《history of philosophy》

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history of philosophy- 第92部分


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principle of positing itself within it; and also the principle of not positing itself。 Hence the ego in its
essence would be contradictory and self…repellent; there would be in it a twofold or contradictory
principle; which assumption contradicts itself; for in that case there would be no principle within it。
The ego would” consequently “not exist; for it would abrogate itself。 All contradictions are
reconciled through the further determination of contradictory propositions。 The ego must be
posited in one sense as infinite; and in another as finite。 Were it to be posited as infinite and finite in
one and the same sense; the contradiction would be insoluble; the ego would not be one but two。
In so far as the ego posits itself as infinite; its activity is directed upon itself and on nothing else but
itself。 In so far as the ego posits limits; and itself in these limits; its activity is not exercised directly
on itself; but on a non…ego which has to be placed in opposition;” upon another and again upon
another; and so on into infinitude; that is the object; and the activity of the ego “is objective
activity。” (24) In this way Fichte in the practical sphere also remains at opposition; only this
opposition now has the form of two tendencies in the ego; both of which are said to be one and
the same activity of the ego。 I am called upon to proceed to determine the other in relation to
which I am negative; the non…ego; in accordance with my freedom it has indeed all determinations
through the activity of the ego; but beyond my determination the same non…ego ever continues to
appear。 The ego clearly posits an object; a point of limitation; but where the limitation is; is
undetermined。 I may transfer the sphere of my determination; and extend it to an infinite degree;
but there always remains a pure Beyond; and the non…ego has no positive self…existent
determination。

The last point in respect of the practical sphere is hence this; that the activity of the ego is a
yearning or striving(25) — like the Kantian “ought” ; Fichte treats this with great prolixity。 The
Fichtian philosophy consequently has the same standpoint as the Kantian; the ultimate is always
subjectivity; as existent in and for itself。 Yearning; according to Fichte; is divine; in yearning I have
not forgotten myself; I have not forgotten that I possess a superiority in myself; and therefore it is a
condition of happiness and satisfaction。 This infinite yearning and desire has then been regarded as
what is highest and most excellent in the Beautiful; and in religious feelings likewise; and with it is
connected the irony of which we have spoken before (Vol。 I。 pp。 400; 401)。 In this return the ego
is merely an effort; on its side it is fixed; and it cannot realize its endeavours。 Striving is thus an
imperfect or implicitly limited action。 The ultimate result is consequently a “circle” which cannot
be broken through; so that “the finite spirit must necessarily posit an absolute outside itself (a
thing…in…itself); and yet on the other hand it must recognize that this same is only there for it (a
necessary noumenon)。” (26) To put it otherwise; we see the ego absolutely determined in
opposition only; we see it only as consciousness and self…consciousness which does not got
beyond this; and which does not reach so far as to Spirit。 The ego is the absolute Notion in so far
as it does not yet reach the unity of thought; or in this simplicity does not reach difference; and in
motion does not have rest; that is to say; in so far as positing; or the pure activity of the ego; and
setting in opposition; are not by it comprehended as the same。 Or the ego does not comprehend
the infinite repulsion; the non…ego; self…consciousness determines the non…ego; but does not know
how to make this Beyond its own。

The deficiency in the Fichtian philosophy is thus firstly that the ego retains the significance of the
individual; actual self…consciousness; as opposed to that which is universal or absolute; or to the
spirit in which it is itself a moment merely; for the individual self…consciousness simply signifies
standing apart as far as another is concerned。 Hence; if the ego was ever called absolute
existence; the most terrible offence was given; because really the ego only came before us as
signifying the individual subject as opposed to the universal。

In the second place; Fichte does not attain to the idea of Reason as the perfected; real unity of
subject and object; or of ego and non…ego; it is only; as with Kant; represented as the thought of a
union in a belief or faith; and with this Fichte likewise concludes (Grundlage der gesammten
Wissenschaftslehre; p。 301)。 This he worked out in his popular writings。 For because the ego is
fixed in its opposition to the non…ego; and is only as being opposed; it becomes lost in that unity。
The attainment of this aim is hence sent further and further back into the false; sensuous infinitude:
it is a progression implying just the same contradiction as that found in Kant; and having no present
actuality in itself; for the ego has all actuality in its opposition only。 The Fichtian philosophy
recognizes the finite spirit alone; and not the infinite; it does not recognize spirit as universal
thought; as the Kantian philosophy does not recognize the not…true; or it is formal。 The knowledge
of absolute unity is apprehended as faith in a moral disposition of the world; an absolute
hypothesis in accordance with which we have the belief that every moral action that we perform
will have a good result。(27) As in Kant's case; this Idea belongs to universal thought。 “In a word;
when anything is apprehended it ceases to be God; and every conception of God that is set up is
necessarily that of a false God。 Religion is a practical faith in the moral government of the world;
faith in a supersensuous world belongs; according to our philosophy; to the immediate verities。”
(28) Fichte thus concludes with the highest Idea; with the union of freedom and nature; but a union
of such a nature that; immediately regarded; it is not known; the opposition alone falls within
consciousness。 This union of faith he likewise finds in the Love of God。 As believed and
experienced; this form pertains to Religion; and not to Philosophy; and our only possible interest is
to know this in Philosophy。 But with Fichte it is still associated with a most unsatisfying externality
of which the basis is the non…Idea; for the one determination is essential only because the other is
so; and so on into infinitude。 “The theory of knowledge is realistic — it shows that the
consciousness of finite beings can only be explained by presupposing an independent and wholly
opposite power; on which; in accordance with their empirical existence; they themselves are
dependent。 But it asserts nothing more than this opposed power; which by finite beings can merely
be felt and not known。 All possible determinations of this power or of this non…ego which can
come forth into infinity in our consciousness; it pledges itself to deduce from the determining
faculties of the ego; and it must actually be able to deduce these; so certainly as it is a theory of
knowledge。 This knowledge; however; is not transcendent but transcendental。 It undoubtedly
explains all consciousness from something independent of all consciousness; but it does not forget
that this independent somewhat is again a product of its own power of thought; and consequently
something dependent on the ego; in so far as it has to be there for the ego。 Everything is; in its
ideality; dependent upon the ego; but in its reality even the ego is dependent。 The fact that the finite
spirit must posit for itself somewhat outside of itself; which last exists only for it; is that circle which
it may infinitely extend but never break through。” The further logical determination of the object is
that which in subject and object is identical; the true connection is that in which the objective is the
possession of the ego; as thought; the ego in itself determines the object。 But Fichte's theory of
knowledge regards the struggle of the ego with the object as that of the continuous process of
determining the object through the ego as subject of consciousness; without the identity of the
restfully self…developing Notion。

Thirdly; because the ego is thus fixed in its one…sidedness; there proceeds from it; as representing
one extreme; the whole of the progress that is made in the content of knowledge; and the
deduction of the philosophy of Fichte; cognition in its content and form; is a progression from
certain determinations to others which do not turn back into unity; or through a succession of
finitenesses which do not have the Absolute in them at all。 The absolute point of view; like an
absolute content; is wanting。 Thus the contemplation of nature; for instance; is a contemplation of it
as of pure finitenesses from the point of view of another; as though the organic body were
regarded thus: “Consciousness requires a sphere entirely its own for its activity。 This sphere is
posited through an original; necessary activity of the ego; in which it does not know itself as free
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