the motions perceived are both really in the object） it is
possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way
at once； both very swift and very slow。 How is this consistent
either with common sense； or with what you just now granted？
｛191｝
。 I have nothing to say to it。
。 Then as for ； either you do not mean any
sensible quality by that word； and so it is beside our inquiry：
or if you do； it must be either hardness or resistance。 But both
the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses： it
being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft
to another； who hath greater force and firmness of limbs。 Nor is
it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body。
。 I own the very of resistance； which is
all you immediately perceive； is not in the body； but the
of that sensation is。
。 But the causes of our sensations are not things
immediately perceived； and therefore are not sensible。 This point
I thought had been already determined。
。 I own it was； but you will pardon me if I seem a
little embarrassed： I know not how to quit my old notions。
。 To help you out； do but consider that if
be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind； the
same must necessarily be granted of motion； solidity； and
gravity； since they all evidently suppose extension。 It is
therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of
them。 In denying extension； you have denied them all to have any
real existence。
。 I wonder； Philonous； if what you say be true； why
those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real
existence should yet attribute it to the Primary。 If there is no
difference between them； how can this be accounted for？
。 It is not my business to account for every opinion
of the philosophers。 But； among other reasons which may be
assigned for this； it seems probable that pleasure and pain being
rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one。 Heat and
cold； tastes and smells； have something more vividly pleasing or
disagreeable than the ideas of extension； figure； and motion
affect us with。 And； it being too visibly absurd to hold that
pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance； men are
more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities。 You will be satisfied there
is something in this； if you recollect the difference you made
between an intense and more moderate degree of heat； allowing the
one a real existence； while you denied it to the other。 But；
after all； there is no rational ground for that distinction； for；
surely an indifferent sensation is as ｛191｝ truly
as one more pleasing or painful； and consequently should not any
more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject。
。 It is just come into my head； Philonous； that I have
somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible
extension。 Now； though it be acknowledged that and
； consisting merely in the relation which other extended
beings have to the parts of our own bodies； do not really inhere
in the substances themselves； yet nothing obliges us to hold the
same with regard to ； which is something
abstracted from and ； from this or that particular
magnitude or figure。 So likewise as to motion； and
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds。 But； it doth not follow； because those modifications of
motion exist not without the mind； that therefore absolute motion
abstracted from them doth not。
。 Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion； or
one part of extension； from another？ Is it not something
sensible； as some degree of swiftness or slowness； some certain
magnitude or figure peculiar to each？
。 I think so。
。 These qualities； therefore； stripped of all sensible
properties； are without all specific and numerical differences；
as the schools call them。
。 They are。
。 That is to say； they are extension in general； and
motion in general。
。 Let it be so。
。 But it is a universally received maxim that
。 How then can motion in
general； or extension in general； exist in any corporeal
substance？ ｛193｝
。 I will take time to solve your difficulty。
。 But I think the point may be speedily decided。
Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or
that idea。 Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue。 If
you can frame in your thoughts a distinct of
motion or extension； divested of all those sensible modes； as
swift and slow； great and small； round and square； and the like；
which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind； I will then
yield the point you contend for。 But if you cannot； it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have
no notion of。
。 To confess ingenuously； I cannot。
。 Can you even separate the ideas of extension and
motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make
the distinction term ？
。 What！ is it not an easy matter to consider extension
and motion by themselves； abstracted from all other sensible
qualities？ Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them？
。 I acknowledge； Hylas； it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those qualities；
without mentioning any other； and； in this sense； to consider or
treat of them abstractedly。 But； how doth it follow that； because
I can pronounce the word by itself； I can form the idea
of it in my mind exclusive of body？ or； because theorems may be
made of extension and figures； without any mention of or
； or any other sensible mode or quality； that therefore it
is possible such an abstract idea of extension； without any
particular size or figure； or sensible quality；＇3 ＇ ＇should be
distinctly formed； and apprehended by the mind？ Mathematicians
treat of quantity； without regarding what other sensible。
qualities it is attended with； as being altogether indifferent to
their demonstrations。 But； when laying aside the words； they
contemplate the bare ideas； I believe you will find； they are not
the pure abstracted ideas of extension。
。 But what say you to ？ May not
abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty？
。 Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all； it is
plain I cannot frame them by the help of ； ｛194｝
whatsoever faculty you understand by those words。 Besides； not to
inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual
objects； as ； ； ； or the like； thus much
seems manifest that sensible things are only to be perceived
by sense； or represented by the imagination。 Figures； therefore；
and extension； being originally perceived by sense； do not belong
to pure intellect： but； for your farther satisfaction； try if you
can frame the idea of any figure； abstracted from all
particularities of size； or even from other sensible qualities。
。 Let me think a little I do not find that I can。
。 And can you think it possible that should really
exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception？
。 By no means。
。 Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind
to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other
sensible qualities； doth it not follow； that where the one exist
there necessarily the other exist likewise？
。 It should seem so。
。 Consequently； the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are；
without any farther application of force； against the Primary
too。 Besides； if you will trust your senses； is it not plain all
sensible qualities coexist； or to them appear as being in the
same place？ Do they ever represent a motion； or figure； as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities？
。 You need say no more on this head。 I am free to own；
if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings
hitherto； that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied
existence without the mind。 But； my fear is that I have been too
liberal in my former concessions； or overlooked some fallacy or
other。 In short； I did not take time to think。
。 For that matter； Hylas； you may take what time you
please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry。 You are at
liberty to recover any slips you might have made； or offer
whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion。
。 One great oversight I take to be this that I did
not sufficiently distinguish the from the 。
Now； though this latter may not exist without the mind； yet it
will not thence follow that the former cannot。
。 What object do you mean？ the object of the senses？
。 The same。
。 It is t