling actual self…consciousness）； such as the Notions of good and evil； of power and riches； and
the fixed conceptions regarding faith in God and His relation to the world； His mode of
government and； further； the duties of self…consciousness towards Him — that all these are not
truths in themselves； having validity beyond the bounds of self…consciousness。 All these forms； the
real implicitude of the actual world and also of the supersensuous world； are therefore set aside in
this spirit conscious of itself。 It does not trouble itself seriously about those who admit the validity
of these conceptions just as they are； and accept them as true； respecting them as independent and
free apart from self…consciousness； but it speaks of such conceptions with intelligence and spirit；
that is to say； it asserts that self…consciousness by its activity is the first to make anything of them；
and to make that a something very different from what they profess to be； for the self…conscious
spirit only intellectual relations； these processes of formation and movement by means of its
self…consciousness； possess validity and interest。 This is the character of the Notion in its actuality；
what has reality for this all…perceiving and all…comprehending consciousness is held to be valid。
We must now consider what form existence takes for this absolutely comprehending self…
consciousness。 In the first place this Notion is fixed as the negative movement of the Notion only；
the positive and simple； or existence； falls outside of this movement。 There remains to the Notion
no distinction； no content； for all determinate content is lost in that negativity。 This empty existence
is for us pure thought generally； what the French call être suprême； or if represented objectively
as existent； and as in opposition to consciousness； it is matter。 Absolute Being is therefore
determined as matter； as empty objectivity； through a Notion which destroys all content and
determination； and has as its object this universal alone。 It is a Notion which acts only
destructively； and does not again construct itself out of this matter or pure thought or pure
substantiality。 We here see so…called materialism and atheism freely emerge； as the necessary
result of the pure comprehending self…consciousness。 From one point of view there perishes in this
negative movement all determination which represents spirit as something beyond
self…consciousness； and more especially all determinations within the spirit； and also those which
express it as spirit； indeed all the conceptions formed of it by faith； for which it has validity as an
existent self…consciousness beyond self…consciousness — in short； all that is traditional or imposed
by authority。 There remains only a present； actual Being； for self…consciousness recognizes implicit
existence only in the form which it has for self…consciousness； and in which it is actually known to
itself； in matter； and matter as actively extending and realizing itself in multiplicity； i。e。； as nature。 In
the present I am conscious to myself of my reality； and consequently self…consciousness finds itself
as matter； finds the soul to be material； and conceptions to be movements and changes in the inner
organ of the brain； which result from external impressions on the senses。 Thought is therefore a
mode of the existence of matter。 The One Substance of Spinoza； to which French materialism as
naturalism is parallel； really finds its accomplishment here in this object as in all respects the
ultimate； but while in Spinoza this category is a possession which we find ready to hand； here it
appears as the result of the abstraction of the understanding proceeding from empiricism。
The other form of the Aufkl？rung is； on the contrary； when absolute Being is set forth as
something beyond self…consciousness； so that of itself； of its implicit Being； nothing whatever can
be known。 It bears the empty name of God。 For though God may be determined in any way
whatever； all these determinations fall away； He is； like x； the altogether unknown quantity。 This
view is not therefore to be termed atheism； in the first place because it still employs the empty；
meaningless name； and in the second place because it expresses the necessary relations of
self…consciousness； duties； &c。； not as necessary in an absolute sense； but as necessary through
relation to another； namely to the unknown — although there can be no positive relation to an
unknown except by abrogating the self as particular。 Yet it is not matter； because this simple and
empty something is negatively defined as non…existent for self…consciousness。 This all comes to the
same thing； however； for matter is the universal； and is Being…for…self represented as abrogated。
But the true reflection on that unknown is this； that it exists for self…consciousness simply as a
negative of the same； i。e。； as matter； reality； the present； it is this negative for me； this is its Notion。
The difference distinguishing this from what appears to be in its entirety something “other；” and in
which any one side is not permitted to say that what it thinks is such is that particular thing； is the
difference which rests on this last abstraction。
Since then the Notion is present only in its negative form； positive extension remains without a
Notion； it has the form of nature； of an existent； both in the physical and in the moral sphere。 The
knowledge of nature remains the ordinary； scientifically unspeculative knowledge； and as to its
essence； in so far as it claims to be philosophy； it is a general way of speaking that plays with the
words； “forces； relations； manifold connections；” but arrives at nothing definite。 Similarly； in the
spiritual sphere； it is so far true that the metaphysic of the spirit is of such a nature that it is nothing
more nor less than a particular organization by means of which the powers which are termed
sensation； perception； &c。； come into existence； but this is a wearisome way of talking； which can
make nothing intelligible； which accepts appearances and perceptions and reasons about them； but
none the less reduces their implicit existence to certain determinate forces； of the inward nature of
which we know nothing further。 The determination and knowledge of the moral sphere has
similarly for its object to bring man back to his so…called natural promptings； its essence has the
form of a natural i