life； without any regard to speculation。
。 Methinks I apprehend your meaning。
。 It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our
senses are not real things； but images or copies of them。 Our
knowledge； therefore； is no farther real than as our ideas are
the true of those 。 But； as these
supposed originals are in themselves unknown； it is impossible to
know how far our ideas resemble them； or whether they resemble
them at all。 We cannot； therefore； be sure we have any real
knowledge。 Farther； as our ideas are perpetually varied； without
any change in the supposed real things； it necessarily follows
they cannot all be true copies of them： or； if some are and
others are not； it is impossible to distinguish the former from
the latter。 And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty。 Again；
when we consider the point； we cannot conceive how any idea； or
anything like an idea； should have an absolute existence out of a
mind： nor consequently； according to you； how there should be any
real thing in nature。 The result of ；all which is that we are
thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism。 Now； give
me leave to ask you； First； Whether your referring ideas to
certain absolutely existing unperceived substances； as their
originals； be not the source of all this scepticism？ Secondly；
whether you are informed； either by sense or reason； of the
existence of those unknown originals？ And； in case you are not；
whether it be not absurd to suppose them？ Thirdly； Whether； upon
inquiry； you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant
by the ？ Lastly； Whether； the premises considered； it be not
the wisest way to follow nature； trust your senses； and； laying
aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances；
admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived
by the senses？
。 For the present； I have no inclination to the
answering part。 I would much rather see how you can get over what
follows。 Pray are not the objects perceived by the ｛247｝
of one； likewise perceivable to others present？ If there were a
hundred more here； they would all see the garden； the trees； and
flowers； as I see them。 But they are not in the same manner
affected with the ideas I frame in my 。 Does not
this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the
latter？
。 I grant it does。 Nor have I ever denied a difference
between the objects of sense and those of imagination。 But what
would you infer from thence？ You cannot say that sensible objects
exist unperceived； because they are perceived by many。
。 I own I can make nothing of that objection： but it
hath led me into another。 Is it not your opinion that by our
senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds？
。 It is。
。 But the idea which is in my mind cannot be in
yours； or in any other mind。 Doth it not therefore follow； from
your principles； that no two can see the same thing？ And is not
this highly； absurd？
。 If the term be taken in the vulgar
acceptation； it is certain （and not at all repugnant to the
principles I maintain） that different persons may perceive the
same thing； or the same thing or idea exist in different minds。
Words are of arbitrary imposition； and； since men are used to
apply the word where no distinction or variety is
perceived； and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions； it
follows that； as men have said before； ； so they may； upon like occasions； still continue to use
the same phrase； without any deviation either from propriety of
language； or the truth of things。 But； if the term be used
in the acceptation of philosophers； who pretend to an abstracted
notion of identity； then； according to their sundry definitions
of this notion （for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic
identity consists）； it may or may not be possible for divers
persons to perceive the same thing。 But whether philosophers
shall think fit to a thing the no； is； I
conceive； of small importance。 Let us suppose several men
together； all endued with the same faculties； and consequently
affected in like sort by their senses； and who had yet never
known the use of language； they would； without question； agree in
their perceptions。 Though perhaps； when they came to the use of
speech； some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived；
might call it the thing： others； especially ｛248｝
regarding the diversity of persons who perceived； might choose
the denomination of things。 But who sees not that all
the dispute is about a word？ to wit； whether。 what is perceived
by different persons may yet have the term applied to it？
Or； suppose a house； whose walls or outward shell remaining
unaltered； the chambers are all pulled down； and new ones built
in their place； and that you should call this the ； and I
should say it was not the house。 would we not； for all
this； perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house； considered in
itself？ And would not all the difference consist in a sound？ If
you should say； We differed in our notions； for that you super…
added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of
identity； whereas I did not； I would tell you； I know not what
you mean by ； and should desire
you to look into your own thoughts； and be sure you understood
yourself。 Why so silent； Hylas？ Are you not yet satisfied men
may dispute about identity and diversity； without any real
difference in their thoughts and opinions； abstracted from names？
Take this farther reflexion with you： that whether Matter be
allowed to exist or no； the case is exactly the same as to the
point in hand。 For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what
we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas。 Your
difficulty； therefore； that no two see the same thing； makes
equally against the Materialists and me。
。 ＇Ay； Philonous；＇＇10＇ But they suppose an external
archetype； to which referring their several ideas they may truly
be said to perceive the same thing。
。 And （not to mention your having discarded those
archetypes） so may you suppose an external archetype on my
principles； ； ； ： though
indeed it must be' supposed to exist in that Mind which
comprehends all things； but then； this serves all the ends of
； as well as if it existed out of a mind。 And I am sure
you yourself will not say it is less intelligible。
。 You have indeed clearly satisfied me either that
there is no difficulty at bottom in this point； or； if there be；
that it makes equally against both opinions。
。 But that which makes equally against two
contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither。
。 I acknowledge it。 But； after all； Philonous； when I
consider ｛249｝ the substance of what you advance against
； it amounts to no more than this： We are sure that
we really see； hear； feel； in a word； that we are affected with
sensible impressions。
。 And how are concerned any farther？ I see this
cherry； I feel it； I taste it： and I am sure cannot be
seen； or felt； or。 tasted： it is therefore red。 Take away the
sensations of softness； moisture； redness； tartness； and you take
away the cherry； since it is not a being distinct from
sensations。 A cherry； I say； is nothing but a congeries of
sensible impressions； or ideas perceived by various senses： which
ideas are united into one thing （or have one name given them） by
the mind； because they are observed to attend each other。 Thus；
when the palate is affected with such a particular taste； the
sight is affected with a red colour； the touch with roundness；
softness； &c。 Hence； when I see； and feel； and taste； in such
sundry certain manners； I am sure the cherry exists； or is real；
its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those
sensations。 But if by the word you； mean an unknown
nature； distinct from all those sensible qualities； and by its
something distinct from its being perceived； then；
indeed； I own； neither you nor I； nor any one else； can be sure
it exists。
。 But； what would you say； Philonous； if I should bring
the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things
； which you have offered against their existing ？
。 When I see your reasons； you shall hear what I have
to say ；to them。
。 Is the mind extended or unextended？
。 Unextended； without doubt。
。 Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind？
。 They are。
。 Again； have I not heard you speak of sensible
impressions？
。 I believe you may。
。 Explain to me now； 0 Philonous！ how it is possible
there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in
your mind。 Can extended things be contai