there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in
your mind。 Can extended things be contained in that which is
unextended？ Or； are we to imagine impressions made on a thing
void of all solidity？ You cannot say objects are in your mind； as
books in your study： or that things are imprinted on it； as the
figure of a seal upon wax。 In what sense； therefore； are we to
understand those expressions？ Explain me this if you can： and I
shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put
to me about my 。
。 Look you； Hylas； when I speak of objects as existing
in the mind； or imprinted on the senses； I would not be
understood in the gross literal sense； as when bodies are said to
exist in a place； or a seal to make an impression upon wax。 My
meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them； and
that it is affected from without； or by some being distinct from
itself。 This is my explication of your difficulty； and how it can
serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material
intelligible； I would fain know。
。 Nay； if that be all； I confess I do not see what use
can be made of it。 But are you not guilty of some abuse of
language in this？
。 None at all。 It is no more than common custom； which
you know is the rule of language； hath authorised： nothing being
more usual； than for philosophers to speak of the immediate
objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind。 'Nor
is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general
analogy of language； most part of the mental operations being
signified by words borrowed from sensible things； as is plain in
the terms ； reflect； ； &。； which； being
applied to the mind； must not be taken in their gross； original
sense。
。 You have； I own； satisfied me in this point。 But
there still remains one great difficulty； which I know not how
you will get over。 And； indeed； it is of such importance that if
you could solve all others； without being able to find a solution
for this； you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your
principles。
。 Let me know this mighty difficulty。
。 The Scripture account of the creation is what appears
to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions。 Moses tells us of
a creation： a creation of what？ of ideas？ No； certainly； but of
things； of real things； solid corporeal substances。 Bring your
principles to agree with this； and I shall perhaps agree with
you。
。 Moses mentions the sun； moon； and stars； earth and
sea； plants and animals。 That all these do really exist； and were
in the beginning created by God； I make no question。 ｛251｝ If by
you mean fictions and fancies of the mind； then these are
no ideas。 If by you mean immediate objects of the
understanding； or sensible things； which cannot exist
unperceived； or out of a mind； then these things are ideas。 But
whether you do or do not call them ； matters little。
The difference is only about a name。 And； whether that name be
retained or rejected； the sense； the truth； and reality of things
continues the same。 In common talk； the objects of our senses are
not termed ； but 。 Call them so still： provided
you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence； and
I shall never quarrel with you for a word。 The creation；
therefore； I allow to have been a creation of things； of
things。 Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my
principles； as is evident from what I have now said； and would
have been evident to you without this； if you had not forgotten
what had been so often said before。 But as for solid corporeal
substances； I desire you to show where Moses makes any mention of
them； and； if they should be mentioned by him； or any other
inspired writer； it would still be incumbent on you to shew those
words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation； for things
falling under our senses； but in the philosophic acceptation； for
Matter； or ； 。
When you have proved these points； then （and not till then） may
you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute。
。 It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear。 I am
content to refer it to your own conscience。 Are you not satisfied
there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of
the creation and your notions？
。 If all possible sense which can be put on the first
chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my
principles as any other； then it has no peculiar repugnancy with
them。 But there is no sense you may not as well conceive；
believing as I do。 Since； besides spirits； all you conceive are
ideas； and the existence of these I do not deny。 Neither do you
pretend they exist without the mind。
。 Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in。
。 Why； I imagine that if I had been present at the
creation； I should have seen things produced into being that
is become perceptible in the order prescribed by the sacred
historian。 I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the
creation； and now find no alteration in my manner of believing
it。 When things are said to begin or end their existence； we
｛252｝ do not mean this with regard to God； but His creatures。 All
objects are eternally known by God； or； which is the same thing；
have an eternal existence in His mind： but when things； before
imperceptible to creatures； are； by a decree of God； perceptible
to them； then are they said to begin a relative existence； with
respect to created minds。 Upon reading therefore the Mosaic
account of the creation； I understand that the several parts of
the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits； endowed
with proper faculties； so that； whoever such were present； they
were in truth perceived by them。 This is the literal obvious
sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture： in
which is included no mention； or no thought； either of
；