particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie；
or in the foresight and contrivance of the parents； and so forth。 But its objective
source lies in the free consent of the persons； especially in their consent to make
themselves one person； to renounce their natural and individual personality to this
unity of one with the other。 From this point of view； their union is a
self…restriction； but in fact it is their liberation； because in it they attain their
substantive self…consciousness。
Remark： Our objectively appointed end and so our ethical duty is to enter the married state。
The external origin of any particular marriage is in the lure of the case contingent； and it depends
principally on the extent which reflective thought has been developed。 At one extreme； the step is
that the marriage is arranged by the contrivance of benevolent parents； the appointed end of the
parties is a union of mutual love； their inclination to marry arises from the fact that each grows
acquainted with the other from the first as a destined partner。 At the other extreme； it is the
inclination of the parties which comes first； appearing in them as these two infinitely particularised
individuals。 The more ethical way to matrimony may be taken to be the former extreme or any
way at all whereby the decision to marry comes first and the inclination to do so follows； so that in
the actual wedding both decision and inclination coalesce。 In the latter extreme； it is the uniqueness
of the infinitely particularised which makes good its claims in accordance with the subjective
principle of the modern world （see Remark to § 124）。
But those works of modern art； dramatic and other； in which the love of the sexes is the main
interest； are pervaded by a chill despite the heat of passion they portray； for they associate the
passion with accident throughout and represent the entire dramatic interest as if it rested solely on
the characters as these individuals； what rests on them may indeed be of infinite importance to
them； but is of none whatever in itself。
Addition： Amongst peoples who hold the female sex in scant respect； marriages are arranged
by the parents at will without consulting the young people。 The latter raise no objection； since at
that level of culture the particularity of feeling makes no claims for itself。 For the woman it is only a
matter of getting a husband； for the man； of getting a wife。 In other social conditions；
considerations of wealth； connections； political ends； may be the determining factor。 In such
circumstances； great hardships may arise through making marriage a means to other ends。
Nowadays； however； the subjective origin of marriage； the state of being in love； is regarded as
the only important originating factor。 Here the position is represented to be that a man must wait
until his hour has struck and that he can bestow his love only on one specific individual。
§ 163。
The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the parties' consciousness of this unity
as their substantive aim； and so in their love； trust； and common sharing of their
entire existence as individuals。 When the parties are in this frame of mind and
their union is actual； their physical passion sinks to the level of a physical
moment； destined to vanish in its very satisfaction。 On the other hand； the
spiritual bond of union secures its rights as the substance of marriage and thus
rises； inherently indissoluble； to a plane above the contingency of passion and the
transience of particular caprice。
Remark： It was noted above （in § 75） that marriage； so far as its essential basis is concerned； is
not a contractual relation。 On the contrary； though marriage begins in contract； it is precisely a
contract to transcend the standpoint of contract； the standpoint from which persons are regarded
in their individuality as self…subsistent units。 The identification of personalities； whereby the family
becomes one person and its members become its accidents （though substance is in essence the
relation of accidents to itself）； is the ethical mind。 Taken by itself and stripped of the manifold
externals of which it is possessed owing to its embodiment in these individuals and the interests of
the phenomenal realm； interests limited in time and numerous other ways； this mind emerges in a
shape for representative thinking and has been revered as Penates； &c。； and in general it is in this
mind that the religious character of marriage and the family； or pietas； is grounded。 It is a further
abstraction still to separate the divine； or the substantive； from its body； and then to stamp it；
together with the feeling and consciousness of mental unity； as what is falsely called 'Platonic' love。
This separation is in keeping with the monastic doctrine which characterises the moment of
physical life as purely negative and which； precisely by thus separating the physical from the
mental； endows the former by itself with infinite importance。
Addition： The distinction between marriage and concubinage is that the latter is chiefly a matter
of satisfying natural desire； while this satisfaction is made secondary in the former。 It is for this
reason that physical experiences may be mentioned in married life without a blush； although
outside the marriage tie their mention would produce a sense of shame。 But it is on this account；
too； that marriage must be regarded as in principle indissoluble； for the end of marriage is the
ethical end； an end so lofty that everything else is manifestly powerless against it and made subject
to it。 Marriage is not to be dissolved because of passion； since passion is subordinate to it。 But it is
not indissoluble except in principle； since as Christ says； only 'for the hardness of your heart' is
divorce established。 Since marriage has feeling for one of its moments； it is not absolute but weak
and potentially dissoluble。 Legislators； however； must make its dissolution as difficult as possible
and uphold the right of the ethical order against caprice。
§ 164。
Mere agreement to the stipulated terms of a contrast in itself involves the genuine
transfer of the property in question （see § 79）。 Similarly； the solemn declaration
by the parties of their consent to enter the ethical bond of marriage； and its
corresponding recognition and confirmation by their family and community；
constitutes the formal completion and actuality of marriage。 The knot is tied and
made ethical only after this ceremony； whereby through the use of signs； i。e。 of
language （the most mental embodiment of mind … see § 78）； the substantial thing
in the marriage is brought completely into being。 As a result； the sensuous
moment； the one proper to physical life； is put into its ethical place as something
only consequential and accidental； belonging to the external embodiment of the
ethical bond； which indeed can subsist exclusively in reciprocal love and support。
Remark： If with a view to framing or criticising legal enactments； the question is asked： what
should be regarded as the chief end of marriage？； the question may be taken to mean： which single
facet of marriage in its actuality is to be regarded as the most essential one？ No one facet by itself；
however； makes up the whole range of its implicit and explicit content； i。e。 of its ethical character；
and one or other of its facets may be lacking in an existing marriage without detriment to the
essence of marriage itself。
It is in the actual conclusion of a marriage； i。e。 in the wedding； that the essence of the tie is
expressed and established beyond dispute as something ethical； raised above the contingency of
feeling and private inclination。 If this ceremony is taken as an external formality； a mere so…called
'civil requirement'； it is thereby stripped of all significance except perhaps that of serving the
purpose of edification and attesting the civil relation of the parties。 It is reduced indeed to a mere
fiat of a civil or ecclesiastical authority。 As such it appears as something not merely indifferent to
the true nature of marriage； but actually alien to it。 The heart is constrained by the law to attach a
value to the formal ceremony and the latter is looked upon merely as a condition which must
precede the complete mutual surrender of the parties to one another。 As such it appears to bring
disunion into their loving disposition and； like an alien intruder； to thwart the inwardness of their
union。 Such a doctrine ；。pretentiously claims to afford the highest conception of the freedom；
'inwardness； and perfection of love； but in fact it is a travesty of the ethical aspect of love； the
higher aspect which restrains purely sensual impulse and puts it in the background。 Such restraint is
already present at the instinctive level in shame； and it rises to chastity and modesty as
consciousness becomes more specifically intelligent。 In particular； the view just criticised casts
aside marriage's specifically ethical character； which consists in this； that the consciousness of the
parties is crystallised out of its physical and subjective m