the level of morality； subjectivity is still distinct from freedom； the concept of subjectivity； but at the
level of ethical life it is the realisation of the concept in a way adequate to the concept itself。
§ 153。
The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is fulfilled when
they belong to an actual ethical order； because their conviction of their freedom
finds its truth in such an objective order； and it is in an ethical order that they are
actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner universality （see §
147）。
Remark： When a father inquired about the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct；
a Pythagorean replied： 'Make him a citizen of a state with good laws。' （The phrase has also been
attributed to others。）
Addition： The educational experiments； advocated by Rousseau in Emile； of withdrawing
children from the common life of every day and bringing them up in the country； have turned out to
be futile； since no success can attend an attempt to estrange people from the laws of the world。
Even if the young have to be educated in solitude； it is still useless to hope that the fragrance of the
intellectual world will not ultimately permeate this solitude or that the power of the world mind is
too feeble to gain the mastery of those outlying regions。 It is by becoming a citizen of a good state
that the individual first comes into his right。
§ 154。
The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is also contained in the
ethical substantial order； since particularity is the outward appearance of the
ethical order — a mode in which that order is existent。
§ 155。
Hence in this identity of the universal will with the particular will； right and duty
coalesce； and by being in the ethical order a man has rights in so far as he has
duties； and duties in so far as he has rights。 In the sphere of abstract right； I have
the right and another has the corresponding duty。 In the moral sphere； the right of
my private judgement and will； as well as of my happiness； has not； but only
ought to have； coalesced with duties and become objective。
Addition： A slave can have no duties； only a free man has them。 If all rights were put on one
side and all duties on the other； the whole would be dissolved； since their identity alone is the
fundamental thing； and it is to this that we have here to hold fast。
§ 156。
The ethical substance； as containing independent self…consciousness united with
its concept； is the actual mind of a family and a nation。
Addition： Ethical life is not abstract like the good； but is intensely actual。 Mind has actuality； and
individuals are accidents of this actuality。 Thus in dealing with ethical life； only two views are
possible： either we start from the substantiality of the ethical order； or else we proceed
atomistically and build on the basis of s ingle individuals。 This second point of view excludes mind
because it leads only to a juxtaposition。 Mind； however； is not something single； but is the unity of
the single and the universal。
§ 157。
The concept of this Idea has being only as mind； as something knowing itself and
actual； because it is the objectification of itself； the movement running through the
form of its moments。 It is therefore
（A） ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase — the Family。 This
substantiality loses its unity； passes over into division； and into the phase of
relation； i。e。 into
（B） Civil Society — an association of members as self…subsistent individuals in a
universality which； because of their self…subsistence； is only abstract。 Their
association is brought about by their needs； by the legal system — the means to
security of person and property — and by an external organisation for attaining
their particular and common interests。 This external state
（C） is brought back； to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State
which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the
public life devoted thereto。
Third Part： Ethical Life
i The Family
（a）： Marriage … （b） Family Capital … C： Children & Dissolution
§ 158。
The family； as the immediate substantiality of mind； is specifically characterised
by love； which is mind's feeling of its own unity。 Hence in a family； one's frame
of mind is to have self…consciousness of one's individuality within this unity as the
absolute essence of oneself； with the result that one is in it not as an independent
person but as a member。
Addition： Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another； so that I am
not in selfish isolation but win my self…consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence
and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me。 Love；
however； is feeling； i。e。 ethical life in the form of something natural。 In the state； feeling disappears；
there we are conscious of unity as law； there the content must be rational and known to us。 The
first moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self…subsistent and independent person and that； if
I were； then I would feel defective and incomplete。 The second moment is that I find myself in
another person； that I count for something in the other； while the other in turn comes to count for
something in me。 Love； therefore； is the most tremendous contradiction； the Understanding cannot
resolve it since there is nothing more stubborn than this point （Punktualit？t） of self…consciousness
which is negated and which nevertheless I ought to possess as affirmative。 Love is at once the
propounding and the resolving of this contradiction。 As the resolving of it； love is unity of an ethical
type。
§ 159。
The right which the individual enjoys on the strength of the family unity and
which is in the first place simply the individual's life within this unity； takes on the
form of right （as the abstract moment of determinate individuality） only when the
family begins to dissolve。 At that point those who should be family…members both
in their inclination and in actuality begin to be self…subsistent persons； and
whereas they formerly constituted one specific moment within the whole； they
now receive their share separately and so only in an external fashion by way of
money； food； educational expenses； and the like。
Addition： The right of the family properly consists in the fact that its substantiality should have
determinate existence。 Thus it is a right against externality and against secessions from the family
unity。 On the other hand； to repeat； love is a feeling； something subjective； against which unity
cannot make itself effective。 The demand for unity can be sustained； then； only in relation to such
things as are by nature external and not conditioned by feeling。
§ 160。
The family is completed in these three phases：
（a） Marriage； the form assumed by the concept of the family in its immediate
phase；
（b） Family Property and Capital （the external embodiment of the concept） and
attention to these；
（c） The Education of Children and the Dissolution of the Family。
A。 Marriage
§ 161。
Marriage； as the immediate type of ethical relationship； contains first； the moment
of physical life； and since marriage is a substantial tie； the life involved in it is life
in its totality； i。e。 as the actuality of the race and its life…process。 But； secondly； in
self…consciousness the natural sexual union…a union purely inward or implicit and
for that very reason existent as purely external …is changed into a union on the
level of mind； into self…conscious love。
Addition： Marriage is in essence an ethical tie。 Formerly； especially in most systems of natural
law； attention was paid only to the physical side of marriage or to its natural character。
Consequently； it was treated only as a sex relationship； and this completely barred the way to its
other characteristics。 This is crude enough； but it is no less so to think of it as only a civil contract；
and even Kant does this。 On this view； the parties are bound by a contract of mutual caprice； and
marriage is thus degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use。 A third view of marriage is
that which bases it on love alone； but this must be rejected like the other two； since love is only a
feeling and so is exposed in every respect to contingency； a guise which ethical life may not
assume。 Marriage； therefore； is to be more precisely characterised as ethico…legal （rechtlich
sittliche） love； and this eliminates from marriage the transient； fickle； and purely subjective aspects
of love。
§ 162。
On the subjective side； marriage may have a more obvious source in the
particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie；
or in the foresight