in the strict and proper sense of the word。 A Being whose
spirituality； omnipresence； providence； omniscience； infinite
power and goodness； are as conspicuous as the existence of
sensible things； of which （notwithstanding the fallacious
pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics） there is no more
reason to doubt than of our own being。 Then； with relation to
human sciences。 In Natural Philosophy； what intricacies； what
obscurities； what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led
men into！ To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its
extent； continuity； homogeneity； gravity； divisibility； &c。 do
they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on
bodies； according to the laws of motion？ and yet； are they able
to comprehend how one body should move another？ Nay； admitting
there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert
being with a cause； or in conceiving how an accident might pass
from one body to another； yet； by all their strained thoughts and
extravagant suppositions； have they been able to reach the
production of any one animal or vegetable body？ Can
they account； by the laws of motion； for sounds； tastes； smells；
or colours； or for the regular course of things？ Have they
accounted； by physical principles； for the aptitude and
contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the
universe？ But； laying aside Matter and corporeal； causes； and
admitting only the efficiency of an All…perfect Mind； are not all
the effects of nature easy and intelligible？ If the
are nothing else but ； God is a ； but Matter an
unintelligent； unperceiving being。 If they demonstrate an
unlimited power in their cause； God is active and omnipotent； but
Matter an inert mass。 If the order； regularity； and usefulness of
them can ｛258｝ never be sufficiently admired； God is infinitely
wise and provident； but Matter destitute of all contrivance and
design。 These surely are great advantages in 。 Not to
mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally
disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions； which they
would be more cautious of； in case they thought Him immediately
present； and acting on their minds； without the interposition of
Matter； or unthinking second causes。 Then in ：
what difficulties concerning entity in abstract； substantial
forms； hylarchic principles； plastic natures； substance and
accident； principle of individuation； possibility of Matter's
thinking； origin of ideas； the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as ； should
mutually operate on each other？ what difficulties； I say； and
endless disquisitions； concerning these and innumerable other the
like points； do we escape； by supposing only Spirits and ideas？ …
… Even the themselves； if we take away the absolute
existence of extended things； become much more clear and easy；
the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those
sciences depending on the。 infinite divisibility of finite
extension； which depends on that supposition But what need is
there to insist on the particular sciences？ Is not that
opposition to all science whatsoever； that frenzy of the ancient
and modern Sceptics； built on the same foundation？ Or can you
produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal
things； or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their
natures； which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an
external absolute existence？ Upon this supposition； indeed； the
objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck； or the
appearance of the broken oar in the water； must be allowed to
have weight。 But these and the like objections vanish； if we do
not maintain the being of absolute external originals； but place
the reality of things in ideas；。 fleeting indeed； and changeable；
however； not changed at random； but according to the fixed
order of nature。 For； herein consists that constancy and truth of
things which secures all the concerns of life； and distinguishes
that which is real from the the fancy。
｛259｝
。 I agree to all you have now said。； and must own that
nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the
advantages I see it is attended with。 I am by nature lazy； and
this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge。 What doubts； what
hypotheses； what labyrinths of amusement； what fields of
disputation； what an ocean of false learning； may be avoided by
that single notion of ！
。 After all； is there anything farther remaining to be
done？ You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which
upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and
remote from Scepticism。 This； by your own confession； is that
which denies Matter； or the existence of corporeal
things。 Nor is this all； the same notion has been proved several
ways； viewed in different lights； pursued in its consequences；
and all objections against it cleared。 Can there be a greater
evidence of its truth？ or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false？
。 I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in
all respects。 But； what security can I have that I shall still
continue the same full assent to your opinion； and that no
unthought…of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter？
。 Pray； Hylas； do you in other cases； when a point is
once evidently proved； withhold your consent on account of
objections or difficulties it may be liable to？ Are the
difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable
quantities； of the angle of contact； of the asymptotes to curves；
or the like； sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical
demonstration？ Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God；
because there may be some particular things which you know not
how to reconcile with it？ If there are difficulties ； there are at the same time direct and evident
proofs of it。 But for the existence of Matter there is not one
proof； and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie
against it。 But where are those mighty difficulties you insist
on？ Alas！ you know not where or what they are； something which
may possibly occur hereafter。 If this be a sufficient pretence
for withholding your full assent； you should never yield it to
any proposition； how free soever from exceptions； how clearly and
solidly soever demonstrated。
。 You have satisfied me； Philonous。
。 But； to arm you against all future objections； do
but consider： That which bears equally hard on two contradictory
｛260｝ opinions can be proof against neither。 Whenever； therefore；
any difficulty occurs； try if you can find a solution for it on
the hypothesis of the 。 Be not deceived by words；
but sound your own thoughts。 And in case you cannot conceive it
easier by the help of ； it is plain it can be no
objection against 。 Had you proceeded all along by
this rule； you would probably have spared yourself abundance of
trouble in objecting； since of all your difficulties I challenge
you to shew one that is explained by Matter： nay； which is not
more unintelligible with than without that supposition； and
consequently makes rather for it。 You should
consider； in each particular； whether the difficulty arises from
the …。 If it doth not； you might as
well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against
the Divine prescience； as from such a difficulty against
。 And yet； upon recollection； I believe you will
find this to have been often； if not always； the case。 You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a 。 One is
apt to say The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real
things； rather than the ideas in our minds： and who can tell but
the unthinking external substance may concur； as a cause or
instrument； in the productions of our ideas？ But is not this
proceeding on a supposition that there are such external
substances？ And to suppose this； is it not begging the question？
But； above all things； you should beware of imposing on yourself
by that vulgar sophism which is called 。 You
talked often as if you thought I maintained the non…existence of
Sensible Things。 Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly
assured of their existence than I am。 And it is you who doubt； I
should have said； positively deny it。 Everything that is seen；
felt； heard； or any way perceived by the senses； is； on the
principles I embrace； a real being； but not on yours。 Remember；
the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat （if indeed it
may be termed ）； which is quite stripped of all
sensible qualities； and can neither be perceived by sense； nor
apprehended by the mind。 Remember I say； that it is not any
object which is hard or soft； hot or cold； blue or white； round
or square； &c。 For all these things I affirm do exist。 Though
indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being
perceived； or that they exist out