ethics and of man's supreme value； and is thus pronounced the supreme and the sacrosanct； at
another； all we have to do with is error； and my conviction is something trivial and casual； in fact
something strictly external； which may turn out this way or that。 Really； my being convinced is
something supremely trivial if I cannot know the truth； for then it is a matter of indifference how I
think； and all that is left to my thinking is that empty good； the abstraction to which the
Understanding reduces the good。
One other point。 It follows further； on this principle of justification by conviction； that logic requires
me； in dealing with the way others act against my action； to admit that they are quite in the right …
so far at any rate as they maintain with faith and conviction that my action is criminal。 On such
logic； not merely do I gain nothing； I am even deposed from the post of liberty and honour into a
situation of slavery and dishonour。 Justice； which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs； I feel only
as a foreign subjective conviction； and when it is executed on me； I fancy myself to be treated only
by an external force。
（f） Finally； the supreme form in which this subjectivism is completely comprised and expressed is
the phenomenon which has been called by a name borrowed from Plato … 'Irony'。 The name alone；
however； is taken from Plato； he used it to describe a way of speaking which Socrates employed
in conversation when defending the Idea of truth and justice against the conceit of the Sophists and
the uneducated。 What he treated ironically； however； was only their type of mind； not the Idea
itself。 Irony is only a manner of talking against people。 Except as directed against persons； the
essential movement of thought is dialectic； and Plato was so far from regarding the dialectical in
itself； still less irony； as the last word in thought and a substitute for the Idea； that he terminated the
flux and reflux of thinking； let alone of a subjective opinion； and submerged it in the substantiality of
the Idea。
Footnote： My colleague； the late Professor Solger； adopted the word 'irony' which Friedrich von Schlegel
brought into use at a comparatively early period of his literary career and enhanced to equivalence with the
said principle of subjectivity knowing itself as supreme。 But Solger's finer mind was above such an
exaggeration； he had philosophic insight and so seized upon； emphasised； and retained only that part of
Schlegel's view which was dialectic in the strict sense； i。e。 dialectic as the pulsating drive of speculative
inquiry。 His last publication； a solid piece of work； a thorough Kritik über die Vorlesungen des Herrn August
Wilhelm von Schlegel über dramatische Kunst und Literatur； I find somewhat obscure； however； and I cannot
agree with the argument which he develops。 'True irony'； he says； 'arises from the view that so long as man
lives in this present world； it is only in this world that he can fulfil his 〃appointed task〃 no matter how elevated
a sense we give to this expression。 Any hope we may have of transcending finite ends is foolish and empty
conceit。 'Even the highest is existent for our conduct only in a shape that is limited and finite。' Rightly
understood； this is Platonic doctrine； and a true remark in rejection of what he has referred to earlier； the empty
striving towards the （abstract） infinite。 But to say that the highest is existent in a limited and finite shape； like
the ethical order （and that order is in essence actual life and action）； is very different from saving that the
highest thing is a finite end。 The outward shape； the form of finitude； in no way deprives the content of ethical
life of its substantiality and the infinity inherent within it。 Solger continues： 'And just for this reason the
highest is in us as negligible as the lowest and perishes of necessity with us and our nugatory thoughts and
feelings。 The highest is truly existent in God alone； and as it perishes in us it is transfigured into something
divine； a divinity in which we would have had no share but for its immediate presence revealed in the very
disappearance of our actuality； now the mood to which this process directly comes home in human affairs is
tragic irony。' The arbitrary name 'irony' would be of no importance； but there is an obscurity here when it is said
that it is 'the highest' which perishes with our nothingness and that it is in the disappearance of our actuality
that the divine is first revealed； e。g。 again （ibid。； p。 91）：'We see heroes beginning to wonder whether they have
erred in the noblest and finest elements of their feelings and sentiments； not only in regard to their successful
issue； but also to their source and their worth； indeed； what elevates us is the destruction of the best itself。'
（The just destruction of utter scoundrels and criminals who flaunt their villainy — the hero of a modern tragedy
Die Schuld； is one — has an interest for criminal law； but none at all for art proper which is what is in question
here。） The tragic destruction of figures whose ethical life is on the highest plane can interest and elevate us
and reconcile us to its occurrence only in so far as they come on the scene in opposition to one another
together with equally justified but different ethical powers which have come into collision through misfortune；
because the result is that then these figures acquire guilt through their opposition to an ethical law。 Out of this
situation there arises the right and wrong of both parties and therefore the true ethical Idea； which； purified and
in triumph over this one…sidedness； is thereby reconciled in us。 Accordingly； it is not the highest in us which
perishes； we are elevated not by the destruction of the best but by the triumph of the true。 This it is which
constitutes the true； purely ethical； interest of ancient tragedy （in romantic tragedy the character of the interest
undergoes a certain modification）。 All this I have worked out in detail in my Phenomenology of Mind 。 But the
ethical Idea is actual and pregnant in the world of social institutions without the misfortune of tragic clashes
and the destruction of individuals overcome by this misfortune。 And this Idea's （the highest's） revelation of
itself in its actuality as anything but a nullity is what the external embodiment of ethical life； the state； purposes
and effects； and what the ethical self…consciousness possesses； intuits； and knows in the state and what the
thinking mind comprehends there。
The culminating form of this subjectivity which conceives itself as the final court of appeal — our
topic here — can be nothing except what was implicitly present already in its preceding forms；
namely subjectivity knowing itself as the arbiter and judge of truth； right； and duty。 It consists then
in this； that it knows the objective ethical principles； but fails in self…forgetfulness and
self…renunciation to immerse itself in their seriousness and to base action upon them。 Although
related to them； it holds itself aloof from them and knows itself as that which wills and decides
thus； although it may equally well will and decide otherwise。 You actually accept a law； it says； and
respect it as absolute。 So do 1； but I go further than you； because I am beyond this law and can
make it to suit myself It is not the thing that is excellent； but I who am so； as the master of law and
thing alike； I simply play with them as with my caprice； my consciously ironical attitude lets the
highest perish and I merely hug myself at the thought。 This type of subjectivism not merely
substitutes a void for the whole content of ethics； right； duties； and laws — and so is evil； in fact
evil through and through and universally — but in addition its form is a subjective void； i。e。 it knows
itself as this contentless void and in this knowledge knows itself as absolute。
In my Phenomenology of Mind； I have shown how this absolute self…complacency fails to rest in
a solitary worship of itself but builds up a sort of community whose bond and substance is； e。g。；
the 'mutual Asseveration of conscientiousness and good intentions； the enjoyment of this mutual
purity'； but is above all 'the refreshment derived from the glory of this self…knowledge and
self…expression； from the glory of fostering and cherishing this experience'。 I have shown also how
what has been called a 'beautiful soul' — that still nobler type of subjectivism which empties the
objective of all content and so fades away until it loses all actuality — is a variation of subjectivism
like other forms of the same phenomenon akin to the series of them here considered。 What is said
here may be compared with the entire section （C）； 'Conscience'； in the Phenomenology；
especially the part dealing with the transition to a higher stage — a stage； however； there different
in characters
Addition： Representative thinking may go further and pervert the evil will into a show of
goodness。 Although it cannot alter the nature of evil； it can invest it with a show of goodness。 Since
every action has a positive aspect； and since the category of good as opposed to evil is likewise
reduced to posi