man； who is implicitly rational； must create himself by working through and out of himself and by
reconstructing himself within himself； before he can become also explicitly rational。
§ 11。
The will； which is at first only implicitly free； is the direct or natural will。 The
distinctive phases； which the self…determining conception sets up in the will；
appear in the direct will； as a directly present content。 They are impulses；
appetites； inclinations； by which the will finds itself determined by nature。 Now
this content； with all its attendant phases； proceeds from the rationality of the will；
and is therefore implicitly rational； but let loose in its immediate directness it has
not as yet the form of rationality。 The content is indeed for me and my own； but
the form and the content are yet different。 The will is thus in itself finite。
Note。 Empirical psychology enumerates and describes these impulses and inclinations； and the
wants which are based upon them。 It takes； or imagines that it takes this material from experience；
and then seeks to classify it in the usual way。 It will be stated below； what the objective side of
impulse is； and what impulse is in its truth； apart from the form of irrationality which it has as an
impulse； and also what shape it assumes when it reaches existence。
Addition。 Impulse； appetite； inclination are possessed by the animal also； but it has not will； it
must obey impulse； if there is no external obstacle。 Man； however； is the completely undetermined；
and stands above impulse； and may fix and set it up as his。 Impulse is in nature； but it depends on
my will whether I establish it in the I。 Nor can the will be unconditionally called to this action by the
fact that the impulse lies in nature。
§ 12。
The system of this content； as it occurs directly in the will； exists only as a
multitude or multiplicity of impulses； every one of which is mine in a general way
along with others； but is at the same time universal and undetermined； having
many objects and ways of satisfaction。 The will； by giving itself in this two…fold
indefiniteness the form of individuality （§ 7）； resolves； and only as resolving is it
actual。
Remark： Instead of to 〃 resolve；〃 i。e。 to supersede the indefinite condition in which a content is
merely possible； our language has the expression 〃decide 〃 （〃 unfold itself 〃）。 The indeterminate
condition of the will； as neutral but infinitely fruitful germ of all existence； contains within itself its
definite character and ends； and brings them forth solely out of itself。
§ 13。
By resolution； will fixes itself as the will of a definite individual； and as thereby
distinguishing itself from another。 However apart from this finite character which
it has as consciousness （§ 8）； the immediate will is in virtue of the distinction
between its form and its content formal。 Hence its resolution as such is abstract；
and its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom。
Remark： To the intelligence； as thinking； the object or content remains universal ； the intelligence
retains the form merely of a universal activity。 Now the universal signifies in will that which is mine；
i。e。 it is individuality。 And yet； also； the direct and formal will is abstract ； its individuality is not yet
filled with its free universality。 Hence at the beginning the peculiar finitude of the intelligence is in
will； and only by exalting itself again to thought and giving itself intrinsic universality does the will
transcend the distinction of form and content and make itself objective infinite will。 It is therefore a
misunderstanding of the nature of thought and will to suppose that in the will man is infinite； while in
thought and even in reason he is limited。 In so far as thought and will are still distinct； the reverse is
rather the case； and thinking reason； when it becomes will； assigns itself to finitude。
Addition。 A will which resolves nothing； is not an actual will； that which is devoid of definite
character never reaches a volition。 The reason for hesitation may lie in a sensitiveness； which is
aware that in determining itself it is engaged with what is finite； is assigning itself a limit； and
abandoning its infinity ； it may thus hold to its decision not to renounce the totality which it intends。
Such a feeling is dead； even when it aims to be something beautiful。 〃Who will be great；〃 says
Goethe； 〃must be able to limit himself。〃 By volition alone man enters actuality； however distasteful
it may be to him； for indolence will not desert its own self…brooding； in which it clings to a universal
possibility。 But possibility is not yet actuality。 Hence the will； which is secure simply of itself； does
not as yet lose itself in any definite reality。
§ 14。
The finite will； which has merely from the standpoint of form doubled itself back
upon itself； and has become the infinite and self…secluded I （§ 5）； stands above
its content of different impulses and also above the several ways by which they
are realised and satisfied。 At the same time； as it is only formally infinite； it is
confined to this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and external
actuality； although it is undetermined and not confined to one content rather than
another （§§ 6； 11）。 As to the return of the I into itself such a will is only a
possible will； which may or may not be mine； and the I is only the possibility of
deputing itself to this or that object。 Hence amongst these definite phases； which
in this light are for the I external； the will chooses。
§ 15。
Freedom of the will is； in this view of it； caprice； in which are contained both a
reflection； which is free and abstracted from everything and a dependence upon a
content or matter either internally or externally provided。 Since the content is in
itself or implicitly necessary as all end； and in opposition to this reflection is a
definite possibility； caprice； when it is will； is in its nature contingent。
Remark： The； usual idea of freedom is that of caprice。 It is a midway stage of reflection
between the will as merely natural impulse and the will as free absolutely。 When it is said that
freedom as a； general thing consists in doing what one likes； such an idea must be taken to imply
an utter lack of developed thought； containing as yet not even the suspicion of what is meant by
the absolutely free will； right； the ethical system； etc。 Reflection； being the formal universality and I
unity of self…consciousness； is the will's abstract certitude of its freedom； but it is not yet the truth
of it； because it has not as yet itself for content and end； the subjective side is still different from the
objective。 Thus the content in such a case remains purely and completely finite。 Caprice； instead of
being will in its truth； is rather will in its contradiction。
In the controversy carried on； especially at the time of the metaphysic of Wolf； as to whether the
will is really free or our consciousness of its freedom is a delusion； it was this caprice； which was in
the minds of both parties。 Against the certitude of abstract self…direction； determinism rightly
opposed a content； which was externally presented； and not being contained in this certitude came
from without。 It did not matter whether this 〃without〃 were impulse； imagination； or in general a
consciousness so filled that the content was not the peculiar possession of the self…activity as such。
Since only the formal element of free self…direction is immanent in caprice； while the other element
is something given to it from without； to take caprice as freedom may fairly be named a delusion。
Freedom in every philosophy of reflection； whether it be the Kantian or the Friesian； which is the
Kantian superficialised； is nothing more than this formal self…activity。
Addition。 Since I have the possibility of determining himself in this or that way； since I have the
power of choice； possess caprice； or what is commonly called freedom。 This choice is due to the
universality of the will； enabling me to make my own this thing or another。 This possession is a
particular content； which is therefore not adequate to me； but separated from me； and is mine only
in possibility； just as I am the possibility of bringing myself into coincidence with it。 Hence choice is
due to the indeterminateness of the I； and to the determinateness of a content。 But as to this
content the will is not free； although it has in itself formally the side of infinitude。 No such content
corresponds to will ； in no content can it truly find itself。 In caprice it is involved that the content is
not formed by the nature of my will； but by contingency。 I am dependent upon this content。 This is
the contradiction contained in caprice。 Ordinary man believes that he is free； when lie is allowed to
act capriciously； but precisely in caprice is it inherent that he is not free。 When I will the rational； I
do not act as a particular individual but according to the conceptio