that abstract good to which subjectivity adheres。 When we say： 'We want to be free'； the primary
meaning of the words is simply： 'We want abstract freedom'； and every institution and every organ
of the state passes as a restriction on freedom of that kind。 Thus duty is not a restriction on
freedom； but only on freedom in the abstract； i。e。 on unfreedom。 Duty is the attainment of our
essence； the winning of positive freedom。
§ 150。
Virtue is the ethical order reflected in the individual character so far as that
character is determined by its natural endowment。 When virtue displays itself
solely as the individual's simple conformity with the duties of the station to which
he belongs； it is rectitude。
Remark： In an ethical community； it is easy to say what man must do； what are the duties he
has to fulfil in order to be virtuous： he has simply to follow the well…known and explicit rules of his
own situation。 Rectitude is the general character which may be demanded of him by law or
custom。 But from the standpoint of morality； rectitude often seems to be something comparatively
inferior； something beyond which still higher demands must be made on oneself and others；
because the craving to be something special is not satisfied with what is absolute and universal； it
finds consciousness of peculiarity only in what is exceptional。
The various facets of rectitude may equally well be called virtues； since they are also properties of
the individual； although not specially of him in contrast with others。 Talk about virtue； however；
readily borders on empty rhetoric； because it is only about something abstract and indeterminate；
and furthermore； argumentative and expository talk of the sort is addressed to the individual as to
a being of caprice and subjective inclination。 In an existing ethical order in which a complete
system of ethical relations has been developed and actualised； virtue in the strict sense of the word
is in place and actually appears only in exceptional circumstances or when one obligation clashes
with another。 The clash； however； must be a genuine one； because moral reflection can
manufacture clashes of all sorts to suit its purpose and give itself a consciousness of being
something special and having。 made sacrifices。 It is for this reason that the phenomenon of virtue
proper is commoner when societies and communities are uncivilised； since in those circumstances
ethical conditions and their actualisation are more a matter of private choice or the natural genius
of an exceptional individual。 For instance； it was especially to Hercules that the ancients ascribed
virtue。 In the states of antiquity； ethical life had not grown into this free system of an objective
order self…subsistently developed； and consequently it was by the personal genius of individuals
that this defect had to be made good。 It follows that if a 'doctrine of virtues' is not a mere 'doctrine
of duties'； and if therefore it embraces the particular facet of character； the facet grounded in
natural endowment； it will be a natural history of mind。
Since virtues are ethical principles applied to the particular； and since in this their subjective aspect
they are something indeterminate； there turns up here for determining them the quantitative
principle of more or less。 The result is that consideration of them introduces their corresponding
defects or vices； as in Aristotle； who defined each particular virtue as strictly a mean between an
excess and a deficiency。
The content which assumes the form of duties and then virtues is the same as that which also has
the form of impulses （see Remark to § 19）。 Impulses have the same basic content as duties and
virtues； but in impulses this content still belongs to the immediate will and to instinctive feeling； it
has not been developed to the point of； becoming ethical。 Consequently； impulses have in common
with the content of duties and virtues only the abstract object on which they are directed； an
object indeterminate in itself； and so devoid of anything to discriminate them as good or evil。 Or in
other words； impulses； considered abstractly in their positive aspect alone； are good； while；
considered abstractly in their negative aspect alone； they are evil （see § 18）。
Addition： To conform to the ethical order on this or that particular occasion is hardly enough to
make a man virtuous； he is virtuous only when this mode of behaviour is a fixed element in his
character。 Virtue is rather like ethical virtuosity； ＇Heroes （'ethical virtuosi'） lived in uncivilised
conditions （see Addition to § 93） and there was no ethical life in society as they found it； but since
they introduced ethical institutions for the first time （see Remarks to §§ 167 and 203）； they
displayed virtue as a kind of virtuosity。 Nowadays； ethical life is common to everyone and consists
in conformity to the existing order； not in divergence from it。＇ and the reason why we speak of
virtue less nowadays than formerly is that ethical living is less like the form of a particular
individuals character。 The French are par excellence the people who speak most of virtue； and
the reason is that amongst them ethical life in the individuals is more a matter of his own
idiosyncrasies or a natural mode of conduct。 The Germans； on the other hand； are more
thoughtful； and amongst them the same content acquires the form of universality。
§ 151。
But when individuals are simply identified with the actual order； ethical life （das
Sittliche） appears as their general mode of conduct； i。e。 as custom （Sitte）； while
the habitual practice of ethical living appears as a second nature which； put in the
place of the initial； purely natural will； is the soul of custom permeating it through
and through； the significance and the actuality of its existence。 It is mind living
and present as a world； and the substance of mind thus exists now for the first
time as mind。
Addition： Just as nature has its laws； and as animals； trees； and the sun fulfil their law； so
custom （Sitte） is the law appropriate to free mind。 Right and morality are not yet what ethics
（Sitte） is； namely mind。 In right； particularity is still not the particularity of the concept； but only that
of the natural will。 So； too； at the standpoint of morality； self…consciousness is not yet mind's
consciousness of itself。 At that level it is only the worth of the subject in himself that is in question；
i。e。 the subject who determines himself by reference to good in contrast with evil； who still has
self…will as the form of his willing。 Here； however； at the standpoint of ethics； the will is mind's will
and it has a content which is substantive and in conformity with itself。
Education is the art of making men ethical。 It begins with pupils whose life is at the instinctive level
and shows them the way to a second birth； the way to change their instinctive nature into a
second； intellectual； nature； and makes this intellectual level habitual to them。 At this point the clash
between the natural and the subjective will disappears； the subject's internal struggle dies away。 To
this extent； habit is part of ethical life as it is of philosophic thought also； since such thought
demands that mind be trained against capricious fancies； and that these be destroyed and
overcome to leave the way clear for rational thinking。 It is true that a man is killed by habit； i。e。 if
he has once come to feel completely at home in life； if he has become mentally and physically dull；
and if the clash between subjective consciousness and mental activity has disappeared； for man is
active only in so far as he has not attained his end and wills to develop his potentialities and
vindicate himself in struggling to attain it。 When this has been fully achieved； activity and vitality are
at an end； and the result … loss of interest in life … is mental or physical death。
§ 152。
In this way the ethical substantial order has attained its right； and its right its
validity。 That is to say； the self…will of the individual has vanished together with
his private conscience which had claimed independence and opposed itself to the
ethical substance。 For； when his character is ethical； he recognises as the end
which moves him to act the universal which is itself unmoved but is disclosed in
its specific determinations as rationality actualised。 He knows that his own dignity
and the whole stability of his particular ends are grounded in this same universal；
and it is therein that he actually attains these。 Subjectivity is itself the absolute
form and existent actuality of the substantial order； and the distinction between
subject on the one hand and substance on the other； as the object； end； and
controlling power of the subject； is the same as； and has vanished directly along
with； the distinction between them in form。
Remark： Subjectivity。 is the ground wherein the concept of freedom is realised （see § 106）。 At
the level of morality； subjectivity is still distinct from freedom； the concept of subjectivity； but at the
level of ethical l