it is just this level of diremption which distinguishes man from the unreasoning animal； the point is
that the will should not rest at that level and cling to the particular as if that and not the universal
were the essential thing； it should overcome the diremption as a nullity。 Further； as to this necessity
of evil； it is subjectivity； as infinite self…reflection； which is present in and confronted by this
opposition of universal and particular； if it rests in this opposition； i。e。 if it is evil； then it is eo ipso
independent； regarding itself as isolated； and is itself this Self…Will。 Therefore if the individual
subject as such does evil； the evil is purely and simply his own responsibility。
Addition： The abstract self…certainty which knows itself as the basis of everything has in it the
potentiality either of willing the universality of the concept or alternatively of taking a particular
content as a principle and realising that。 The second alternative is evil； which therefore always
includes the abstraction of self…certainty。 It is only man who is good； and he is good only because
he can also be evil。 Good and evil are inseparable； and their inseparability is rooted in the fact that
the concept becomes an object to itself； and as object it eo ipso acquires the character of
difference。 The evil will wills something opposed to the universality of the will； while the good will
acts in accordance with its true concept。
The difficulty of the question as to how the will can be evil as well as good usually arises because
we think of the will as related to itself purely positively and because we represent its volition as
something determinate confronting it； as the good。 But the problem of the origin of evil may be
more precisely put in the form： 'How does the negative come into the positive？' If we begin by
presupposing that in the creation of the world God is the absolutely positive； then； turn where we
will； we shall never discover the negative within that positive； since to talk of God's 'Permitting' evil
is to ascribe to him a passive relation to evil which is unsatisfactory and meaningless。 In the
representative thinking of religious mythology there is no comprehension of the origin of evil； i。e。
the positive and the negative are not discovered in one another； there is only a representation of
their succession and juxtaposition； so that it is from outside that the negative comes to the positive。
But this cannot satisfy thought； which demands a reason and a necessity and insists on
apprehending the negative as itself rooted in the positive。 Now the solution of the problem； the
way the concept treats the matter； is already contained in the concept； since the concept； or to
speak more concretely； the Idea； has it in its essence to differentiate itself and to posit itself
negatively。 If we adhere to the purely positive； i。e。 if we rest in the unmixed good which is
supposed to be good at its source； then we are accepting an empty category of the Understanding
which clings to abstractions and one…sided categories of this kind and by the very asking of this
question makes it a difficult one。 If we begin with the standpoint of the concept； however； we
apprehend the positive as activity and as self…distinction。 Evil and good alike have their origin in the
will and the will in its concept is both good and evil。
The natural will is implicitly the contradiction of self…distinction； of being both inwardness and also
self…awareness。 To maintain then that evil implies the further point that man is evil in so far as his
will is natural would be to contradict the usual idea that it is just the natural will which is guiltless
and good。 But the natural will stands in opposition to the content of freedom； and the child and the
uneducated man； whose wills are only natural； are for that very reason liable to be called to
account for their actions only in a less degree。 Now when we speak of man； we mean not the child
but the self…conscious adult； and when we speak of good； we mean the knowledge of it。 It is
doubtless true that the natural is inherently innocent； neither good nor bad； but when it is drawn
into the orbit of the will which is free and knows that it is free； it acquires the character of not being
free and is therefore evil。 When man wills the natural； it is no longer merely natural； but the
negative opposed to the good； i。e。 to the concept of the will。
On the other hand； if it is now objected that since evil is rooted in the concept and inevitable； man
would be guiltless if he committed it； our reply must be that a man's decision is his own act； and his
own act is freely chosen and his own responsibility。 In the religious legend it is said that man is as
God when he knows good and evil； and it is true that this likeness to God is present in such
knowledge in that the inevitability here is no natural inevitability since on the contrary the decision
is really the transcendence of this duality of good and evil。 When both good and evil are placed
before me； I have a choice between the two； I can decide between them and endow my
subjective character with either。 Thus the nature of evil is that man may will it but need not。
§ 140。
In every end of a self…conscious subject； there is a positive aspect （see § 135）
necessarily present because the end is what is purposed in an actual concrete
action。 This aspect he knows how to elicit and emphasise； and he may then
proceed to regard it as a duty or a fine intention。 By so interpreting it； he is
enabled to pass off his action as good in the eyes both of himself and others；
despite the fact that； owing to his reflective character and his knowledge of the
universal aspect of the will； he is aware of the contrast between this aspect and
the essentially negative content of his action。 To impose in this way on others is
hypocrisy； while to impose on oneself is a stage beyond hypocrisy； a stage at
which subjectivity claims to be absolute。
Remark： This final； most abstruse； form of evil； whereby evil is perverted into good and good
into evil； and consciousness； in being aware of its power to effect this perversion； is also made
aware of itself as absolute； is the high…water mark of subjectivity at the level of morality； it is the
form into which evil has blossomed in our present epoch； a result due to philosophy； i。e。 to a
shallowness of thought which has twisted a profound concept into this shape and usurped the
name of philosophy； just as it has arrogated to evil the name of good。
In this Remark； I will indicate briefly the chief forms of this subjectivity which have become
current。
（a） In hypocrisy the following moments are contained：
＇a＇ knowledge of the true universal； whether knowledge in the form merely of a feeling for
right and duty； or of a deeper cognition and apprehension of them；
＇b＇ volition of the particular which conflicts with this universal；
＇c＇ conscious comparison of both moments ＇a＇ and ＇b＇； so that the conscious subject is
aware in willing that his particular volition is evil in character。
These points are descriptive of acting with a bad conscience； hypocrisy proper involves something
more。
At one time great importance was attached to the question whether an action was evil only in so
far as it was done with a bad conscience； i。e。 with explicit knowledge of the three moments just
specified。 The inference from an affirmative answer is admirably drawn by Pascal： Ils seront tous
damnés ces demi…pécheurs； qui ont quelque amour pour la vertu。 Mais pour ces
franc…pécheurs； pécheurs endurcis； pécheurs sans mélange； pleins et achevés； 1'enfer ne
les tient pas； ils ont trompé le diable à force de s'y abandonner。
Footnote： Lettres provinciales； iv。 In the same context； Pascal also quotes Christ's intercession on the
Cross for his enemies： 'Father； forgive them； for they know not what they do' … a superfluous prayer if the fact
that they did not know what they did made their action innocent and so took away the need of forgiveness。
Pascal quotes there too Aristotle's distinction between the man who acts ouk eidos and the one who acts
agnoon； in the former type of ignorance； his action is not freely willed （here the ignorance depends on external
circumstances； see above； § 117） and his action is not imputable to him。 But of the latter Aristotle says： 'Every
wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing； and it is this kind of
failure which makes men unjust and in general bad。。。。 An ignorant choice' between good and evil 'is the cause
not of the action's being involuntary' （of being non…imputable） 'but only of its being wicked'。 Aristotle
evidently had a deeper insight into the connection between knowing and willing than has become common in a
superficial philosophy which teaches that the opposite of knowledge； the heart and enthusiasm； are the true
principles of ethical action。
The subjective right of self…consciousness to know whether an action is truly good or evil in
character must not be thought of as so colliding with the absolute right of the objec