do not act as a particular individual but according to the conception of ethical life in general。 In an
ethical act I establish not myself but the thing。 A man； who acts perversely； exhibits particularity。
The rational is the highway on which every one travels； and no one is specially marked。 When a
great artist finishes a work we say： 〃It must be so。〃 The particularity of the； artist has wholly
disappeared and the work shows no mannerism。 Phidias has no mannerism； the statue itself lives
and moves。 But the poorer is the artist； the more easily we discern himself； his particularity all
caprice。 If we adhere to the consideration that in caprice a man can will what he pleases； we have
certainly freedom of a kind； but again； if we hold to the view that the content is given； then man
must be determined by it； and in this light is no longer free。
§ 16。
What is resolved upon and chosen （§ 14） the will may again give up （§ 5）。 Yet；
even with the possibility of transcending any other content which it may
substitute； and of proceeding in this way ad infinitum； the will does not advance
beyond finitude； because every content in turn is different from the form and is
finite。 The opposite aspect； namely indeterminateness； irresolution or abstraction；
is also one…sided。
§ 17。
Since the contradiction involved in caprice （§ 15） is the dialectic of the impulses
and inclinations； it is manifested in their mutual antagonism。 The satisfaction of
one demands the subjection and sacrifice of the satisfaction of another。 Since an
impulse is merely the simple tendency of its own essential nature； and has no
measure in itself； to subject or sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a
contingent decision of caprice。 In such a case caprice may act upon the
calculation as to which impulse will bring the greater satisfaction； or may have
some other similar purpose。
Addition。 Impulses and inclinations are in the first instance the content of will； and only
reflection transcends them。 But these impulses are self…directing； crowding upon and jostling one
another； and all seeking to be satisfied。 To set all but one in the background； and put myself into
this one； is to limit and distort myself； since I； in so doing； renounce my universality； which is a
system of the impulses。 Just as little help is found in a mere subordination of them； a course usually
followed by the understanding。 There is available no criterion by which to make such an
arrangement； and hence the demand for a subordination is usually sustained by tedious and
irrelevant allusions to general savings。
§ 18。
With regard to the moral estimate of impulses； dialectic appears in this form。 The
phases of the direct or natural will are immanent and positive； and thus good。
Hence man is by nature good。 But natural characteristics； since they are opposed
to freedom and the conception of the spirit； and are； hence； negative； must be
eradicated。 Thus man is by nature evil。 To decide for either view is a matter of
subjective caprice。
Addition。 The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is loftier than the opposite that he is
naturally good； and is to be interpreted philosophically in this way。 Man as spirit is a free being；
who need not give way to impulse。 Hence in his direct and unformed condition； man is in a
situation in which he ought not to be； and he must free himself。 This is the meaning of the doctrine
of original sin； without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom。
§ 19。
In the demand that impulses must be purified is found the general idea that they
must be freed from the form of direct subjection to nature； and from a content
that is subjective and contingent； and must be restored to their substantive
essence。 The truth contained in this indefinite demand is that impulses should be
phases of will in a rational system。 To apprehend them in this way as proceeding
from the conception is the content of the science of right。
Remark： The content of this science may； in all its several elements； right； property； morality；
family； state； be represented in this way； that man has by nature the impulse to right； the impulse to
property； to morality； to sexual love； and to social life。 If instead of this form； which belongs to
empirical psychology； a philosophic form be preferred； it may be obtained cheap from what； in
modern times was reputed and still is reputed to be philosophy。 He will then say that man finds in
himself as a fact of consciousness that he wills right； property； the state； etc。 Later will be given still
another form of the content which appears here in the shape of impulses； that； namely； of duties。
§ 20。
The reflection which is brought to bear upon impulses； placing them before itself；
estimating them； comparing them with one another； and contrasting them with
their means and consequences； and also with a whole of satisfaction； namely
happiness； brings the formal universal to this material； and in an external way
purifies it of its crudity and barbarism。 This propulsion by the universality of
thought is the absolute worth of civilisation （§ 187）。
Addition。 In happiness thought has already the upper hand with the force of natural impulse；
since it is not satisfied with what is momentary； but requires happiness as a whole。 This happiness
is dependent upon civilisation to the extent to which civilisation confirms the universal。 But in the
ideal of happiness there are two elements。 There is
1。a universal that is higher than all particulars； vet； as the content of this universal is in turn only
universal pleasure； there arises once more the individual； particular and finite； and retreat
must be made to impulse；
2。Since the content of happiness lies in the subjective perception of each individual； this
universal end is again particular； nor is there present in it any true unity of content and form。
§ 21。
But the truth of this formal universality； which taken by itself is undetermined and
finds definite character in externally given material； is the self…directing
universality which is will or freedom。 Since the will has as its object； content and
end； universality itself； and thus assumes the form of the infinite； it is free not
only in itself or implicitly； but for itself or explicitly。 It is the true idea。
Remark： The self…consciousness of the will in the form of appetite or impulse is sensible； the
sensible in general indicating the externality of self…consciousness； or that condition in which
self…consciousness is outside of itself。 Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the
reflecting will； and the other is the abstract universality of thought。 But the absolute will has as its
object the will itself as such in its pure universality。 In this universality the directness of the natural
will is superseded； and so also is the private individuality which is produced by reflection and
infects the natural condition。 But to supersede these and lift them into the universal； constitutes the
activity of thought。 Thus the self…consciousness； which purifies its object； content or end； and
exalts it to universality； is thought carrying itself through into will。 It is at this point that it becomes
clear that the will is true and free only as thinking intelligence。 The slave knows not his essence； his
infinitude； his freedom； he does not know himself in his essence； and not to know himself is not to
think himself。 The self…consciousness； which by thought apprehends that itself is essence； and thus
puts away from itself the accidental and untrue； constitutes the principle of right； morality； and all
forms of ethical life。 They who； in speaking philosophically of right； morality； and ethical life； would
exclude thought and turn to feeling； the heart； the breast； and inspiration； express the deepest
contempt for thought and science。 And science itself； overwhelmed with despair and utter
insipidity； makes barbarism and absence of thought a principle； and so far as in it lay robbed men
of all truth； dignity； and worth。
Addition。 In philosophy truth is had when the conception corresponds to reality。 A body is the
reality； and soul is the conception。 Soul and body should be adequate to each other。 A dead man
is still an existence； but no longer a true existence； it is a reality void of conception。 For that reason
the dead body decays。 So with the true will； that which it wills； namely； its content； is identical with
it； and so freedom wills freedom。
§ 22。
The will which exists absolutely is truly infinite； because its object being the will
itself； is for it not another or a limitation。 In the object the will has simply reverted
into itself。 Moreover； it is not mere possibility； capacity； potentiality （potential； but
infinitely actual （infinitum actu）； because the reality of the conception or its
visible externality is internal to itself。
Remark： Hen