revenge。 If he were； he would be an animal which would have to be knocked on the head as
dangerous and unsafe because of its liability to fits of madness。
The claim is made that the criminal in the moment of his action must have had a 'clear idea' of the
wrong and its culpability before it can be imputed to him as a crime。 At first sight； this claim seems
to preserve the right of his subjectivity； but the truth is that it deprives him of his indwelling nature
as intelligent； a nature whose effective presence is not confined to the 'clear ideas' of Wolff's
psychology； and only in cases of lunacy is it so deranged as to be divorced from the knowing and
doing of isolated things。
The sphere in which these extenuating circumstances come into consideration as grounds for the
mitigation of punishment is a sphere other than that of rights； the sphere of pardon。
§ 133。
The particular subject is related to the good as to the essence of his will； and
hence his will's obligation arises directly in this relation。 Since particularity is
distinct from the good and falls within the subjective will； the good is
characterised to begin with only as the universal abstract essentiality of the will；
i。e。 as duty。 Since duty is thus abstract and universal in character； it should be
done for duty's sake。
Addition： From my point of view the essence of the will is duty。 Now if my knowledge stops at
the fact that the good is my duty； I am still going no further than the abstract character of duty。 I
should do my duty for duty's sake； and when I do my duty it is in a true sense my own objectivity
which I am bringing to realisation。 In doing my duty； I am by myself and free。 To have emphasised
this meaning of duty has constituted the merit of Kant's moral philosophy and its loftiness of
outlook。
§ 134。
Because every action explicitly calls for a particular content and a specific end；
while duty as an abstraction entails nothing of the kind； the question arises： what
is my duty？ As an answer nothing is so far available except： （a） to do the right；
and （b） to strive after welfare； one's own welfare； and welfare in universal terms；
the welfare of others （see § 119）。
Addition： This is the same question as was put to Jesus when someone wished to learn from
him what he should do to inherit eternal life。 Good as a universal is abstract and cannot be
accomplished so long as it remains abstract。 To be accomplished it must acquire in addition the
character of particularity。
§ 135。
These specific duties； however； are not contained in the definition of duty itself；
but since both of them are conditioned and restricted； they eo ipso bring about
the transition to the higher sphere of the unconditioned； the sphere of duty。 Duty
itself in the moral self…consciousness is the essence or the universality of that
consciousness； the way in which it is inwardly related to itself alone； all that is left
to it； therefore； is abstract universality； and for its determinate character it has
identity without content； or the abstractly positive； the indeterminate。
Remark： However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned
self…determination of the will as the root of duty； and to the way in which knowledge of the will；
thanks to Kant's philosophy； has won its firm foundation and starting…point for the first time owing
to the thought of its infinite autonomy； still to adhere to the exclusively moral position； without
making the transition to the conception of ethics； is to reduce this gain to an empty formalism； and
the science of morals to the preaching of duty for duty's sake。 From this point of view； no
immanent doctrine of duties is possible； of course； material may be brought in from outside and
particular duties may be arrived at accordingly； but ff the definition of duty is taken to be the
absence of contradiction； formal correspondence with itself … which is nothing but abstract
indeterminacy stabilised … then no transition is possible to the specification of particular duties nor；
if some such particular content for acting comes under consideration； is there any criterion in that
principle for deciding whether it is or is not a duty。 On the contrary； by this means any wrong or
immoral line of conduct may be justified。
Kant's further formulations the possibility of visualising an action as a universal maxim； does lead
to the more concrete visualisation of a situation； but in itself it contains no principle beyond
abstract identity and the 'absence of contradiction' already mentioned。
The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as the non…existence of this or
that nation； family； &c。； or the death of the whole human race。 But if it is already established on
other grounds and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected； then
indeed it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder； a contradiction must be a contradiction of
something； i。e。 of some content presupposed from the start as a fixed principle。 It is to a principle
of that kind alone； therefore； that an action can be related either by correspondence or
contradiction。 But if duty is to be willed simply for duty's sake and not for the sake of some
content； it is only a formal identity whose nature it is to exclude all content and specification。
The further antinomies and configurations of this never…ending ought…to…be； in which the
exclusively moral way of thinking … thinking in terms of relation … just wanders to and fro without
being able to resolve them and get beyond the ought…to…be； I have developed in my
Phenomenology of Mind。
Addition： While we laid emphasis above on the fact that the outlook of Kant's philosophy is a
high one in that it propounds a correspondence between duty and rationality； still we must notice
here that this point of view is defective in lacking all articulation。 The proposition： 'Act as if the
maxim of thine action could be laid down as a universal principle'； would be admirable if we
already had determinate principles of conduct。 That is to say； to demand of a principle that it shall
be able to serve in addition as a determinant of universal legislation is to presuppose that it already
possesses a content。 Given the content； then of course the application of the principle would be a
simple matter。 In Kant's case； however； the principle itself is still not available and his criterion of
non…contradiction is productive of nothing； since where there is nothing； there can be no
contradiction either。
§ 136。
Because of the abstract characterisation of the good； the other moment of the
Idea … particularity in general … falls within subjectivity。 Subjectivity in its
universality reflected into itself is the subject's absolute inward certainty
（Gewissheit） of himself； that which establishes the particular and is the
determining and decisive element in him； his conscience （Gewissen）。
Addition： We may speak in a very lofty strain about duty； and talk of the kind is uplifting and
broadens human sympathies； but if it never comes to anything specific it ends in being wearisome。
Mind demands particularity and is entitled to it。 But conscience is this deepest inward solitude with
oneself where everything external and every restriction has disappeared … this complete withdrawal
into oneself。 As conscience； man is no longer shackled by the aims of particularity； and
consequently in attaining that position he has risen to higher ground； the ground of the modern
world； which for the first time has reached this consciousness； reached this sinking into oneself。
The more sensuous consciousness ＇For the distinction between sense…consciousness and 'more
highly developed types of consciousness'； see Remarks to §§ 21 and 35。＇ of earlier epochs had
something external and given confronting it； either religion or law。 But conscience knows itself as
thinking and knows that what alone has obligatory force for me is this that I think。
§ 137。
True conscience is the disposition to will what is absolutely good。 It therefore has
fixed principles and it is aware of these as its explicitly objective determinants and
duties。 In distinction from this its content （i。e。 truth）； conscience is only the
formal side of the activity of the will； which as this will has no special content of
its own。 But the objective system of these principles and duties； and the union of
subjective knowing with this system； is not present until we come to the
standpoint of ethical life。 Here at the abstract standpoint of morality； conscience
lacks this objective content and so its explicit character is that of infinite abstract
self…certainty； which at the same time is for this very reason the self…certainty of
this subject。
Remark： Conscience is the expression of the absolute title of subjective self…consciousness to
know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory； to give recognition only to what it
thus knows as good； and at the same time