raised like a standard among the nations； liberty of conviction and of conscience in me。 They said
to mankind； “In this sign thou shalt conquer；” for they had before their eyes what had been done
in the name of the cross alone； what had been made a matter of faith and law and religion — they
saw how the sign of the cross had been degraded。 For in the sign of the cross lying and deceit had
been victorious； under this seal institutions had become fossilised； and had sunk into all manner of
degradation； so that this sign came to be represented as the epitome and root of all evil。 Thus in
another form they completed the Reformation that Luther began。 This concrete had manifold
forms； social instincts in the practical sphere； laws of nature in the theoretical。 There is present the
absolute impulse to find a compass immanent in themselves； i。e。 in the human mind。 For the human
mind it is imperative to have a fixed point such as this； if； indeed； it is to be within itself； if it is to be
free in its own world at least。 But this striving after really present vitality took forms which as
by…paths were themselves one…sided。 In this striving after unity； which was； however； concrete
unity； the further varieties of the content likewise lie。
On the theoretic side of their philosophy； therefore； the French proceeded to materialism or
naturalism； because the requirements of the understanding； as abstract thought； which from a firmly
fixed principle allows the most monstrous consequences to be drawn； drove them to set up one
principle as ultimate； and that a principle which had at the same time to be present and to lie quite
close to experience。 Hence they accept sensation and matter as the only truth； to which must be
reduced all thought； all morality； as a mere modification of sensation。 The unities which the French
propounded were in this way one…sided。
a。 OPPOSITION OF SENSATION AND THOUGHT。
To this one…sidedness belongs the opposition between sentir and penser； or else； if you like； their
identity； making the latter only a result of the former； there is not； however； any speculative
reconciliation of this opposition in God； such as we find in Spinoza and Malebranche。 This
reduction of all thought to sensation； which in certain respects took place with Locke； becomes a
widely extended theory。 Robinet （De la Nature； T。 I。 P。 IV。 chap。 iii。 pp。 257…259） lights also on
this opposition； beyond which he does not get； that mind and body are not separate； but that the
manner in which they are united is inexplicable。 The Système de la Nature （T。 I。 chap。 x。 p。 177）
is marked by an especially plain reduction of thought to sensation。 The leading thought is this：
“Abstract thoughts are only modes in which our inmost organ views its own modifications。 The
words goodness； beauty； order； intelligence； virtue； &c。； have no meaning for us if we do not refer
and apply them to objects which our senses have shown to be capable of these qualities； or to
modes of being and acting which are known to us。” Thus even psychology passed into
materialism； as for instance we may find in La Mettrie's work L'homme Machine： All thought and
all conception have meaning only if they are apprehended as material； matter alone exists。
b。 MONTESQUIEU。
Other great writers have opposed to the above the feeling in the breast； the instinct of
self…preservation； benevolent dispositions towards others； the impulse to fellowship； which last
Puffendorf also made the foundation of his system of law （supra； p。 321）。 From this point of view
much that is excellent has been said。 Thus Montesquieu； in his charming book； L'Esprit des Lois；
of which Voltaire said it was an esprit sur les lois； regarded the nations from this important point
of view； that their constitution； their religion； in short； everything that is to be found in a state；
constitutes a totality。
c。 HELVETIUS。
This reduction of thought to feeling in the case of Helvetius takes the form that if in man as a moral
being a single principle is sought； this ought to be called self…love； and he endeavoured to
demonstrate by ingenious analysis that whatever we term virtue； all activity and law and right； has
as its foundation nothing but self…love or selfishness； and is resolvable thereinto。（8） This principle is
one…sided； although the “I myself” is an essential moment。 What I will； the noblest； the holiest； is
my aim； I must take part in it； I must agree to it； I must approve of it。 With all self…sacrifice there is
always conjoined some satisfaction； some finding of self； this element of self； subjective liberty；
must always be present。 If this is taken in a one…sided sense； there may be consequences drawn
from it which overthrow all that is sacred； but it is found in equal degree in a morality as noble as
any possibly can be。
d。 ROUSSEAU。
In connection with the practical side of things this particular must also be noted； that when the
feeling of right； the concrete practical mind； and； speaking generally； humanity and happiness were
made the principle； this principle； universally conceived； had certainly the form of thought； but in
the case of such concrete content derived from our impulse or inward intuition； even though that
content were religious； the thought itself was not the content。 But now this further phase appeared；
that pure thought was set up as the principle and content； even if again there was lacking to this
content the true consciousness of its peculiar form for it was not recognised that this principle was
thought。 We see it emerge in the sphere of will； of the practical； of the just； and so apprehended
that the inner…most principle of man； his unity with himself； is set forth as fundamental and brought
into consciousness； so that man in himself acquired an infinite strength。 It is this that Rousseau from
one point of view said about the state。 He investigated its absolute justification； and inquired as to
its foundation。 The right of ruling and associating； of the relation of order； of governing and being
governed； he apprehends from his own point of view； so that it is made to rest historically on
power； compulsion； conquest； private property； &c。（9）
Rousseau makes free…will the principle of this justification； and without reference to the positive
right of states he made answer to the above question （chap。 iv。 p。 12）； that man has free…will；
because “liberty is the distinguishing feature of man。 To renounce his liberty signifies to renounce
his manhood。 Not to be free is therefore a renunciation of a man's rights as a human being； and
even of his duties。” The slave has neither rights nor duties。 Rousseau therefore says （chap。 vi。 p。
21）： “The fundamental task is to find a form of association which will shield and protect with the
power of the whole commonwealth combined the person and property of every one of its
members； and in which each individual； while joining this association； obeys himself only； and thus
remains as free as before。 The solution is given by the Social Contract；” this is the association of
which each is a member by his own will。 These principles； thus abstractly stated； we must allow to
be correct； yet the ambiguity in them soon begins to be felt。 Man is free； this is certainly the
substantial nature of man； and not only is this liberty not relinquished in the state； but it is actually in
the state that it is first realised。 The freedom of nature； the gift of freedom； is not anything real； for
the state is the first realisation of freedom。
The misunderstanding as to the universal will proceeds from this； that the Notion of freedom must
not be taken in the sense of the arbitrary caprice of an individual； but in the sense of the rational
will； of the will in and for itself。 The universal will is not to be looked on as compounded of
definitively individual wills； so that these remain absolute； otherwise the saying would be correct：
“Where the minority must obey the majority； there is no freedom。” The universal will must really
be the rational will； even if we are not conscious of the fact； the state is therefore not an
association which is decreed by the arbitrary will of individuals。 The wrong apprehension of these
principles does not concern us。 What does concern us is this； that thereby there should come into
consciousness as content the sense that man has liberty in his spirit as the altogether absolute； that
free…will is the Notion of man。 Freedom is just thought itself； he who casts thought aside and
speaks of freedom knows not what he is talking of。 The unity of thought with itself is freedom； the
free will。 Thought； as volition merely； is the impulse to abrogate one's subjectivity； the relation to
present existence； the realising of oneself； since in that I am endeavouring to place myself as
existent on an equality with myself as thinking。 It is only as having the power of thinking that the
will is free。 The principle of freedom emerged in Rousseau； and gave to man； who apprehends
himself as infinite； this infinite strength。 This furnishes the transition to the Kantian philosophy；
which； theoretically considered； made this principle its foundation； knowledge aimed