to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them； and those；
upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold； must be
thought to have cold in them。
。 They must。
。 Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a
man into an absurdity？
。 Without doubt it cannot。
。 Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing
should be at the same time both cold and warm？
。 It is。
。 Suppose now one of your hands hot； and the other
cold； and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of
｛179｝ water； in an intermediate state； will not the water seem
cold to one hand； and warm to the other？
。 It will。
。 Ought we not therefore； by your principles； to
conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time； that
is； according to your own concession； to believe an absurdity？
。 I confess it seems so。
。 Consequently； the principles themselves are false；
since you have granted that no true principle leads to an
absurdity。
。 But； after all； can anything be more absurd than to
say； ？
。 To make the point still clearer； tell me whether； in
two cases exactly alike； we ought not to make the same judgment？
。。 We ought。
。 When a pin pricks your finger； doth it not rend and
divide the fibres of your flesh？
。 It doth。
。 And when a coal burns your finger； doth it any more？
。 It doth not。
。 Since； therefore； you neither judge the sensation
itself occasioned by the pin； nor anything like it to be in the
pin； you should not； conformably to what you have now granted；
judge the sensation occasioned by the fire； or anything like it；
to be in the fire。
。 Well； since it must be so； I am content to yield this
point； and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations
existing in our minds。 But there still remain qualities enough to
secure the reality of external things。
。 But what will you say； Hylas； if it shall appear
that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible
qualities； and that they can no more be supposed to exist without
the mind； than heat and cold？
。 Then indeed you will have done something to the
purpose； but that is what I despair of seeing proved。
。 Let us examine them in order。 What think you of
； do they exist without the mind； or no？
。 Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is
sweet； or wormwood bitter？
。 Inform me； Hylas。 Is a sweet taste a particular kind
of pleasure or pleasant sensation； or is it not？ ｛180｝
。 It is。
。 And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or
pain？
。 I grant it。
。 If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking
corporeal substances existing without the mind； how can sweetness
and bitterness； that is； Pleasure and pain； agree to them？
。 Hold； Philonous； I now see what it was delude time。
You asked whether heat and cold； sweetness at were not particular
sorts of pleasure and pain； to which simply； that they were。
Whereas I should have thus distinguished： those qualities； as
perceived by us； are pleasures or pair existing in the external
objects。 We must not therefore conclude absolutely； that there is
no heat in the fire； or sweetness in the sugar； but only that
heat or sweetness； as perceived by us； are not in the fire or
sugar。 What say you to this？
。 I say it is nothing to the purpose。 Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things； which you
defined to be； 。 Whatever other qualities； therefore； you speak of as
distinct from these； I know nothing of them； neither do they at
all belong to the point in dispute。 You may； indeed； pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive； and
assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar。 But
what use can be made of this to your present purpose； I am at a
loss to conceive。 Tell me then once more； do you acknowledge that
heat and cold； sweetness and bitterness （meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses）； do not exist without the
mind？
。 I see it is to no purpose to hold out； so I give up
the cause as to those mentioned qualities。 Though I profess it
sounds oddly； to say that sugar is not sweet。
。 But； for your farther satisfaction； take this along
with you： that which at other times seems sweet； shall； to a
distempered palate； appear bitter。 And； nothing can be plainer
than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same
food； since that which one man delights in； another abhors。 And
how could this be； if the taste was something really inherent in
the food？
。 I acknowledge I know not how。
。 In the next place； are to be considered。
And； with regard to these； I would fain know whether what hath
｛181｝ been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them？ Are
they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations？
。 They are。
。 Can you then conceive it possible that they should
exist in an unperceiving thing？
。 I cannot。
。 Or； can you imagine that filth and ordure affect
those brute animals that feed on them out of choice； with the
same smells which we perceive in them？
。 By no means。
。 May we not therefore conclude of smells； as of the
other forementioned qualities； that they cannot exist in any but
a perceiving substance or mind？
。 I think so。
。 Then as to ； what must we think of them： are
they accidents really inherent in external bodies； or not？
。 That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from hence： because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an
air…pump sends forth no sound。 The air； therefore； must be
thought the subject of sound。
。 What reason is there for that； Hylas？
。 Because； when any motion is raised in the air； we
perceive a sound greater or lesser； according to the air's
motion； but without some motion in the air； we never hear any
sound at all。
。 And granting that we never hear a sound but when
some motion is produced in the air； yet I do not see how you can
infer from thence； that the sound itself is in the air。
。 It is this very motion in the external air that
produces in the mind the sensation of 。 For； striking on
the drum of the ear； it causeth a vibration； which by the
auditory nerves being communicated to the brain； the soul is
thereupon affected with the sensation called 。
。 What！ is sound then a sensation？
。 I tell you； as perceived by us； it is a particular
sensation in the mind。
。 And can any sensation exist without the mind？
。 No； certainly。
。 How then can sound； being a sensation； exist in the
air； if by the you mean a senseless substance existing
without the mind？
。 You must distinguish； Philonous； between sound as it
is ｛182｝ perceived by us； and as it is in itself； or （which is
the same thing） between the sound we immediately perceive； and
that which exists without us。 The former； indeed； is a particular
kind of sensation； but the latter is merely a vibrative or
undulatory motion the air。
。 I thought I had already obviated that distinction；
by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before。
But； to say no more of that； are you sure then that sound is
really nothing but motion？
。 I am。
。 Whatever therefore agrees to real sound； may with
truth be attributed to motion？
。 It may。
。 It is then good sense to speak of as of a
thing that is ； ； ； 。
。 see you are resolved not to understand me。 Is it
not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible
sound； or the common acceptation of the word； but not
to in the real and philosophic sense； which； as I just
now told you； is nothing but a certain motion of the air？
。 It seems then there are two sorts of sound the
one vulgar； or that which is heard； the other philosophical and
real？
。 Even so。
。 And the latter consists in motion？
。 I told you so before。
。 Tell me； Hylas； to which of the senses； think you；
the idea of motion belongs？ to the hearing？
。 No； certainly； but to the sight and touch。
。 It should follow then； that； according to you； real
sounds may possibly be ； but never 。
。 Look you； Philonous； you may； if you please； make a
jest of my opinion； but that will not alter the truth of things。
I own； indeed； the inferences you draw me into sound something
oddly； but common language； you know； is framed by； and for the
use of the vulgar： we must not therefore wonder if expressions