visible externality is internal to itself。
Remark： Hence when the free will is spoken of without the qualification of absolute freedom；
only the capacity of freedom is meant； or the natural and finite will （§ 11）； and； notwithstanding all
words and opinions to the contrary； not the free will。 Since the understanding comprehends the
infinite only in its negative aspect； and hence as a beyond； it thinks to do the infinite all the more
honour the farther it removes it into the vague distance； and the more it takes it as a foreign thing。
In free will the true infinite is present and real； it is itself the actually present self…contained idea。
Addition。 The infinite has rightly been represented as a circle。 The straight line goes out farther
and farther； and symbolises the merely negative and bad infinite； which； unlike the true； does not
return into itself。 The free will is truly infinite； for it is not a mere possibility or disposition。 Its
external reality is its own inner nature； itself。
§ 23。
Only in this freedom is the will wholly by itself； because it refers to nothing but
itself； and all dependence upon any other thing falls away。 The will is true； or
rather truth itself； because its character consists in its being in its manifested
reality； or correlative opposite； what it is in its conception。 In other words； the
pure conception has the perception or intuition of itself as its end and reality。
§ 24。
The will is universal； because in it all limitation and particular individuality are
superseded。 These one…sided phases are found only in the difference between the
conception and its object or content； or； from another standpoint； in the
difference between the conscious independent existence of the subject； and the
will's implicit； or self…involved existence； or between its excluding and concluding
individuality； and its universality。
Remark： The different phases of universality are tabulated In the logic （Encyclopaedia。 of the
Phil。 Sciences； §§ 118…126）。 Imaginative thinking always takes universality in an abstract and
external way。 But absolute universality is not to be thought of either as the universality of reflection；
which is a kind of consensus or generality； or； as the abstract universality and self…identity； which is
fashioned by the understanding （§ 6； note）； and keeps aloof from the individual。 It is rather the
concrete； self…contained； and self…referring universality； which is the substance； intrinsic genus； or
immanent idea of self…consciousness。 It is a conception of free will as the universal； transcending its
object； passing through and beyond its own specific character； and then becoming identical with
itself。 This absolute universal is what is in general called the rational； and is to be apprehended only
in this speculative way。
§ 25。
The subjective side of the will is the side of its self…consciousness and
individuality （§ 7）； as distinguished from its implicit conception。 This subjectivity
is
＇a＇ pure form or absolute unity of self…consciousness with itself。 This unity is the
equation 〃 I = I；〃 consciousness being characterised by a thoroughly inward and
abstract self…dependence。 It is pure certitude of itself in contrast with the truth；
＇b＇ particularity of will； as caprice with its accidental content of pleasurable ends；
＇c＇ in general a one…sided form （§ 8）； in so far as that which is willed is at first an
unfulfilled end； or a content which simply belongs to self…consciousness。
§ 26。
＇a＇ In so far as free will is determined by itself； and is in accord with its
conception and true； it is wholly objective will。 ＇b＇ But objective
self…consciousness； which has not the form of the infinite； is a will sunk in its
object or condition； whatever the content of that may be。 It is the will of the
child； or the will present in slavery or superstition。 ＇c＇ Objectivity is finally a
one…sided form in opposition to the subjective phase of will ； it is direct reality； or
external existence。 In this sense the will becomes objective only by the execution
of its ends。
Remark： These logical phases of subjectivity and objectivity； since they are often made use of in
the sequel； are here exposed； with the express purpose of noting that it happens with them as with
other distinctions and opposed aspects of reflection； they by virtue of their finite and dialectic
character pass over into their opposites。 For imagination and understanding the meanings of
antithetic phases are not convertible； because their identity is still internal。 But in will； on the
contrary； these phases； which ought to be at once abstract and yet also sides of that which can be
known only as concrete； lead of themselves to identity； and to an exchange of meaning。 To the
understanding this is unintelligible。 Thus； e。g。； the will； as a freedom which exists in itself； is
subjectivity itself； thus subjectivity is the conception of the will； and therefore its objectivity。 But
subjectivity is finite in opposition to objectivity； yet in this opposition the will is ＇lot isolated； but in
intricate union with the object ； and thus its finitude consists quite as much in its not being
subjective； etc。 What in the sequel is to be meant by the subjective or the objective side of the will；
has each time to be made clear from the context； which will supply their positions in relation to the
totality。
Addition。 It is ordinarily supposed that subjective and objective are blank opposites ； but this is
not the case。 Rather do they pass into one another； for they are not abstract aspects like positive
and negative； but have already a concrete significance。 To consider in the first instance the
expression 〃subjective；〃 this may mean an end which is merely the end of a certain subject。 In this
sense a poor work of art； that is not adequate to the thing is merely subjective。 But； further； this
expression may point to the content of the will； and is then of about the same meaning as
capricious； the subjective content then is that which belongs merely to the subject。 In this sense
bad acts are merely subjective。 Further； the pure； empty I may be called subjective； as it has only
itself as an object； and possesses the power of abstraction from all further content。 Subjectivity
has； moreover； a wholly particular and correct meaning in accordance with which anything； in
order to win recognition from me； has to become mine and seek validity in me。 This is the infinite
avarice of subjectivity； eager to comprehend and consume everything within the simple and pure I。
Similarly we may take the objective in different ways。 By it we may understand anything to which
we give existence in contrast to ourselves； whether it be an actual thing or a mere thought； which
we place over against ourselves。 By it also we understand the direct reality； in which the end is to
be realised。 Although the end itself is quite particular and subjective； we yet name it objective after
it has made its appearance。 Further； the objective will is also that in which truth is； thus； God's will；
the ethical will also； are objective。 Lastly； we may call the will objective； when it is wholly
submerged in its object； as； e。g。； the child's will； which is confiding and without subjective
freedom； and the slave's will； which does not know itself as free； and is thus a will…less will。 In this
sense any will is objective； if it is guided in its action by a foreign authority； and has not yet
completed the infinite return into itself。
§ 27。
The absolute character or； if you like； the absolute impulse of the free spirit （§
21） is； as has been observed； that its freedom shall be for it an object。 It is to be
objective in a two…fold sense： it is the rational system of itself； and this system is
to be directly real （§ 26）。 There is thus actualised as idea what the will is
implicitly。 Hence； the abstract conception of the idea of the will is in general the
free will which wills the free will。
§ 28。
The activity of the will； directed to the task of transcending the contradiction
between subjectivity and objectivity； of transferring its end from subjectivity into
objectivity； and yet while in objectivity of remaining with itself； is beyond the
formal method of consciousness （§ 8）； in which objectivity is only direct
actuality。 This activity is the essential development of the substantive content of
the idea （§ 21）。 In this development the conception moulds the idea； which is in
the first instance abstract； into the totality of a system。 This totality as substantive
is independent of the opposition between mere subjective end and its realisation；
and in both of these forms is the same。
§ 29。
That a reality is the realisation of the free will； this is what is meant by a right。
Right； therefore； is； in general； freedom as idea。
Remark： In the Kantian doctrine （Introduction to Kant's Theory of Right）； now generally
accepted； 〃th