part of the sky red； and another blue； and that my reason doth
thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that
diversity of colours； yet that cause cannot be said to be a
sensible thing； or perceived by the sense of seeing？
。 It doth。
。 In like manner； though I hear variety of sounds； yet
I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds？
。 You cannot。
。 And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot
and heavy； I cannot say； with any truth or propriety； that I feel
the cause of its heat or weight？
。 To prevent any more questions of this kind； I tell
you once for all； that by I mean those only
which are perceived by sense； and that in truth the senses
perceive nothing which they do not perceive ： for
they make no ｛175｝ inferences。 The deducing therefore of causes
or occasions from effects and appearances； which alone are
perceived by sense； entirely relates to reason。
。 This point then is agreed between us That
。 You will farther inform me； whether we immediately
perceive by sight anything beside light； and colours； and
figures； or by hearing； anything but sounds； by the palate；
anything beside tastes； by the smell； beside odours； or by the
touch； more than tangible qualities。
。 We do not。
。 It seems； therefore； that if you take away all
sensible qualities； there remains nothing sensible？
。 I grant it。
。 Sensible things therefore are ｛250｝ nothing else but
so many sensible qualities； or combinations of sensible
qualities？
。 Nothing else。
。 then is a sensible thing？
。 Certainly。
。 Doth the of sensible things consist in
being perceived？ or； is it something distinct from their being
perceived； and that bears no relation to the mind？
。 To is one thing； and to be is
another。
。 I speak with regard to sensible things only。 And of
these I ask； whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind； and distinct from their being
perceived？
。 I mean a real absolute being； distinct from； and
without any relation to； their being perceived。
。 Heat therefore； if it be allowed a real being； must
exist without the mind？
。 It must。
。 Tell me； Hylas； is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat； which we perceive； or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some； and deny it to
others？ And if there be； pray let me know that reason。
。 Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense； we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it。
。 What！ the greatest as well as the least？
。 tell you； the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both。 They are both perceived by sense； nay； the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived； and
consequently； if there is ｛176｝ any difference； we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree。
。 But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain？
。 No one can deny it。
。 And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure？
。 No； certainly。
。 Is your material substance a senseless being； or a
being endowed with sense and perception？
。 It is senseless without doubt。
。 It cannot therefore be the subject of pain？
。 By no means。
。 Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense； since you acknowledge this to be no small pain？
。 I grant it。
。 What shall we say then of your external object； is
it a material Substance； or no？
。 It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it。
。 How then can a great heat exist in it； since you own
it cannot in a material substance？ I desire you would clear this
point。
。 Hold； Philonous； I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain。 It should seem rather； that pain is something
distinct from heat； and the consequence or effect of it。
。 Upon putting your hand near the fire； do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation； or two distinct
sensations？
。 But one simple sensation。
。 Is not the heat immediately perceived？；
。 It is。
。 And the pain？
。 True。
。 Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time； and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea； it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived； and the pain； and；
consequently； that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain。
。 It seems so。
。 Again； try in your thoughts； Hylas； if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure。
｛177｝
。 I cannot。
。 Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general； abstracted from every particular
idea of heat； cold； tastes； smells？ &c。
。 I do not find that I can。
。 Doth it not therefore follow； that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas； in an intense
degree？
。 It is undeniable； and； to speak the truth； I begin to
suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving
it。
。 What！ are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense； between affirming and denying？
。 I think I may be positive in the point。 A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind。
。 It hath not therefore according to you； any
being？
。 I own it。
。 Is it therefore certain； that there is no body in
nature really hot？
。 I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies。 I
only say； there is no such thing as an intense real heat。
。 But； did you not say before that all degrees of heat
were equally real； or； if there was any difference； that the
greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser？
。 True： but it was because I did not then consider the
ground there is for distinguishing between them； which I now
plainly see。 And it is this： because intense heat is nothing else
but a particular kind of painful sensation； and pain cannot exist
but in a perceiving being； it follows that no intense heat can
really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance。 But this is
no reason wh' we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist
in such a substance。
。 But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of
heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without
it？
。 That is no difficult matter。 You know the least pain
cannot exist unperceived； whatever； therefore； degree of heat is
a pain exists only in the mind。 But； as for all other degrees of
heat； nothing obliges us to think the same of them。
。 I think you granted before that no unperceiving
being was capable of pleasure； any more than of pain。
。 I did。 ｛178｝
。 And is not warmth； or a more gentle degree of heat
than what causes uneasiness； a pleasure？
。 What then？
。 Consequently； it cannot exist without the mind in an
unperceiving substance； or body。
。 So it seems。
。 Since； therefore； as well those degrees of heat that
are not painful； as those that are； can exist only in a thinking
substance； may we not conclude that external bodies are
absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever？
。 On second thoughts； I do not think it so evident that
warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain。
。 do not pretend that warmth is as great a
pleasure as heat is a pain。 But； if you grant it to be even a
small pleasure； it serves to make good my conclusion。
。 I could rather call it an 。 It seems to be
nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure。 And that
such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking
substance； I hope you will not deny。
。 If you are resolved to maintain that warmth； or a
gentle degree of heat； is no pleasure； I know not how to convince
you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense。 But what think
you of cold？
。 The same that I do of heat。 An intense degree of cold
is a pain； for to feel a very great cold； is to perceive a great
uneasiness： it cannot therefore exist without the mind； but a
lesser degree of cold may； as well as a lesser degree of heat。
。 Those bodies； therefore； upon whose application to
our own； we perceive a moderate degree of heat； must be concluded
to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them； and those；
upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold； must be
thoug