use of the vulgar： we must not therefore wonder if expressions
adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the
way。
。 Is it come to that？ I assure you； I imagine myself
to have gained no small point； since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions； it being a main part
of our inquiry； to examine whose notions are widest of the ｛183｝
common road； and most repugnant to the general sense of the
world。 But； can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox； to say that ； and that the
idea of them is obtained by some other sense？ And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things？
。 To deal ingenuously； I do not like it。 And； after the
concessions already made； I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind。
。 And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of 。
。 Pardon me： the case of colours is very different。 Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects？
。 The objects you speak of are； I suppose； corporeal
Substances existing without the mind？
。 They are。
。 And have true and real colours inhering in them？
。 Each visible object hath that colour which we see in
it。
。 How！ is there anything visible but what we perceive
by sight？
。 There is not。
。 And； do we perceive anything by sense which we do
not perceive immediately？
。 How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing？
I tell you； we do not。
。 Have patience； good Hylas； and tell me once more；
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses；
except sensible qualities。 I know you asserted there was not； but
I would now be informed； whether you still persist in the same
opinion。
。 I do。
。 Pray； is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality； or made up of sensible qualities？
。 What a question that is！ who ever thought it was？
。 My reason for asking was； because in saying； ； you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances； which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities； or else that
there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight：
but； as this point was formerly agreed between us； and is still
maintained by you； it is a clear consequence； that your
is nothing distinct from 。 ｛184｝
。 You may draw as many absurd consequences as you
please； and endeavour to perplex the plainest things； but you
shall never persuade me out of my senses。 I clearly understand my
own meaning。
。 I wish you would make me understand it too。 But；
since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal
substance examined； I shall urge that point no farther。 Only be
pleased to let me know； whether the same colours which we see
exist in external bodies； or some other。
。 The very same。
。 What！ are then the beautiful red and purple we see
on yonder clouds really in them？ Or do you imagine they have in
themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour？
。 I must own； Philonous； those colours are not really
in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance。 They are only
apparent colours。
。 call you them？ how shall we distinguish
these apparent colours from real？
。 Very easily。 Those are to be thought apparent which；
appearing only at a distance； vanish upon a nearer approach。
。 And those； I suppose； are to be thought real which
are discovered by the most near and exact survey。
。 Right。
。 Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help
of a microscope； or by the naked eye？
。 By a microscope； doubtless。
。 But a microscope often discovers colours in an
object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight。
And； in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned
degree； it is certain that no object whatsoever； viewed through
them； would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the
naked eye。
。 And what will you conclude from all this？ You cannot
argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects：
because by artificial managements they may be altered； or made to
vanish。
。 I think it may evidently be concluded from your own
concessions； that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are
only apparent as those on the clouds； since they vanish upon a
more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a
microscope。 Then' as to what you say by way of prevention： ｛185｝
I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is
better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight； or by one
which is less sharp？
。 By the former without doubt。
。 Is it not plain from that microscopes
make the sight more penetrating； and represent objects as they
would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a
most exquisite sharpness？
。 It is。
。 Consequently the microscopical representation is to
be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the
thing； or what it is in itself。 The colours； therefore； by it
perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived
otherwise。
。 I confess there is something in what you say。
。 Besides； it is not only possible but manifest； that
there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to
perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape
our sight。 What think you of those inconceivably small animals
perceived by glasses？ must we suppose they are all stark blind？
Or； in case they see； can it be imagined their sight hath not the
same use in preserving their bodies from injuries； which appears
in that of all other animals？ And if it hath； is it not evident
they must see particles less than their own bodies； which will
present them with a far different view in each object from that
which strikes our senses？ Even our own eyes do not always
represent objects to us after the same manner。 In the jaundice
every one knows that all things seem yellow。 Is it not therefore
highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very
different texture from that of ours； and whose bodies abound with
different humours； do not see the same colours in every object
that we do？ From all which； should it not seem to follow that all
colours are equally apparent； and that none of those which we
perceive are really inherent in any outward object？
。 It should。
。 The point will be past all doubt； if you consider
that； in case colours were real properties or affections inherent
in external bodies； they could admit of no alteration without
some change wrought in the very bodies themselves： but； is it not
evident from what hath been said that； upon the use of
microscopes； upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eye；
or a variation of distance； without any manner of real alteration
｛186｝ in the thing itself； the colours of any object are either
changed； or totally disappear？ Nay； all other circumstances
remaining the same； change but the situation of some objects； and
they shall present different colours to the eye。 The same thing
happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light。 And
what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently
coloured by candle…light from what they do in the open day？ Add
to these the experiment of a prism which； separating the
heterogeneous rays of light； alters the colour of any object； and
will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the
naked eye。 And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that
every body hath its true real colour inhering in it； and； if you
think it hath； I would fain know farther from you； what certain
distance and position of the object； what peculiar texture and
formation of the eye； what degree or kind of light is necessary
for ascertaining that true colour； and distinguishing it from
apparent ones。
。 I own myself entirely satisfied； that they are all
equally apparent； and that there is no such thing as colour
really inhering in external bodies； but that it is altogether in
the light。 And what confirms me in this opinion is； that in
proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid； and
if there be no light； then are there no colours perceived。
Besides； allowing there are colours on external objects； yet； how
is it possible for us to perceive them？ For no external body
affects the mind； unless it acts first on our organs of sense。
But the only action of bodies is motion； and motion cannot be
communicated otherwise than by impulse。 A distant object
therefore cannot act on the eye； nor consequently make itself or
its properties perceivable to the soul。 Whence it plainly follows
that it is immediately some contiguous substance； which；
operating o