which； theoretically considered； made this principle its foundation； knowledge aimed at freedom；
and at a concrete content which it possesses in consciousness。
1。 Emile ou de l'éducation； T。 II。 （Paris； 1813； él。 stéréotype）； Book IV。； Profession de foi du
vicaire savoyard； p。 215 seq。
2。 Buhle： Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Pt。 VIII。 pp。 62； 63： Système de la Nature
par Mirabaud （Londres； 1770）； T。 I。 chap。 i。 p。 10； chap。 ii。 p 28。
3。 Buhle： Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Pt。 VIII。 pp。 63； 64。 Système de la Nature； T。
I。 chap。 ii。 pp。 18； 16； 21； et 15。
4。 Buhle； ibidem； pp。 64； 65； 70； Système de la Nature； T。 I。 chap。 ii； pp。 30； 31； chap。 iii； pp。 39；
40； chap。 iv。 pp。 45； 46； chap。 vii； pp。 90； 91。
5。 Robinet： De la Nature （Troisième édition； Amsterdam； 1766）； T。I。P。I。 chap。 iii。 iv。 pp。 16； 17。
6。 Robinet： De la Nature； T。I。P。II。 chap。 ii。 pp。 156； 157； chap。 vii。 pp。 166； 168； chap。 ix。…xi。；
chap。 xv。 pp。 202； 203； chap。 xix。 p。 217。
7。 Robinet： De la Nature； T。I。P。I。 chap。 xxviii。 p。 138； chap。 xiii。 p。 70。
8。 Helvetius： De l'esprit （Oeuvres complètes； T。 II。 Deux…Ponts； 1784）； T。 I。 Discours II。 chap。 i。
pp。 62…64； chap。 ii。 pp。 65； 68； 69； chap。 iv。 p。 90； chap。 v。 p。 91； chap。 viii。 p。 114； chap。 xxiv。
pp。 256； 257。
9。 Rousseau： Du contrat social （Lyon； 1790）； Book I。 chap。 iii。 pp。 8； 9； chap。 iv。 pp。 10； 11；
13…16。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period
D。 THE GERMAN ILLUMINATION。
The Germans were at this time quietly drifting along in their Leibnitzo…Wolffian philosophy； in its
definitions； axioms and proofs。 Then they were gradually breathed upon by the spirit of foreign
lands； they made acquaintance with all the developments which there came to pass； and took very
kindly to the empiricism of Locke； on the other hand they at the same time laid aside metaphysical
investigations； turned their attention to the question of how truths can be grasped by the healthy
human understanding； and plunged into the Aufkl？rung and into the consideration of the utility of
all things … a point of view which they adopted from the French。 Utility as the essence of existent
things signifies that they are determined as not being in themselves； but for another： this is a
necessary moment； but not the only one。 The German Aufkl？rung warred against ideas； with the
principle of utility as its weapon。 Philosophic investigations on this subject had degenerated into a
feeble popular treatment of it which was incapable of going deeper； they displayed a rigid
pedantry and an earnestness of the understanding； but were unspiritual。 The Germans are busy
bees who do justice to all nations； they are old…clothesmen for whom anything is good enough；
and who carry on their haggling with everyone。 Picked up as it was from foreign nations； all this
had lost the wit and life； the energy and originality which with the French had made the content to
be lost sight of in the form。 The Germans； who honestly sift a matter to its root； and who would
put rational arguments in the place of wit and vivacity； since wit and vivacity really prove nothing；
in this way reached a content which was utterly empty； so much so that nothing could be more
wearisome than this profound mode of treatment； such was the case with Eberhard； Tetens； and
those like them。
Others； like Nicolai； Sulzer and their fellows； were excellent in their speculations on questions of
taste and the liberal sciences； for literature and art were also to flourish among the Germans。 But
with all this they only arrived at a most trivial treatment of ？sthetics … Lessing（1） called it shallow
chatter。 As a matter of fact； indeed； the poems of Gellert； Weisse and Lessing sank almost； if not
quite as much into the same poetic feebleness。 Moreover； previous to the philosophy of Kant； the
general principle was really the theory of happiness； which we have already met with in the
philosophy of the Cyrenaics （Vol。 I。 p。 477）； and the point of view of pleasant or unpleasant
sensations held good among the philosophers of that time as an ultimate and essential
determination。 Of this manner of philosophizing I will quote an example which Nicolai gives in the
account of a conversation which he had with Mendelssohn： what is in question is the pleasure in
tragic subjects which is held to be awakened even by means of the unpleasant emotions depicted
in a tragedy：
HERR MOSES。 〃The power of having an inclination for perfections and of shunning
imperfections is a reality。 Therefore the exercise of this power brings a pleasure with it； which；
however； is in nature comparatively less than the displeasure which arises from the contemplation
of the object。
I。 Yet even then； when the violence of passion causes us unpleasant sensations； the movement
（what else is this movement than the power of loving perfections； &c。？） which it brings with it has
still delights for us。 It is the strength of the movement which we enjoy； even in spite of the painful
sensations which oppose what is pleasant in the passion； and in a short time obtain the victory。
HERR MOSES。 In a stage play； on the contrary； as the imperfect object is absent； pleasure
must gain the upper hand and eclipse the small degree of displeasure。
I。 A passion therefore which is not followed by these results must be altogether pleasant。 Of this
sort are the imitations of the passions which the tragedy affords。〃（2）
With such vapid and meaningless drivel they rambled on。 In addition to these； the eternity of
punishment in hell； the salvation of the heathen； the difference between uprightness and godliness；
were philosophic matters on which much labour was expended among the Germans； while the
French troubled themselves little about them。 Finite determinations were made to hold good
against the infinite； against the Trinity it was asserted that One cannot be Three； against original sin；
that each must bear his own guilt； must have done his own deeds of himself； and must answer for
them； in the same way against redemption； that another cannot take upon himself punishment that
is due； against forgiveness of sin； that what is done cannot be rendered undone； to sum up
generally； the incommensurability of the human nature with the divine。 On the one side we see
healthy human understanding； experience； facts of consciousness； but on the other side there was
still in vogue the Wolffian metaphysics of the dry； dead understanding； thus we see Mendelssohn
take his stand by the healthy human understanding； and make it his rule。
Some movement was brought into this authority； which had settled into perfect peace and security
and let no dreams of other matters cross its path； by the chance dispute of Mendelssohn with
Jacobi； first as to whether Lessing had been a disciple of Spinoza； and then regarding the doctrines
of Spinoza himself。 On this occasion it came to light how much Spinoza was really forgotten； and
in what horror Spinozism was held。 But while Jacobi in this way once more unexpectedly brought
to remembrance in connection with Spinozism a quite different content of philosophy； faith； i。e。； the
simply immediate certainty of external； finite things； as well as of the divine （which faith in the divine
he called reason） was certainly placed by him； as an independent thinker； in opposition to
mediating knowledge； which he apprehended as mere understanding。 This continued until Kant
gave a new impulse in Germany to philosophy； which had died out in the rest of Europe。
As far as the transition to modern German philosophy is concerned； it is from Hume and
Rousseau； as we have said （pp。 369； 374； 402）； that it took its start。 Descartes opposes extension
to thought； as what is simply one with itself。 He is charged with dualism； but； like Spinoza and
Leibnitz； he did away with the independence of the two sides； and made supreme their unity； God。
But； as this unity； God is first of all only the Third； and He is further determined in such a way that
no determination pertains to Him。 Wolff's understanding of the finite； his school metaphysics
generally； his science of the understanding； and his divergence into the observation of nature； after
it has grown strong in its conformity with law and in its finite knowledge； turns against the infinite
and the concrete determinations of religion； and comes to a standstill with abstractions in his
theologia naturalis； for the determinate is his domain。 But from this time an utterly different point
of view is introduced。 The infinite is transported into abstraction or incomprehensibility。 This is an
incomprehensible position to adopt。 Nowadays it is looked on as most pious； most justifiable。 But
as we see the third； the unity of difference； defined as something which cannot be thought or
known； this unity is not one of thought； for it is above all thought； and God is not simply thought。
Nevertheless this unity is defined as the absolutely concrete； i。e。； as the unity of thought and Being。
Now we have come so far that this unity is a unity simply in thought； and pertaining to
consciousness； so that the objectivity of