Right； therefore； is； in general； freedom as idea。
Remark： In the Kantian doctrine （Introduction to Kant's Theory of Right）； now generally
accepted； 〃the； highest factor is a limitation of my freedom or caprice； in order that it may be able
to subsist alongside of every other individual's caprice in accordance with a universal law。〃 This
doctrine contains only a negative phase； that of limitation。 And besides； the positive phase； the
universal law or so…called law of reason； consisting in the agreement of the caprice of one with that
of another； goes beyond the well…known formal identity and the proposition of contradiction。 The
definition of right； just quoted； contains the view which has especially since Rousseau spread
widely。 According to this view neither the absolute and rational will； nor the true spirit； but the will
and spirit of the particular individual in their peculiar caprice； are the substantive and primary basis。
When once this principle is accepted； the rational can announce itself only as limiting this freedom。
Hence it is not an inherent rationality； but only a mere external and formal universal。 This view is
accordingly devoid of speculative thought； and is rejected by the philosophic conception。 In the
minds of men and in the actual world it has assumed a shape； whose horror is without a parallel；
except in the shallowness of the thoughts upon which it was founded。
§ 30。
Right in general is something holy； because it is the embodiment of the absolute
conception and self…conscious freedom。 But the formalism of right； and after a
while of duty also； is due to distinctions arising out of the development of the
conception of freedom。 In contrast with the more formal； abstract and limited
right； there is that sphere or stage of the spirit； in which spirit has brought to
definite actuality the further elements contained in the idea。 This stage is the
richer and more concrete； it is truly universal and has therefore a higher right。
Remark： Every step in the development of the idea of freedom has its peculiar right； because it
is the embodiment of a phase of freedom。 When morality and ethical life are spoken of in
opposition to right； only the first or formal right of the abstract personality is meant。 Morality；
ethical life； a state…interest； are every one a special right； because each of these is a definite
realisation of freedom。 They can come into collision only in so far as they occupy the same plane。
If the moral standpoint of spirit were not also a right and one of the forms of freedom； it could not
collide with the right of personality or any other right。 A right contains the conception of freedom
which is the highest phase of spirit； and in opposition to it any other kind of thing is lacking in real
substance。 Yet collision also implies a limit and a subordination of one phase to another。 Only the
right of the world…spirit is the unlimited absolute。
§ 31。
The scientific method by which the conception is self…evolved； and its phases
self…developed and self…produced； is not first of all an assurance that certain
relations are given from somewhere or other； and then the application to this
foreign material of the universal。 The true process is found in the logic； and here
is presupposed。
Remark： The efficient or motive principle； which is not merely the analysis but the production of
the several elements of the universal； I call dialectic。 Dialectic is not that process in which an object
or proposition； presented； to feeling or the direct consciousness； is analysed； entangled； taken
hither and thither； until at last its contrary is derived。 Such a merely negative method appears
frequently in Plato。 It may fix the opposite of any notion； or reveal the contradiction contained in it；
as did the ancient scepticism； or it may in a feeble way consider an approximation to truth； or
modern half…and…half attainment of it； as its goal。 But the higher dialectic of the conception does
not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and opposite； but produces out of this negative a
positive content and result。 Only by such a course is there development and inherent progress。
Hence this dialectic is not the external agency of subjective thinking； but the private soul of the
content； which unfolds its branches and fruit organically。 Thought regards this development of the
idea and of the peculiar activity of the reason of the idea as only subjective； but is on its side
unable to make any addition。 To consider anything rationally is not to bring reason to it from the
outside； and work it up in this way； but to count it as itself reasonable。 Here it is spirit in its
freedom； the summit of self…conscious reason； which gives itself actuality； and produces itself as
the existing world。 The business of science is simply to bring the specific work of the reason；
which is in the thing； to consciousness。
§ 32。
The phases of the development of the conception are themselves conceptions。
And yet； because the conception is essentially the idea； they have the form of
manifestations。 Hence the sequence of the conceptions； which arise in this way； is
at the same time a sequence of realisations； and are to be by science so
considered。
Remark： In a speculative sense the way； in which a conception is manifested in reality； is
identical with a definite phase of the conception。 But it is noteworthy that； in the scientific
development of the idea； the elements； which result in a further definite form； although preceding
this result as phases of the conception； do not in the temporal development go before it as
concrete realisations。 Thus； as will be seen later； that stage of the idea which is the family
presupposes phases of the conception； whose result it is。 But that these internal presuppositions
should be present in such visible realisations as right of property； contract； morality； etc。； this is the
other side of the process； which only in a highly developed civilisation has attained to a specific
realisation of its elements。
Addition。 The idea must always go on determining itself within itself； since at the beginning it is
only abstract conception。 However； this initial abstract conception is never given up； but only
becomes inwardly richer； the last phase being the richest。 The earlier and merely implicit phases
reach in this way free self…dependence； but in such a manner that the conception remains the soul
which holds everything together； and only through a procedure immanent within itself arrives at its
own distinctions。 Hence the last phase falls again into a unity with the first； and it cannot be said
that the conception ever comes to something new。 Although the elements of the conception appear
to have fallen apart when they enter reality； this is only a mere appearance。 Its superficial character
is revealed in the process； since all the particulars finally turn back again into the conception of the
universal。 The empirical sciences usually analyse what they find in pictorial ideas； and if the
individual is successfully brought back to the general； the general property is then called the
conception。 But this is not our procedure。 We desire only to observe how the conception
determines itself； and compels us to keep at a distance everything of our own spinning and
thinking。 But what we get in this way is one series of thoughts and another series of realised forms。
As to these two series； it may happen that the order of time of the actual manifestations is partly
different from the order of the conception。 Thus it cannot； e。g。； be said that property existed
before the family； and yet； in spite of that it is discussed before the family is discussed。 The
question might also be raised here； Why do we not begin with the highest； i。e。； with concrete truth
？ The answer is； because we desire to see truth in the form of a result； and it is an essential part of
the process to conceive the conception first of all as abstract。 The actual series of realisations of
the conception is thus for us in due course as follows； even although in actuality the order should
be the same。 Our process is this； that the abstract forms reveal themselves not as self … subsistent
but as untrue。
Division of the Work。
§ 33。
According to the stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will；
A。 The will is direct or immediate； its conception is therefore； abstract； i。e。；
personality； and its embodied reality is a direct external thing。 This is the sphere
of abstract or formal right。
B。 The will； passing out of external reality； turns back into itself。 Its phase is
subjective individuality； and it is contrasted with the universal。 This universal is
on its internal side the good； and on its external side a presented world； and these
two sides are occasioned only by means of each other。 In this sphere the idea is
divided； and exists in separate elements。 The right of the subjective will is in a
relation of contrast to the right of the world； or the right of the idea。