every action has a positive aspect； and since the category of good as opposed to evil is likewise
reduced to positivity； I may claim that my action in its bearing on my intention is good。 Thus evil
has good linked with it not only in my consciousness but also if we look at my action on its positive
side。 When self…consciousness gives out； to others only； that its action is good； this form of
subjectivism is hypocrisy。 But if it goes so far as to claim that the deed is good in its own eyes
also； then we have a still higher peak of the subjectivism which knows itself as absolute。 For this
type of mind absolute good and absolute evil have both vanished； and the subject is therefore at
liberty to pass himself off at discretion as anything he likes。 This is the position of the absolute
sophistry which usurps the office of lawgiver and rests the distinction between good and evil on its
own caprice。 The chief hypocrites are the pious ones （the Tartuffes） who are punctilious in every
ritual observance and may even be religious to all appearance； while yet they do just as they
please。 There is little mention of hypocrites nowadays； partly because the accusation of hypocrisy
seems to be too harsh； partly； however； because hypocrisy in its naive form has more or less
disappeared。 This downright falsehood； this veneer of goodness； has now become too transparent
not to be seen through； and the divorce between doing good with one hand and evil with the other
no longer occurs； since advancing culture has weakened the opposition between these categories。
Instead； hypocrisy has now assumed the subtler form of Probabilism； which involves the agent's
attempt to represent a transgression as something good from the point of view of his private
conscience。 This doctrine can only arise when the moral and the good are determined by authority；
with the result that there are as many reasons as there are authorities for supposing that evil is
good。 Casuist theologians； Jesuits especially； have worked up these cases of conscience and
multiplied them ad infinitum。
These cases have now been elaborated to such a high degree of subtlety that numerous clashes
have arisen between them； and the opposition between good and evil has become so weak that in
single instances they appear to turn into one another。 The only desideratum now is probability； i。e。
something approximately good； something which may be supported by any single reason or
authority。 Thus the special characteristic of this attitude is that its content is purely abstract； it sets
up the concrete content as something inessential or rather abandons it to bare opinion。 On this
principle； anyone may have committed a crime and yet have willed the good。 For example； if a
bad character is murdered； the positive side of the action may be given out to be the withstanding
of evil and the will to diminish it。
Now the next step beyond Probabilism is that it is no longer a question of someone else's
statement or authority； it is a question only of the subject himself； i。e。 of his own convictions
conviction which alone is able to make a thing good。 The defect here is that everything is supposed
to fall within the orbit of conviction alone and that the absolutely right； for which this conviction
should be only the form； no longer exists。 It is certainly not a matter of indifference whether I do
something by habit and custom or because I am actuated throughout by the truth which underlies
these。 But objective truth is still different from my conviction； because conviction lacks the
distinction between good and evil。 Conviction always remains conviction； and the bad could only
be that of which I am not convinced。
Now while this obliteration of good and evil implies a very lofty attitude； there is involved in this
attitude the admission that it is subject to error； and to that extent it is brought down from its
pedestal into mere fortuitousness and seems undeserving of respect。 Now this form of subjectivism
is irony； the consciousness that this principle of conviction is not worth much and that； lofty
criterion though it be； it is only caprice that governs it。 This attitude is really a product of Fichte's
philosophy； which proclaims that the Ego is absolute； i。e。 is absolute certainty； the 'universal
self…hood' which advances through a course of further development to objectivity。 Of Fichte
himself it cannot property be said that he made subjective caprice a guiding principle in ethics； but；
later on； this principle of the mere particular； in the sense of 'particular self…hood'； was deified by
Friedrich von Schlegel with reference to the good and the beautiful。 As a result； he made objective
goodness only an image of my conviction； receiving support from my efforts alone； and dependent
for its appearance and disappearance on me as its lord and master。 If I relate myself to something
objective； it vanishes at the same moment before my eyes； and so I hover over a pit of
nothingness； summoning shapes from the depths and annihilating them。 This supreme type of
subjectivism can emerge only in a period of advanced culture when faith has lost its seriousness；
and its essence is simply 'all is vanity'。
Transition from Morality to Ethical Life
§ 141。
For the good as the substantial universal of freedom； but as something still
abstract； there are therefore required determinate characteristics of some sort and
the principle for determining them； though a principle identical with the good
itself。 For conscience similarly； as the purely abstract principle of determination； it
is required that its decisions shall be universal and objective。 If good and
conscience are each kept abstract and thereby elevated to independent totalities；
then both become the indeterminate which ought to be determined。 But the
integration of these two relative totalities into an — absolute identity has already
been implicitly achieved in that this very subjectivity of pure self…certainty； aware
in its vacuity of its gradual evaporation； is identical with the abstract universality
of the good。 The identity of the good with the subjective will； an identity which
therefore is concrete and the truth of them both； is Ethical Life。
Remark： The details of such a transition of the concept are made intelligible in logic。 Here；
however； it need only be said that it is the nature of the restricted and the finite （i。e。 here the
abstract good which only ought to ：be ＇but is not＇； and the equally abstract subjectivity which only
ought 'to be good ＇but is not＇） to have its opposite implicit within it； the good its actuality； and
subjectivity （the moment in which ethical life is actual） the good； but since they are one…sided they
are not yet posited in accordance with their implicit nature。 They become so posited in their
negation。 That is to say； in their one…sidedness； when each is bent on declining to have in it what is
in it implicitly — when the good is without subjectivity and a determinate character； and the
determining principle； subjectivity； is without what is implicit within it — and when both build
themselves into independent totalities； they are annulled and thereby reduced to moments； to
moments of the concept which becomes manifest as their unity and； having acquired reality
precisely through this positing of its moments； is now present as Idea — as the concept which has
matured its determinations to reality and at the same time is present in their identity as their implicit
essence。
The embodiment of freedom which was ＇a＇ first of all immediate as right； is ＇b＇ characterised in the
reflection of self…consciousness as good。 ＇c＇ The third stage； originating here； in its transition from
＇b＇ to ethical life； as the truth of good and subjectivity； is therefore the truth both of subjectivity
and right。 Ethical life is a subjective disposition； but one imbued with what is inherently right。 The
fact that this Idea is the truth of the concept of freedom is something which； in philosophy； must be
proved； not presupposed； not adopted from feeling or elsewhere。 This demonstration is contained
only in the fact that right and the moral self…consciousness both display in themselves their
regression to this Idea as their outcome。 Those who hope to be able to dispense with proof and
demonstration in philosophy show thereby that they are still far from knowing the first thing about
what philosophy is。 On other topics argue they may； but in philosophy they have no right to join in
the argument if they wish to argue without the concept。
Addition： Each of the two principles hitherto discussed； namely good in the abstract and
conscience； is defective in lacking its opposite。 Good in the abstract evaporates into something
completely powerless； into which I may introduce any and every content； while the subjectivity of
mind becomes just as worthless because it lacks any objective significance。 Thus a longing may
arise for an objective order in which man gladly degrades himself to servitude and total subjection；
if only to escape the torment of vacuity and negation。 Many Protestants have recently gone over t