into classes came about objectively of itself； because it is inherently rational； but the principle of
subjective particularity was at the same time denied its rights； in that； for example； the allotment of
individuals to classes was left to the ruling class； as in Plato’s Republic； or to the accident of birth；
as in the Indian caste…system。 Thus subjective particularity was not incorporated into the
organisation of society as a whole； it was not reconciled in the whole； and therefore — since as an
essential moment it emerges there in any event — it shows itself there as something hostile； as a
corruption of the social order （see Remark to § 185）Either it overthrows society； as happened in
the Greek states and in the Roman Republic； or else； should society preserve itself in being as a
force or as a religious authority； for instance； it appears as inner corruption and complete
degeneration； as was the case to some extent in Sparta and is now altogether the case in India。
But when subjective particularity is upheld by the objective order in conformity with it and is at the
same time allowed its rights； then it becomes the animating principle of the entire civil society； of
the development alike of mental activity； merit； and dignity。 The recognition and the right that what
is brought about by reason of necessity in civil society and the state shall at the same time be
effected by the mediation of the arbitrary will is the more precise definition of what is primarily
meant by freedom in common parlance （see § 121）。
§ 207。
A man actualises himself only in becoming something definite； i。e。 something
specifically particularised； this means restricting himself exclusively to one of the
particular spheres of need。 In this class…system； the ethical frame of mind
therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps； i。e。 the disposition to make oneself a
member of one of the moments of civil society by one’s own act； through one’s
energy； industry； and skill； to maintain oneself in this position； and to fend for
oneself only through this process of mediating oneself with the universal； while in
this way gaining recognition both in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others。
Morality has its proper place in this sphere where the paramount thing is
reflection on one’s doings； and the quest of happiness and private wants； and
where the contingency in satisfying these makes into a duty even a single and
contingent act of assistance。
Remark： At first （i。e。 especially in youth） a man chafes at the idea of resolving on a particular
social position； and looks upon this as a restriction on his universal character and as a necessity
imposed on him purely ab extra。 This is because his thinking is still of that abstract kind which
refuses to move beyond the universal and so never reaches the actual。 It does not realise that if the
concept is to be determinate； it must first of all advance into the distinction between the concept
and its real existence and thereby into determinacy and particularity （see § 7） — It is only thus that
the concept can win actuality and ethical objectivity。
Addition： When we say that a man must be a ‘somebody’； we mean that he should belong to
some specific social class； since to be a somebody means to have substantive being。 A man with
no class is a mere private person and his universality is not actualised。 On the other hand； the
individual in his particularity may take himself as the universal and presume that by entering a class
he is surrendering himself to an indignity。 This is the false idea that in attaining a determinacy
necessary to it； a thing is restricting and surrendering itself。
§ 208。
As the private particularity of knowing and willing； the principle of this system of
needs contains absolute universality； the universality of freedom； only abstractly
and therefore as the right of property。 At this point； however； this right is no
longer merely implicit but has attained its recognised actuality as the protection of
property through the administration of justice。
B。 Administration of Justice
a： Right as Law b： Determinate Law c： Courts
§ 209。
The relatedness arising from the reciprocal bearing on one another of needs and
labour to satisfy these is first of all reflected into itself as infinite personality； as
abstract right。 But it is this very sphere of relatedness — a sphere of education；
which gives abstract right the determinate existence of being something
universally recognised； known； and willed； and having a validity and an objective
actuality mediated by this known and willed character。
Remark： It is part of education； of thinking as the consciousness of the single in the form of
universality； that the ego comes to be apprehended as a universal person in which all are identical。
A man counts as ‘a man in virtue of his manhood alone； not because he is a Jew； Catholic；
Protestant； German； Italian； &c。 This is an assertion which thinking ratifies and to be conscious of
it is of infinite importance。 It is defective only when it is crystallised； e。g。 as a cosmopolitanism in
opposition to the concrete life of the state。
Addition： From one point of view； it is through the working of the system of particularity that
right becomes an external compulsion as a protection of particular interests。 Even though this result
is due to the concept； right none the less only becomes something existent because this is useful for
men’s needs。 To become conscious in thought of his right； man must be trained to think and give
up dallying with mere sensation。 We must invest the objects of our thought with the form of
universality and similarly we must direct our willing by a universal principle。 It is only after man has
devised numerous needs and after their acquisition has become intertwined with his satisfaction；
that he can frame laws for himself。
§ 210。
The objective actuality of the right consists； first； in its existence for
consciousness； in its being known in some way or other； secondly； in its
possessing the power which the actual possesses； in its being valid； and so also in
its becoming known as universally valid。
（a） Right as Law
§ 211。
The principle of rightness becomes the law （Gesetz） when； in its objective
existence； it is posited （gesetzt）； i。e。 when thinking makes it determinate for
consciousness and makes it known as what is right and valid； and in acquiring this
determinate character； the right becomes positive law in general。
Remark： To posit something as universal； i。e。 to bring it before consciousness as universal； is； I
need hardly say； to think （compare Remarks to §§ 13 and 21）。 Thereby its content is reduced to
its simplest form and so is given its final determinacy。 In becoming law； what is right first time not
only the form proper to its universality； but also its determinacy。 Hence making a law is not to be
represented as merely the expression of a rule of behaviour； valid for everyone； though that is one
moment in legislation； the more important moment； the inner essence of the matter； is knowledge
of the content of the law in its determinate universality。
Since it is only animals which have their law as instinct； while it is man alone who has law as
custom； even systems of customary law contain the moment of being thoughts and being known。
Their difference from positive law consists solely in this； that they are known only in a subjective
and accidental way； with the result that in themselves they are less determinate and the universality
of thought is less clear in them。 （And apart from this； knowledge of a system of law either in
general or in its details； is the accidental possession of a few。） The supposition that it is customary
law； on the strength of its character as custom； which possesses the privilege of having become
part of life is a delusion； since he valid laws of a nation do not cease to be its customs by being
written and codified — and besides； it is as a rule precisely those versed in the deadest of topics
and the deadest of thoughts who talk nowadays of ‘life’ and of ‘becoming part of life’。 When
a nation begins to acquire even a little culture； its customary law must soon come to be collected
and put together。 Such a collection is a legal code； but one which； as a mere collection； is
markedly formless； indeterminate； and fragmentary。 The main difference between it and a code
properly so…called is that in the latter the principles of jurisprudence in their universality； and so in
their determinacy； have been apprehended in terms of thought and expressed。 English national law
or municipal law is contained； as is well known； in statutes （written laws） and in so…called
‘unwritten’ laws。 This unwritten law； however； is as good as written； and knowledge of it may；
and indeed must； be acquired simply by reading the numerous quartos which it fills。 The monstrous
confusion； however； which prevails both i