indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being
perceived； or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever。 Think
on these points； let them be attentively considered and still
kept in view。 Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the
question； without which your objections ｛261｝ will always be wide
of the mark； and； instead of mine； may possibly be directed （as
more than once they have been） against your own notions。
。 I must needs own； Philonous； nothing seems to have
kept me from agreeing with you more than this same 。 In denying Matter；。 at first； glimpse I am tempted to
imagine you deny the things we see and feel： but； upon reflexion；
find there is no ground for it。 What think you； therefore； of
retaining the name ； and applying it to ？ This may be done without any change in your sentiments：
and； believe me； it would be a means of reconciling them to some
persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in
opinion。
。 With all my heart： retain the word ； and
apply it to the objects of sense； if you please； provided you do
not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being
perceived。 I shall never quarrel with you for an expression。
； or ； are terms introduced by
philosophers； and； as used by them； imply a sort of independency；
or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind： but are
never used by common people； or； if ever； it is to signify the
immediate objects of sense。 One would think； therefore； so long
as the names of all particular things； with the ；
； ； ； and the like； are retained； the
word should be never missed in common talk。 And in
philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite
out： since there is not； perhaps； any one thing that hath more
favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards
Atheism than the use of that general confused term。
。 Well but； Philonous； since I am content to give up
the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind； I
think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word
as I please； and annexing it to a collection of sensible
qualities subsisting only in the mind。 I freely own there is no
other substance； in a strict sense； than 。 But I have
been so long accustomed to the that I know not how
to part with it： to say； there is no in the world； is
still shocking to me。 Whereas to say There is no ； if
by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without
the mind； but if by is meant some sensible thing； whose
existence consists in being perceived； then there is ：
distinction gives it quite another turn； and men will come
into your notions with ｛262｝ small difficulty； when they are
proposed in that manner。 For； after all； the controversy about
in the strict acceptation of it； lies altogether between
you and the philosophers： whose principles； I acknowledge； are
not near so natural； or so agreeable to the common sense of
mankind； and Holy Scripture； as yours。 There is nothing we either
desire or shun but as it makes； or is apprehended to make； some
part of our happiness or misery。 But what hath happiness or
misery； joy or grief； pleasure or pain； to do with Absolute
Existence； or with unknown entities； ？ It is evident； things regard us only as they are pleasing
or displeasing： and they can please or displease only so far
forth as they are perceived。 Farther； therefore； we are not
concerned； and thus far you leave things as you found them。 Yet
still there is something new in this doctrine。 It is plain； I do
not now think with the Philosophers； nor yet altogether with the
vulgar。 I would know how the case stands in that respect；
precisely； what you have added to； or altered in my former
notions。
。 I do not pretend to be a setter…up of new notions。
My endeavours tend only to unite； and place in a clearer light；
that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the
philosophers： the former being of opinion； that ； and the latter；
that ； 。 Which two notions put together； do； in effect；
constitute the substance of what I advance。
。 I have been a long time distrusting my senses：
methought I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses。
Now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my
under standing。 I am clearly convinced that I see things in their
native forms； and am no longer in pain about their 。 This is the state I find myself
in at present； though； indeed； the course that brought me to it I
do not yet thoroughly comprehend。 You set out upon the same
principles that Academics； Cartesians； and the like sects usually
do； and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their
philosophical Scepticism： but； in the end； your conclusions are
directly opposite to theirs。
。 You see； Hylas； the water of yonder fountain； how it
is forced upwards； in a round column； to a certain height； at
｛263｝ which it breaks； and falls back into the basin from whence
it rose： its ascent； as well as descent； proceeding from the same
uniform law or principle of gravitation。 just so； the same
Principles which； at first view； lead to Scepticism； pursued to a
certain point； bring men back to Common Sense。
Notes：
＇2＇＇Text within brackets is not contained in the first and second
editions。＇
＇3＇＇〃Size or figure； or sensible quality〃 〃size； colour； &c；〃
in the first and second
editions。＇
＇4＇＇〃In stones and minerals〃 in first and second editions。＇
＇5＇＇The passage within brackets first appeared in the third
edition。＇
＇6＇＇0mitted in last edition。＇
＇7＇〃Tell me； Hylas；〃 〃So Hylas〃 in first and second
editions。＇
＇8＇＇This important passage； printed within brackets； is not found
in the first and second editions of the Didogues。 It is； by
anticipation； Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the
objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter； to
the reality of the Ego or Self； of which we are aware through
memory； as identical amid the changes of its successive states。…
A。 C。 F。＇
＇9＇＇The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition。＇
＇10＇＇Omitted in authoes last edition。＇
＇11＇＇In the first and second editions only。＇
The End