demonstrate them in their necessity； from the time of Aristotle onwards no one had thought of so
doing。 The first of these forms is the determination of reciprocity； which we already met with in the
third proposition： “By the determination of the reality or negation of the ego； the negation or reality
of the non…ego is equally determined；” the two in one is reciprocal action。 In the second place；
“Causality is the same degree of activity in the one as of passivity in the other。” In so far as
something is considered as the reality of the non…ego； the ego is considered as passive； and； on the
other hand； in so far as 'I' am real； the object is passive； this relation； that the passivity of the
object is my activity or reality； and the opposite； is the conception of Causality。 “As many parts of
negation as the ego posits in itself； so many parts of reality it posits in the non…ego； it therefore
posits itself as self…determining in so far as it is determined； and as suffering determination in so far
as it determines itself。 In so far；” in the third place； “as the ego is regarded as embracing the
whole absolutely determined realm of all reality； it is substance； on the other hand when it is
posited in a not absolutely determined sphere of this realm； in so far there is an accidence in the
ego。” （19） That is the first rational attempt that has ever been made to deduce the categories； this
progress from one determination to another is； however； only an analysis from the standpoint of
consciousness； and is not in and for itself。
The ego is so far the ideal ground of all conceptions of the object； all determination of this object is
a determination of the ego。 But in order that it may be object； it must be placed in opposition to
the ego； i。e。 the determinations set forth through the ego are another； the non…ego； this placing of
the object in opposition is the real ground of conceptions。 The ego is； however； likewise the real
ground of the object； for it is likewise a determination of the ego that the non…ego as object is set
in opposition to the ego。 Both； the real ground and the ideal ground of the conception； are thus
one and the same。（20） Regarding the ego as ideal principle and the non…ego as real principle；
Krug has likewise talked a great deal of nonsense。 Regarded from the one point of view； the ego
is active and the non…ego purely passive； while from the other side the ego is passive and the
object active and operative。 But since the ego in the non…philosophic consciousness does not have
the consciousness of its activity in the conception of the object； it represents to itself its own
activity as foreign； i。e。 as belonging to the non…ego。
We here see the opposition adopting various forms： ego； non…ego； positing； setting in opposition；
two sorts of activity of the ego； &c。 The fact that I represent is undoubtedly my activity； but the
matter of main importance is the content of the positing and its necessary connection through itself。
If one occupies oneself only with this content； that form of subjectivity which is dominant with
Fichte； and which remains in his opposition； disappears。 As the ego is affirmative and determining；
there now is in this determination a negative likewise present； I find myself determined and at the
same time the ego is like itself； infinite； i。e。 identical with itself。 This is a contradiction which Fichte
indeed endeavours to reconcile； but in spite of it all he leaves the false basis of dualism
undisturbed。 The ultimate； beyond which Fichte does not get； is only an 'ought；' which does not
solve the contradiction； for while the ego should be absolutely at home with itself； i。e。 free； it
should at the same time be associated with another。 To Fichte the demand for the solution of this
contradiction thus adopts the attitude of being a demanded solution only； of signifying that I ever
have to destroy the barriers； that I ever have to reach beyond the limitation into utter infinitude；
and that I ever find a new limit； a continual alternation takes place between negation and
affirmation； an identity with self which again falls into negation； and from this negation is ever again
restored。 To speak of the bounds of human reason is； however； an unmeaning form of words。
That the reason of the subject is limited is comprehensible from the nature of the case； but when
we speak of Thought； infinitude is none other than one's own relation to self； and not to one's limit；
and the place in which man is infinite is Thought。 Infinitude may then be likewise very abstract； and
in this way it is also once more finite； but true infinitude remains in itself。
Fichte further deduces the ordinary conception thus： the fact that the ego in going forth at once
finds its activity checked by a limitation； and returns once more into itself； brings about two
opposite tendencies in me； between which I waver； and which I try to unite in the faculty of
imagination。 In order that a fixed determination may exist between the two； I have to make the
limit a permanent one； and we have that in the understanding。 All further determinations of the
object are； as categories of the understanding； modes of synthesis； but each synthesis is a new
contradiction。 New mediations are thus once more necessary； and these are new determinations。
Thus Fichte says： I can always continue to determine the non…ego； to make it my conception； i。e。
to take from it its negation as regards me。 I have to deal with my activity alone； but there is always
an externality therein present which still remains； and which is not explained by my activity。 This
Beyond which alone remains to the undetermined ego Fichte calls the infinite check upon the ego；
with which it ever has to deal； and beyond which it cannot get； thus the activity which proceeds
into infinitude finds itself checked and driven back by this repulsive force； and then it reacts upon
itself。 “The ego in its self…determination has been considered both as determining and determined；
if we reflect on the fact that the absolutely determined determining power must be an absolutely
indeterminate； and further； that ego and non…ego are absolutely opposed to one another； in the one
case ego is the indeterminate and in the other case non…ego。” （21）
Inasmuch as the ego here makes the object its conception and negates it； this philosophy is
Idealism； in which philosophy all the determinations of the object are ideal。 Everything determinate
which the ego possesses it has through its own positing； I even make a coat or a boot because I
put them on。 There remains only the empty repulsive force； and that is the Kantian Thing…in…itself；
beyond which even Fichte cannot get； even though the theoretic reason continues its determination
into infinitude。 “The ego as intelligence” ever “remains dependent on an undetermined non…ego； it
is only through this that it is intelligence。” （22） The theoretic side is thus dependent。 In it we have
not therefore to deal with the truth in and for itself but with a contingent； because ego is limited； not
absolute； as its Notion demands： intelligence is not here considered as spirit which is free。 This is
Fichte's standpoint as regards the theoretic side。
c。 Practical reason comes next； the point of view from which it starts is that “The ego posits itself
as determining the non…ego。” Now the contradiction has thus to be solved of ego being at home
with itself； since it determines its Beyond。 The ego is thus infinite activity； and； as ego=ego； the
absolute ego； it is undoubtedly abstract。 But in order to have a determination； a non…ego must
exist； ego is thus activity； causality； the positing of the non…ego。 But as with Kant sensuousness and
reason remain opposed； the same contradiction is present here； only in a more abstract form； and
not in the rude empiricism of Kant。 Fichte here turns and twists in all sorts of ways； or he gives the
opposition many different forms； the crudest form is that ego is posited as causality； for in it
another is necessitated on which it exercises its activity。 “The absolute ego has accordingly to be”
now “the cause of the non…ego； i。e。 only of that in the non…ego which remains when we abstract
from all demonstrable forms of representation or conception — of that to which is ascribed the
check given to the infinitely operative activity of the ego； for the fact that the intelligent ego is； in
accordance with the necessary laws of the conception； the cause of the particular determinations
of that which is conceived as such； is demonstrated in the theoretic science of knowledge。” （23）
The limits of intelligence must be broken through； the ego must alone be active； the other side； the
infinite repulsion； must be removed； in order that the ego may be liberated。
“According to our hypothesis the ego must now posit a non…ego absolutely； and without any
ground； i。e。 absolutely and without any ground it must limit or in part not posit itself。” This；
indeed； it already does as intelligent。 “It must therefore have the ground of not positing itself”
only “in itself。” The ego is； however； just the ego； it posits itself； “it must” therefore “have the
principle